On-The-Record Briefing: Anti-Corruption Efforts in Iraq

（edt下午3:15）

OPERATOR:Welcome, and thank you for standing by. At this time, all participants are on listen-only mode until the question-and-answer period of today's conference call. During the question-and-answer period, if you'd like to ask a question, please press *1 on the touchpad of your phone. You'll be asked to record your name prior to asking a question.

这时，我想把会议召唤给Tom Casey先生。先生，你可以开始。

先生。凯西：好的，每个人都好好下午。谢谢你在这里加入我们。正如我们所提到的，在伊拉克的反腐败努力的最后几周内出现了很多问题，这是我们自己和伊拉克政府在这项工作中工作的。我们想有机会让秘书长伊拉克特别顾问David Satterfield，与你谈谈我们的活动，我们一直在做什么，然后回答你可能拥有的任何问题。

所以，大卫，让我把它翻过来给你开放评论。

萨尔特菲尔德大使：谢谢，汤姆。我们希望尝试使用这作为一个机会来获取一些积分，所有这些都是在证明或响应各种Q的中制造或大部分所做的一点，因为这是在过去几对中所发生的周。但让我再次把它们送回你，也许有点更强的时尚。

First the issue here: Corruption in Iraq, public corruption, is a major issue. It is a very serious concern to us because of our concerns for the future of Iraq. It is a very serious concern to the people of Iraq, who are the first to suffer from it. It must be a concern for the Government of Iraq and it is formally identified as such.

This is a post-conflict country. It is a country which, as Ambassador Crocker has noted, is undergoing revolutionary transformation and change, the dynamics of which have oftentimes been violent, exacerbated by both internal and external divisions and pressures. It is not unusual for any state in such circumstances to find corruption a real, endemic, pernicious problem. It is certainly such a problem in Iraq.

It's not new. It has been an issue we have focused on for the last several years. We've worked to combat it through a variety of processes, through a variety of programs, working with Iraqis, working with PVOs and NGOs. But it is a slow and steady process. It is not something on which overnight progress can be made.

But I want to make very clear here, corruption is a reality in Iraq, it is a major problem and it is not one that we have ever attempted to diminish the importance of, to cover, to mask or to protect. Iraqis at every level have failed to put the nation's interest ahead of sectarian, tribal, personal, particularist agendas.

It doesn't mean every Iraqi political figure, every Iraqi person in a position of authority is corrupt. But it means this is a problem at all levels of Iraqi society.

现在，像他的前任一样，Maliki总理在他的政府中挫败了腐败和效率低下。他希望改变内阁，但伊拉克的政治现实是这样，现在这些变化尚未进行。他希望使这些变化的原因之一，因为对腐败令人担忧。

腐败，在一天结束时，人们在伊拉克，这是一系列动态的过程中的一个流程，正如我在开始时所说的那样。用于权限的持续的权力斗争，资源。这是我们在伊拉克的所有其他步骤中逐步解决的事情：建立更大的安全性和稳定;提高政府以透明的方式提供服务的能力;最重要的是，在结构，高效透明的地方获得预算执行过程。

And there we have made very significant progress over the course of the last year with cabinet budget execution going up from the low 20 percentage rate last year to what we estimate will be around 70 or 70 percent plus this year. The more effective, the more transparent the budgeting processes are at a national and a provincial level, the more corruption gets reduced. So this has got to be done. Security has to be improved. Stability has to be enhanced. The budgeting process at a local and national level has to be made more transparent. Progress on every one of those fronts, as I think you will know from other fora and other questions, many of which Ryan and David Petraeus answered, are improving.

但即使这些变化也是如此，这里仍有一个主要问题。现在，伊拉克人对此做了什么？我们是唯一一个关注的方吗？答案是不。伊拉克公众诚信委员会，CPI，已进行4,000多次调查。它制造了许多高级别的逮捕，包括石油部的劳动力官员的前部长。已转到伊拉克中央刑事法院的起诉超过2,000例。这就是伊拉克人所做的事情。更清楚地，必须做到。但在起诉这个问题方面，伊拉克人本身并没有从现场缺席。

Iraq had for years a major sink point of corruption in the way Baiji refinery, one of the country's primary refineries, was run. This year, Prime Minister Maliki, working closely with MNFI, ordered Iraqi forces, with our assistance, to replace the corruption-riddled civilian force that was guarding that oil refinery. Corruption there has been dramatically diminished, if not eliminated, and further steps have been taken to improve transparency in the oil sector. All of this is to the credit of an Iraqi Government trying to deal with a very significant problem that affects all of us of that country's society.

