立即发布
2003年11月28日

2002年10月关于伊拉克大规模杀伤性武器(WMD)的国家情报评估(NIE)在美国情报界历史上从未像其他产品一样被仔细分析过。我们重新检查了这份90页的文件中的每一个短语、每一行、每一句话、每一个判断和每一个观点，并完全追溯了它们的起源。�I believed at the time the Estimate was approved for publication, and still believe now, that we were on solid ground in how we reached the judgments we made.�

我仍然相信，任何一个理性的人都不可能浏览情报界掌握的全部信息——确切地说，是数百万页的信息——然后得出任何与我们得出的截然不同的结论或替代观点。�The four National Intelligence Officers who oversaw the production of the NIE had over 100 years' collective work experience on weapons of mass destruction issues, and the hundreds of men and women from across the US Intelligence Community who supported this effort had thousands of man-years invested in studying these issues.�

我要明确指出的是:国家情报评估报告高度确信伊拉克拥有化学和生物武器，以及射程超过联合国安理会规定的150公里限制的导弹，并适度确信伊拉克确实拥有这些武器不拥有核武器。�These judgments were essentially the same conclusions reached by the United Nations and by a wide array of intelligence services—friendly and unfriendly alike.� The only government in the world that claimed that Iraq was not working on, and did not have, biological and chemical weapons or prohibited missile systems was in Baghdad.� Moreover, in those cases where US intelligence agencies disagreed, particularly regarding whether Iraq was reconstituting a uranium enrichment effort for its nuclear weapons program, the alternative views were spelled out in detail.� Despite all of this, ten myths have been confused with facts in the current media frenzy. A hard look at the facts of the NIE should dispel some popular myths making the media circuit.���������

误解1:估计偏向战争包括NIEs在内的情报判断是政策中立的。�We do not propose policies and the Estimate in no way sought to sway policymakers toward a particular course of action.�� We described what we judged were Saddam's WMD programs and capabilities and how and when he might use them and left it to policymakers, as we always do, to determine the appropriate course of action.� ���

迷思2:分析师迫于压力改变判断，以满足布什政府的需要:在2002年10月的NIE中提出的判决是基于15年来获得和分析的数据。�Any changes in judgments over that period were based on new evidence, including clandestinely collected information that led to new analysis.�� Our judgments were presented to three different Administrations.� And the principal participants in the production of the NIE from across the entire US Intelligence Community have sworn to Congress, under oath, that they were NOT pressured to change their views on Iraq WMD or to conform to Administration positions on this issue.� In my particular case, I was able to swear under oath that not only had no one pressured me to take a particular view but that I had not pressured anyone else working on the Estimate to change or alter their reading of the intelligence information.

迷思3:聂的判断对国会来说是新闻在过去的15年里，我们对伊拉克大规模杀伤性武器问题的评估定期提交给六个不同的国会委员会，包括两个监督委员会，参议院情报金博宝正规网址特别委员会和众议院常设情报特别委员会。据我所知，在这个NIE之前，这些委员会从来没有来找过我们，担心有偏见或断言我们做错了

误解4:我们掩盖了分歧的观点，掩盖了不确定性在协调过程中，各个机构的不同意见都得到了全面审查，尤其是关于巴格达是否正在重建其铀浓缩努力，以及作为重建努力的一部分，伊拉克试图购买铝管的目的。美国国务院情报研究局(Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the Department of Energy)、能源部情报办公室(Office of Intelligence in Energy)和美国空军(US Air Force)提出了不同的观点展示了在《国家情报评估》中，并在有关该主题的非机密文件中得到承认。�Moreover, suggestions that their alternative views were buried as footnotes in the text are wrong.�� All agencies were fully exposed to these alternative views, and the heads of those organizations blessed the wording and placement of their alternative views.� Uncertainties were highlighted in the Key Judgments and throughout the main text.�� Any reader would have had to read only as far as the second paragraph of the Key Judgments to know that as we said:� "We lacked specific information on many key aspects of Iraq's WMD program."�

误解5:主要的NIE判断是基于单一的来源:大多数情况下，国家情报研究所对大规模杀伤性武器的主要判断是基于多种来源——通常是人类情报、卫星图像和通讯拦截。这种指控不仅是错误的，而且值得注意的是，它甚至不是一个有效的衡量智力表现质量的标准。�A single human source with direct access to a specific program and whose judgment and performance have proven reliable can provide the "crown jewels"; in the early 1960s Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy, who was then this country's only penetration of the Soviet high command, was just such a source.� His information enabled President Kennedy to stare down a Soviet threat emanating from Cuba, and his information informed US intelligence analysis for more than two decades thereafter.� In short, the charge is both wrong and meaningless.�

误解6:我们过于依赖联合国的报告，在1998年联合国核查人员离开后变得自满我们从来没有接受过联合国的报告。我知道，因为在20世纪90年代中期，我是美国情报支持联合国特别委员会和国际原子能机构的协调员。他们能够亲眼看到伊拉克正在发生的事情，包括我们只能从上面看到的设施内部的情况，这要求我们注意他们所看到的情况，并全力支持他们的努力。我们是否曾经拥有我们想要或需要的所有信息?�当然不会。�Moreover, for virtually any critical intelligence issue that faces us the answer always will be "no."� There is a reason that the October 2002 review of Iraq's WMD programs is called a National Intelligence ESTIMATE and not a National Intelligence FACTBOOK.� On almost any issue of the day that we face, hard evidence will only take intelligence professionals so far.� Our job is to fill in the gaps with informed analysis.� And we sought to do that consistently and with vigor.� The departure of UNSCOM inspectors in 1998 certainly did reduce our information about what was occurring in Iraq's WMD programs.� But to say that we were blind after 1998 is wrong.� Efforts to enhance collection were vigorous, creative, and productive.� Intelligence collection after 1998, including information collected by friendly and allied intelligence services, painted a picture of Saddam's continuing efforts to develop WMD programs and weapons that reasonable people would have found compelling.�

误解7:我们被尼日尔的“黄饼”故事愚弄了——这是国家报告的一个主要问题:这是�不这也是我们对核重建做出关键判断的原因之一。�In the body of the Estimate, after noting that Iraq had considerable low-enriched and other forms of uranium已经在这个国家——足以生产大约100枚核武器——为了完整起见，我们把尼日尔问题包含在适当的警告中。提到，在适当的警告，甚至未经证实的报告是标准的做法，在NIEs和其他情报评估;它帮助评估的消费者了解可能相关的全部智力。

误解8:我们高估了1991年低估大规模杀伤性武器的威胁�我们的判断是基于我们获得的证据和我们在过去15年里所做的分析。NIE指出，我们在20世纪90年代低估了萨达姆大规模杀伤性武器的关键方面。�We were not alone in that regard:� UNSCOM missed Iraq's BW program and the IAEA underestimated Baghdad's progress on nuclear weapons development.� But, what we learned from the past was the difficulty we have had in detecting key Iraqi WMD activities.� Consequently, the Estimate specified what we knew and what we believed but also warned policymakers that we might have underestimated important aspects of Saddam's program.� But in no case were any of the judgments "hyped" to compensate for earlier underestimates.

误解9:我们把快速动员项目当成了真正的武器:长期的化学和生物武器能力与能够迅速动员起来而几乎不可能被发现的武器之间的威胁实际上没有什么区别。该评估报告承认，萨达姆正在寻求快速动员能力，他可以在短时间内重振这种能力。�Those who find such programs to be less of a threat than actual weapons should understand that Iraqi denial and deception activities virtually would have ensured our inability to detect the activation of such efforts.� Even with "only" rapid mobilization capabilities, Saddam would have been able to achieve production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons in the midst of a crisis, and the Intelligence Community would have had little, if any, chance of detecting this activity, particularly in the case of BW.� In the case of chemical weapons, although we might have detected indicators of mobilization activity, we would have been hard pressed to accurately interpret such evidence.� Those who conclude that no threat existed because actual weapons have not yet been found do not understand the significance posed by biological and chemical warfare programs in the hands of tyrants.�

误解10:NIE宣称那里有“大量的大规模杀伤性武器储备”，因为我们没有发现它们，巴格达没有大规模杀伤性武器:从十多年前沙漠风暴结束时的经验来看，我们很清楚，批评者也应该清楚，在冲突后找到大规模杀伤性武器不是一件容易的事。我们估计伊拉克可能拥有100到500公吨的化学武器弹药。一百公吨可以装进一个后院的游泳池;500个可以藏在一个小仓库里。�We made no assessment of the size of Iraq's biological weapons holdings but a biological weapon can be carried in a small container.� (And of course, we judged that Saddam did not have a nuclear weapon.)� When the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), led by David Kay, issued its interim report in October, acknowledging that it had not found chemical or biological weapons, the inspectors had then visited only ten of the 130 major ammunition depots in Iraq; these ammunition dumps are huge, sometimes five miles by five miles on a side.� Two depots alone are roughly the size of Manhattan.� It is worth recalling that after Desert Storm, US forces在不知情的情况下在一个名为卡米西耶的设施销毁了1000多发化学弹药。�Baghdad sometimes had special markings for chemical and biological munitions and sometimes did not.� In short, much remains to be done in the hunt for Iraq's WMD.�

我们不知道ISG最终是否能够找到伊拉克化学和生物武器的实物证据，或确认其大规模杀伤性武器计划及其核野心的状况。�The purposeful, apparently regime-directed, destruction of evidence pertaining to WMD from one end of Iraq to the other, which began even before the Coalition occupied Baghdad, and has continued since then, already has affected the ISG's work.� Moreover, Iraqis who have been willing to talk to US intelligence officers are in great danger.� Many have been threatened; some have been killed.� The denial and deception efforts directed by the extraordinarily brutal, but very competent Iraqi Intelligence Services, which matured through ten years of inspections by various UN agencies, remain a formidable challenge.� And finally,在一个比加利福尼亚州还大的国家里，即使是在一个友好得多的环境里，找到体积小但极其致命的武器也是一项艰巨的任务但是现在我们有自己的眼睛在地面上，David Kay和ISG必须被允许完成他们的工作，我们正在进行的其他收集工作也必须被允许完成他们的工作。�And even then, it will be necessary to integrate all the new information with intelligence and analyses produced over the past fifteen years before we can determine the status of Iraq's WMD efforts prior to the war.� ��

对美国情报工作质量的指控，以及面对这些指控的必要性，迫使美国情报部门的高级情报官员花大量时间回顾过去。�I worry about the opportunity costs of this sort of preoccupation, but I also worry that analysts laboring under a barrage of allegations will become more and more disinclined to make judgments that go beyond ironclad evidence—a scarce commodity in our business.� If this is allowed to happen, the Nation will be poorly served by its Intelligence Community and ultimately much less secure.�从根本上说，情报机构将越来越面临不把这些点连起来，直到这些点变成一条直线的危险。��

我们必须牢记，寻找大规模杀伤性武器不能也不应该是关乎美国情报部门的声誉，甚至仅仅是寻找武器。�At its core, men and women from across the Intelligence Community continue to focus on this issue because understanding the extent of Iraq's WMD efforts and finding and securing weapons and all of the key elements that make up Baghdad's WMD programs—以免落入坏人之手——对我们的国家安全至关重要。�If we eventually are proven wrong—that is, that there were no weapons of mass destruction and the WMD programs were dormant or abandoned—the American people will be told the truth; we would have it no other way.

斯图·科恩是一名在中央情报局工作了30年的情报专家。2002年《伊拉克大规模杀伤性武器国家情报评估》公布时，他是国家情报委员会代理主席。