CONTENTS

List of Illustrations and Tables	ix
Member List xi	
Staff List xiii–xiv	
Preface xv	
Preface xv	

1. "WE HAVE SOME PLANES" 1

- 1.1 Inside the Four Flights 1
- 1.2 Improvising a Homeland Defense 14
- 1.3 National Crisis Management 35

2. THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW TERRORISM 47

- 2.1 A Declaration of War 47
- 2.2 Bin Ladin's Appeal in the Islamic World 48
- 2.3 The Rise of Bin Ladin and al Qaeda (1988-1992) 55
- 2.4 Building an Organization, DeclaringWar on the United States (1992–1996) 59
- 2.5 Al Qaeda's Renewal in Afghanistan (1996–1998) 63

3. COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES 71

- 3.1 From the Old Terrorism to the New:The First World Trade Center Bombing 71
- 3.2 Adaptation—and Nonadaptation in the Law Enforcement Community 73
- 3.3 ... and in the Federal Aviation Administration 82
- 3.4 ... and in the Intelligence Community 86

4.	4.1 4.2 4.3	ONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 108 Before the Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania 108 Crisis: August 1998 115 Diplomacy 121 Covert Action 126 Searching for Fresh Options 134
5.	5.1 5.2 5.3	AEDA AIMS AT THE AMERICAN HOMELAND 145 Terrorist Entrepreneurs 145 The "Planes Operation" 153 The Hamburg Contingent 160
6.	5.4 FRON	A Money Trail? 169 A THREAT TO THREAT 174
٥.	6.1	The Millennium Crisis 174
	6.2	Post-Crisis Reflection: Agenda for 2000 182
	6.3	The Attack on the USS Cole 190
	6.4	Change and Continuity 198
	6.5	The New Administration's Approach 203

... and in the State Department and the Defense Department 93

... and in the White House 98

... and in the Congress 102

7. THE ATTACK LOOMS 215

3.5 3.6

3.7

- 7.1 First Arrivals in California 215
- 7.2 The 9/11 Pilots in the United States 223
- 7.3 Assembling the Teams 231
- 7.4 Final Strategies and Tactics 241

8. "THE SYSTEM WAS BLINKING RED" 254

- 8.1 The Summer of Threat 254
- 8.2 Late Leads—Mihdhar, Moussaoui, and KSM 266

9. HEROISM AND HORROR 278

- 9.1 Preparedness as of September 11 278
- 9.2 September 11, 2001 285
- 9.3 Emergency Response at the Pentagon 311
- 9.4 Analysis 315

10. WARTIME 325

- 10.1 Immediate Responses at Home 326
- 10.2 Planning for War 330
- 10.3 "Phase Two" and the Question of Iraq 334

11. FORESIGHT—AND HINDSIGHT 339

- 11.1 Imagination 339
- 11.2 Policy 348
- 11.3 Capabilities 350
- 11.4 Management 353

12. WHAT TO DO? A GLOBAL STRATEGY 361

- 12.1 Reflecting on a Generational Challenge 361
- 12.2 Attack Terrorists and Their Organizations 365
- 12.3 Prevent the Continued Growth of Islamist Terrorism 374
- 12.4 Protect against and Prepare for Terrorist Attacks 383

13. HOW TO DO IT? A DIFFERENT WAY OF

ORGANIZING THE GOVERNMENT 399

- 13.1 Unity of Effort across the Foreign-Domestic Divide 400
- 13.2 Unity of Effort in the Intelligence Community 407
- 13.3 Unity of Effort in Sharing Information 416
- 13.4 Unity of Effort in the Congress 419
- 13.5 Organizing America's Defenses in the United States 423

Appendix A: Common Abbreviations 429

Appendix B: Table of Names 431

Appendix C: Commission Hearings 439

Notes 449