现在，我们做了什么（听不清）美国政府？我们的回应是逐步建立制定机构来打击腐败，并建立进入限制腐败可能性的管理机构的控制和程序：缓慢，稳定的过程。我们已经明确到他的所有部长总理到总统委员会向主席团致敬，即使我们在关键立法和改善该国治理的其他因素上致力于侵害伊拉克的严重关切。

我们曾与司法改革和技术培训能力建设合作，而不仅仅是预算执行，还涉及公共诚信委员会的能力，CPI进行工作。我们资助了司法居民法律顾问，美国检察官，他与伊拉克法院合作的严重案件，包括反腐败案件。最后，我们有顾问与大使馆自己的问责制和透明办公室合作，以便在董事会中提供支持到伊拉克反腐败实体。

我们支持多种PVOs和非政府组织都在花园dad and outside to focus on this issue and we have also supported work by international institutions, including the OECD, to help deal with this problem. That's what we've been doing.

现在，不可避免地，对腐败的任何讨论都必须转向今天山上所要求的大使馆工作文件或报告的问题。ReportsReports在公共场合有很多交换的国家是否在这个问题上不负责任，没有，已经或没有提供文件，是否有不恰当的文件的减少或不恰当地重新分类文件。而且我想尝试一致地携带这个过程的过程，但这是我们觉得仔细审视的东西。

We have to have concern as a U.S. Government entity about the unauthorized disclosure of controlled internal working papers that were never intended to make public. These are papers that contain sensitive information. It relates to our efforts to work in partnership with Iraqi officials to combat corruption.

When these papers were initially produced, they were improperly classified by those who were unfamiliar with classified procedures. We have repeatedly offered classified briefings and hearings to the committee, Chairman Waxman's committee, on these documents and the material in them. And to date, the committee has declined those offers.

当我们向委员会提供个人面试时，他们被提供为帮助委员会行使判决的手段。这并不努力让人们回答问题。这相反。它是提供信息。我们向该主题的国会提供了我们所要求的一切，我们将继续这样做。

But you have to understand what these documents are. They're not just internal working papers. They are not just documents which contain sensitive information, sources and methods or the individuals who could stand to be persecuted or prosecuted in return for their provision of information. There's something else, too. These are pieces of information. They are anecdotal accounts of an individual's views of what they believe may be going on with respect to corruption. They are provided to individuals within our embassy community. In many cases, this information is completely uncorroborated by us or by other Iraqis. The standing of the information, the accuracy, the comprehensiveness of the information is open to significant challenge. And that's fully appropriate for an internal document.

But these documents have been construed as complete, polished embassy reports and assessments which contain judgments which are actionable. And in fact, they're not. It's our concern for the ability to continue to effectively work the anti-corruption issue to preserve the sources who provide us information on this to allow us the opportunity to deliberate and work through whether there is corroboration or not. And we must exercise control in how these documents are handled.

But none of that means under the rubric of control -- withholding. It simply means there are appropriate fora in which this information can be discussed, in a closed vice open setting, and appropriate controls that need to be applied to the physical custody of the document itself. But it is not in any case a question of withholding or refusal to provide information.

We believe there's a very positive record if one looks at the last several years in terms of what the U.S. Government has attempted to do with respect to the corruption issue. We have not been shy and we are not shy now in addressing bluntly the magnitude of this problem. We will continue to make clear to all Iraqi officials, from the president of the republic to the prime minister on down, the criticality of moving against what is in reality a theft of Iraq's resources from Iraq's people.

But we do not believe that accusations that the Department of State has been concealing information, preventing information from being disclosed to the Congress, which has every right to inquire about these subjects, is accurate.

谢谢你。

先生。凯西：Okay, thank you, David. If we could now turn things over to questions, open things up, we'll see what is on people's minds.

OPERATOR:谢谢你。此时，如果您想提出一个问题，请在手机的触摸板上按* 1。在询问您的问题之前，您将被要求录制您的姓名。再次，那是* 1。拜托我们第一个问题的一刻。

谢谢你。Our first question today comes from Anne Gearan, Associated Press. You may ask your question, ma'am.

问题：Mr. Ambassador, you probably answered this, but the question of what was and was not reclassified in the one report that Chairman Waxman has written to Secretary Rice about, can you tell us a little bit about that decision -- when it was retroactively classified, how much of it was retroactively classified, and why?

萨尔特菲尔德大使：安妮，这里有几个报道，我认为，这是有问题的，我更ReportsReports愿意以更具体，更详细的方式回到这里和有问题。但我可以对你进行一般性评论。

当信息会挫败我们继续收集有关这一主题的信息的信息，或者包括与范围中的机构相反的指控，我们认为分类是合适的。这是一个相对较小的重新分析，而且，您知道，将取出什么。但它确实攻击能够继续起诉反腐败活动，我们在这里需要提供一些保护。

问题：Can you quantify that any more than relatively minor redaction?

萨尔特菲尔德大使：I really can't in terms of telling you it's 20 words out of 10,000 words or, you know, a sentence out of 48. I can't give you that. But it is a very minor redaction taken as a whole. But it is designed to protect the ability to continue to collect and to deal with this issue effectively and the specific question of personal allegations, because that's what these are, allegations, not proven facts.

