I am Walter Goad, Fellow Emeritus of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. At LANL, Fellow is a status recognizing scientific excellence outside the managerial ladder. I hold a PhD in Physics from Duke University. I have been awarded a Los Alamos National Laboratory Distinguished Service Award and am a Fellow of the American Physical Society and of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. I reside at 156 Santa Fe County Road 84C, Espanola, NM 87532. 沃尔特·戈德（Walter Goad）宣言
我加入了1950年末洛斯阿拉莫斯科学实验室的理论部门的工作人员，因为开发热核武器的崩溃计划正在进行中。第一次苏联原子弹测试后，杜鲁门总统下令坠机计划。我从杜克（Duke）出来的是我的教授洛萨·诺德海姆（Lothar Nordheim），他被爱德华·泰勒（Edward Teller）招募了一年。在接下来的十五年中，我是该团队的成员，他们开发了第一批热核武器和随后几代的热核武器。
Development of nuclear weapons is the work of many hands. Science, engineering, fabrication and testing are all necessary, and in all these efforts creating workable concepts is the key to success. At the core of the work is a team of theoretical physicists who must find workable concepts for the basic design of the weapon itself. They have to understand and analyze all the physical mechanisms and material behaviors involved in the explosion of the weapon, and with feedback from all the other groups involved, come up with the detailed design. I was a member of this core theoretical team at Los Alamos, contributing to every aspect of its work.
已故的J. Carson Mark是理论上的领导者，并以伟大的技巧和智慧为工作。否则，理论团队没有正式的层次结构。马克博士经常总结了我们工作的当前状态，勾勒出当前优先事项的观点，团队成员根据个人能力和兴趣遇到问题。核心团队通常平均有十几个人左右，有时会被诸如Enrico Fermi和Hans Bethe之类的著名游客增强。我们开发了基本方法，这些方法仍然构成了美国核设计工作的基础，包括计算机代码的早期版本。逐渐地，在1960年代，这项工作变得更加结构化，并形成了一个理论设计部门，这是当前X分区的前身。现在，正如目前的核武器努力所作证的那样，X-Division在一个高度结构化的组织中拥有数百名成员。
大约1960核weap与英国的合作ons effort, which had been suspended at the end of WWII, was reinstated, and for several years I served on Joint Working Groups whose mission was to see how we could now help each other. The U.K. effort was nearly as unstructured as our own. I feel that I have direct hands-on experience in two distinct nuclear weapons programs, experience with a breadth that is now rare.
自1970年左右以来，我主要从事计算生物学研究，尽管我继续感兴趣地遵循武器计划。
I have studied the indictment of Dr. Wen Ho Lee, and the transcript of his detention hearing before Judge Parker. I have also studied the testimony of Dr. Stephen Younger before Magistrate Judge Svet.
Dr. Younger before Magistrate Judge Svet, and then Dr. Paul Robinson before Judge Parker, testified in apocalyptic terms of danger to the U.S. strategic position posed by the computer codes and data copied onto tapes by Dr. Wen Ho Lee. My experience and expertise tells me that these assertions are exaggerations, grossly misleading in their import. As I explain more fully in the Appendix (which I incorporate in this declaration) the scientific knowledge and computational expertise required for nuclear weapons design is now widely dispersed. Therefore any nation with a substantial scientific establishment is capable of designing nuclear weapons on its own. Only a group already deeply engaged in the design of nuclear weapons could profit from the Lee tapes (if they still exist). At most, the U.S. codes and data could augment, not revolutionize, their efforts. Furthermore, changes in the world strategic balance require not just scientific expertise and information, but the commitment of extensive technical and industrial resources to the practical development, production, and deployment of weapons and weapons carriers.
鲁滨逊博士的证词，李录像带的损失可能会危害美国导弹防御，值得特别通知。在1950年代后期，我和Lew Allen博士通过核弹头携带反物质传播对导弹防御的核方面进行了首次评估。艾伦博士当时是空军队长。后来，他连续成为国家安全局和喷气推进实验室的空军参谋长兼董事。现在正在考虑的导弹防御系统不会使用这项技术，但是导弹防御的基本问题已经很明显。以非常低的成本，攻击导弹可以在飞行中的诱饵中部署或包裹雷达盾牌，从而有效地混淆任何防御。没有任何改变。对于任何开发用于核武器导弹载体的国家，先进的核武器设计可获得的增量进展基本上对这种导弹防御的基本问题没有影响。
Summing up, Drs. Younger and Robinson assert that in foreign hands the Lee tapes could reorder the world strategic balance, that their possible existence poses a danger equivalent to "betting the country" or leaving the "crown jewels" open to theft. From the perspective of my experience and expertise, these assertions represent unbridled exaggeration. The result is not a measured judgment of risk, but incitement of apprehension, even paranoia, that can override fairness and justice.