OPERATOR:谢谢你。Our next question comes from John Donnelly withCongressional Quarterly。你可能会问你的问题。

问题：嗨，它是约翰唐纳利的Congressional Quarterly。你说你没有害羞地解决问题的程度，而你的担忧是关于个人信息，而不是在该特定报告中的个人信息。但是，在听证会上，我猜是在持续在监督和政府改革委员会之前的一周，巴特勒大使被问及关于伊拉克政府是否有政治意愿或腐败的能力，无论是maliki的政治意愿还是能力。政府正在努力改善腐败局势，是总理是否阻碍了任何反腐败调查。这些都是漂亮的广泛的问题。为什么你甚至不能在公开论坛中解决这种问题？

萨尔特菲尔德大使：好吧，我肯定可以告诉你，伊拉克任何政府的能力，这个或任何其他政府在伊拉克发挥目前的情况下解决这个问题并赋予了这个问题的广泛性质，这肯定会影响他们采取行动的能力。作为政府承认腐败问题的程度以及他们应该表演的事实吗？是的，他们这样做。我们是否看到政府的政治意愿，以防止腐败行动？广泛说话，是的。我们想看到更多吗？绝对地。那些非常清楚的反应。

When you get into more specific allegations regarding individual cases and individual actions, frankly, those are topics we were fully prepared to discuss more fully with the Congress, but they should be done in something other than a public setting. And we've offered that.

问题：你的回答有很多即将超过Ambassador Butler's was before the committee on (inaudible) very same issue.

萨尔特菲尔德大使：Well, I'm providing you a U.S. Government response.

问题：好的。

OPERATOR:谢谢你。我们的下一个问题来自Farah Stockman波士顿地球。你可能会问你的问题。

问题：嗨，谢谢你今天和我们谈谈。你谈到了马里基总理的愿望改变了他的内阁。他已经谈到了很多关于带来技术人员的谈话。你谈到这一点作为反腐败措施。你认为这可能实际上 - 他可能能够做到这一点吗？或者这只是未来的梦想吗？

萨尔特菲尔德大使：好吧，显然，我们相信伊拉克政府，伊拉克内阁应该尽可能有效。这是现在不是这种情况。这不是我们的判断力。这是总理的判断。我认为这将是伊拉克高级政治立场的判断。但部长委员会伊拉克内阁委员会在其具体的组成中，是一个出席了这一政府形成的先天政治环境的产物。反过来，他们今天反映了各种民族，宗派，伊拉克人体政治的境内政治化妆。我们非常支持总理的努力和愿望，看看拥有更高效，有效的内阁，当然是一个致力于其个性及其议程，违反腐败的斗争。

Whether or not that outcome will come sooner vice later, that I cannot tell you. But as a goal, it is a goal which is an important one and one that we would support seeing put forward as rapidly as possible. And in that, we fully share the Prime Minister's views.

OPERATOR:谢谢你。我们的下一个问题来自于苏先生与路透社。你可能会问你的问题。

问题：是否有担心，如果详细信息在Maliki政府内部出现腐败，那么他对他的信仰甚至会对他而言，他的身份（a）斗争腐败和（b）鼓励在伊拉克如此糟糕地需要的和解？

萨尔特菲尔德大使：Well, Sue, there's no question for any government in the world, including the current government of Iraq or indeed officials at any level in governance or authority in Iraq, whether in Baghdad or elsewhere, corruption is a violation of a public trust. And that concept very much does exist in Iraq. Certainly, it does not enhance the stature or the responsibilities that ought to be conducted by those officials if they are seen to be either protective of those engaged in corruption or engaged in corrupt practices themselves. And to the extent that the credibility of those in authority at any level in Iraq is diminished, that does affect broader national issues. But I'm not going to draw a point as broadbrush a conclusion as I think you were seeking in your comment -- in your question.

问题：在我的问题中，是的。因为国会的感觉是你是或国家部门是某种关于腐败的隐藏信息，因为你需要保护Maliki政府和各种加强手。

萨尔特菲尔德大使：外观，我会彻底拒绝。我们在伊拉克保护没有人。我们已经明确了这是伊拉克各级权威的可怕问题，而不仅仅是治理问题，而且有权获得资源，资金和权力的个人。由于任何手段，伊拉克并不是伊拉克的独特，但鉴于该国的情况，对美国政府特别敏感，因为我们对该国的人类生活和宝藏的投资特别敏感。

我们所希望的是保持继续有效地打击这个问题的能力，而不是掩盖而是打击它。并且有一些保护必须授予，而不是扣留信息但是关于信息的保护，如果我们被允许有效地前进。但要相信，美国政府隐瞒了重要信息，一些吸烟枪为目前的总理或其政府或其政府或更广泛的方面而言是根本不正确。

问题：Okay, thanks.

OPERATOR:谢谢你。再次，如果您想问一个问题，请在手机的触摸板上按* 1。您将被要求在询问您的问题之前录制您的姓名。那是你手机的触摸板上的* 1。稍等一会儿。

主席先生，此时我毫无疑问。谢谢你。

萨尔特菲尔德大使：谢谢你。

先生。凯西：好的，谢谢，大家。感谢您借此机会加入我们，大卫。非常感谢你。

萨尔特菲尔德大使：谢谢，汤姆。

2007/886.