不幸的是，在参议员约瑟夫·麦卡锡（Joseph McCarthy）时代，我们的历史已经看到了其他例子，在这些例子中，危险夸大了美国传统的公平价值和正义的价值观，这对我这一代人的人们来说是令人难忘的。这些恐惧的水流总是令人困扰和破坏，在这种情况下，对表面上受到保护的非常军事科学的机构造成了特定且无法估量的损害。
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
2000年5月17日执行。
[signed]
沃尔特·戈德（Walter Goad）
APPENDIX New scientific discoveries in the 1920s and 1930s made nuclear weapons possible and by the onset of WWII this was widely understood around the world. The question was, could a workable weapon be built. Those who thought deeply about the problem knew, roughly, how to go about finding out. The U.S. succeeded by bringing enough scientific talent and industrial capability to the task, redirecting resources from other areas of military technology. The Germans seem to have failed because they thought a workable weapon could not be developed, and certainly not by the Americans. The biggest secret, that it was possible, was broken to the world by the detonations at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the years since, the technology of nuclear weapons has been widely publicized in magazine articles and books, and now on the Internet.
现在，在广岛的55年后，核武器设计师所需的基本数据和计算方法已被全球科学界带到了高度发展状态，而不是武器设计，而是基本的科学问题。在各种恒星和天文对象的结构和行为上进行了很多工作。科学家在这些和各种其他宇宙和地面环境中（包括核和热核反应器）追求了物质极端状态的行为。在大气和耦合海洋动力学的计算物理学中有很多工作。这些系统至少比核武器更为复杂，在许多方面更复杂。计算和物理分析的基本问题和技术在所有这些领域上无缝扩展。
And in all these endeavors, there have remained basic scientific problems of computability which cannot be solved by more computing power alone. These are typified by the problem of long range predictions of weather and climate, and extend to predictions of nuclear weapons behavior. This accounts for the fact that, after the enormous investment of effort over many years, weapons codes can still not be relied on for significantly new designs. This is testified to, for example, by Dr. Paul Robinson before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. He opposed the treaty on the ground that, to develop significantly new nuclear weapons, the U.S. required the ability to conduct tests.
In some corners of the world of relevant data, there are results from classified work in the U.S. that are of value in improving the accuracy of some of the computational modules of the U.S. weapons codes. These incremental improvements are of value, of course, but make marginal contributions to the overall reliability of the codes.
To pursue nuclear weapons development requires commitment by a substantial group of able scientists. The techniques and data needed are at hand in the scientific literature, but the group must come, by practice, to thoroughly understand them. (As Dr. Younger testified before Magistrate Judge Svet, "it is possible to run [the U.S. codes] and get the wrong answer"). To actually achieve results, the design group must be part of a much larger engineering and industrial-military complex. Dr. Younger suggests that such a group could train itself by studying the hundreds of thousands of lines of computer code included in the Lee tapes. I think this a particularly inefficient way of going about it, given all the fundamental information in the scientific literature, although to the extent that the databases accompanying the codes save effort needed to marshal relevant data, they could make a contribution to the design group's efforts.
No computer code is in itself a recipe to be relied on. Scientific judgment must deal with uncertainties in the relation of computation to reality in ways consonant with the particular priorities and resources at hand--reconciling reliability and safety, cost and availability of materials and manufacturing capabilities, suiting warheads to carrier design, and so on. Only a highly capable group would have any chance of using U.S. source-language design codes to find out how U.S. scientists deal with these uncertainties by appealing to test data. Although any group with limited manpower would find it a severe drain of effort to trace through and understand hundreds of thousands of lines of source code, it is possible that it could realize some advancement of its effort if it came to understand aspects of U.S. experience.
The extent to which test data is included in the Lee tapes has not been established in the testimony produced by the government. Nevertheless, in considering how such data might be used, we have first to remember that the U.S. designs its weapons in the context of a lavish nuclear-military industrial complex, almost unlimited in its capability; no particular U.S. design is likely to closely match another group's priorities. Second, as indicated above, the use of design codes to extrapolate significantly beyond tested designs is highly problematical. Thus, any group that relied on its understanding of U.S. experience from the Lee tapes alone would significantly expand the inherent uncertainties of its work. The Lee tapes might augment an experienced foreign design group's work, but not qualitatively change it.
我们可以两个relativ注意的条件ely poor nations, India and Pakistan, recently acquired nuclear weapons. Both possess substantial scientific establishments and were willing to commit the required resources. As dangerous as these developments are to the stability of the region, no one has argued that they affect the world strategic balance.
此前，中国测试了许多核武器。它拥有大量训练有素的科学家，其中许多在西方受过教育，并且至少有可能是建造武器和载体并维护它们的广泛资源。它转移世界战略平衡的能力取决于其为建造和维护武器和载体建造和维护所需的资源。就像美国一样，它无疑具有设计针对特定军事用途的武器，但具有自己的设计优先事项。由于上述所有原因，没有理由假设了解美国计算机代码和设计实践的知识可以适度地增强中国能力。
总而言之，通过扩散核武器而造成的情况确实很危险，但是没有理由假设使用Lee磁带上的数据进行解密和运行复杂的计算机代码可能会产生的差异不仅仅是边际差异。如上所述，尽管它的所有科学和计算能力，但美国仍然只能根据计算机代码取得渐进的进步。
Nevertheless, the U.S. classified literature, taken as a whole, contains a great deal of information acquired at great cost, and its protection is properly a national priority. These secrets are much more akin to ordinary industrial proprietary secrets whose loss could offer finite but valuable aid to a competitor than to crown jewels whose loss would be catastrophic.