U.S. Department of Defense
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
Press Briefing
March 18, 2014
Presenters: Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus, Principal Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Marcel Lettre, Admiral John Richardson and Dr. Paul Stockton
March 18, 2014
国防部长查克·黑格尔（Chuck Hagel）：早上好。我将让所有这些衣架登上他们的奇特座位，然后开始。Q: (OFF-MIC)
秒黑格尔：您知道，这就是我们喜欢的方式，您知道，将注意力转移到了真实的事物中。
好的。六个月前，国防部在华盛顿海军院子的无情暴力行为中失去了12名家庭。我说，当时，在部门安全性中存在差距或不足之处的地方，我们将找到它们，我们将纠正它们。
And accordingly today, I'm announcing steps DoD is taking to enhance physical security at our installations and improve security clearance procedures responding to lessons learned from this terrible, terrible tragedy. These new measures are based on the recommendations of two reviews that I ordered in the aftermath of the shooting, including an internal review, led by Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Michael Vickers, and an outside review, led by former Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Stockton, who is with us today, and retired Admiral Eric Olson.
Secretary Mabus, who joins me here this morning, also directed the Department of the Navy to conduct its own reviews of security standards, which complemented our work. I appreciate the hard work and the thorough analysis that went into all of these efforts by all of these people.
The reviews identified troubling gaps in DoD's ability to detect, prevent, and respond to instances where someone working for us, a government employee, member of our military, or a contractor, decides to inflict harm on this institution and its people.
To close these gaps, we will take the following actions recommended by the reviews. First, DoD will implement a continuous evaluation program of personnel with access to DoD's facilities or classified information, including DoD contractors, military and civilian personnel. While individuals with security clearances undergo periodic re-investigations, I am directing the department to establish automated reviews of cleared personnel that will continuously pull information from law enforcement and other relevant databases. This will help trigger an alert if derogatory information becomes available, for example, if someone holding a security clearance is arrested.
Second, the department will establish an insider threat management and analysis center that can quickly analyze the results of these automated record checks, help connect the dots, and determine whether follow-up action is needed. It will also advise and support Department of Defense components to ensure appropriate action is taken on each case.
第三，我们将在位于国防部情报副部长办公室内的单个员工助理下集中对物理和个人安全的责任。目前，这些职责在该部门的多个组成部分之间破裂。该行动将确定国防部中的一个人负责抵制内部威胁的领导努力。
第四，该部将加快国防人力数据中心的身份管理企业服务体系结构的发展。该计划将使国防部安全官员能够共享访问控制信息，并不断针对美国政府数据库进行审查。除了这些行动外，我们还审查了独立审核小组提供的其他三个其他建议的最佳方法。我们将确保在本月早些时候管理层和预算办公室完成的120天安全和稳定报告的更广泛的建议下，对这些想法进行了全面和认真的考虑。
首先，我们将考虑将持有秘密安全许可的人员数量减少至少10％，这是根据国家情报主任2013年10月指导的建议。其次，我们将考虑减少DOD对人事管理办公室进行的背景调查的依赖，并对将清算审查流程返回该部门的成本，效率和有效性进行全面分析。第三，我们将考虑制定更有效的措施来筛查新兵，进一步去污名化治疗，并确保国防部心理保健的质量。
I've directed Undersecretary Vickers to develop an implementation plan based on the recommendations of these reviews and to report back to me in June on the progress that has been made. Everything the Department of Defense is doing is supporting the broader government-wide review of the oversight of security and suitability standards of federal employees and contractors. That review was approved by President Obama earlier this month. That review was led by the Office of Management and Budget and the National Security Council, in coordination with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Office of Personnel Management.
I think we all understand that open and free societies are always vulnerable, but together we're going to do everything possible to provide our people a safe and secure workplace as possible.
Let me conclude by saying that our thoughts and our prayers go out to the victims and their families of that terrible day. We will continue to do everything we can to prevent such a tragedy from happening again. We owe them nothing less.
I appreciate your attention to this. And now let me ask Secretary Mabus to review with you the findings of his review and then I think, as you know, we have three individuals who will go into the details, the specifics of how we intend to implement these recommendations and these directives, so thank you.
马布斯秘书？
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY RAYMOND MABUS: Thank you, Secretary Hagel, good morning.
去年9月16日,整个海军family suffered a devastating tragedy at the Washington Navy Yard. For more than a decade, as a military organization, we've experienced the pain of combat losses, but six months ago, we lost 12 patriots who made the same sacrifice in the service of their nation, this time here at home.
今天，我们正在纪念这三个妇女和九名男子，我们正在释放对枪击事件的调查结果。在所有这些方面，我们的第一个关注是对于那些迷失的人和受伤的人及其家人。在过去的几天中，与家人在一起的海军联络人已经单独接触，为他们提供了这些信息。
Immediately following the attack, we conducted a number of rapid reviews and assessments of our bases and our policies. Based on these reviews, we've already made changes to improve physical security and protect -- force protection on our bases. Our units have completed self-assessments to ensure their own compliance and our departmental leadership has engaged directly with commanding officers around the world to stress their role in protecting our civilian and military personnel.
Where we identified issues with the security clearance processes that involved changes to broader government policy, we forwarded those recommendations through DoD to the appropriate agency and department. We worked closely with the reviews set up in DoD, which Secretary Hagel has explained, and with the broader government-wide review, supporting them with the information we had developed. We will implement as quickly as possible the recommendations laid out by Secretary Hagel, including the continuous evaluation program for security clearances.
我要感谢部长哈格尔unwavering support for Navy and our entire Navy family throughout and for ensuring that DoD's internal and external reviews built on our efforts. I appointed Admiral John Richardson, here today, to conduct an official comprehensive investigation in accordance with the judge advocate general manual, or a JAGMAN report, into the circumstances surrounding the Navy Yard shooting, to include a review of the policies and programs and how well that guidance was executed.
There are 11 major findings and 14 recommendations made in the JAGMAN report, which Admiral Richardson will speak in detail to. I've accepted all the recommendations, and they're in the process of being implemented. I also directed that additional actions be taken to strengthen the Department of the Navy's contractor requirements and to provide greater oversight on how a sailor or Marine's performance is evaluated and reported. A more detailed list of actions the department has taken recommended by our reviews and our investigations has been made available in written form to you.
I want to thank Admiral Richardson and his staff. They put in some very long hours and did an excellent job working against a very short deadline.
And I'd also like to once again express my gratitude to the first responders for their prompt reaction and critical actions that day. The naval security force, NCIS agents, local and federal law enforcement agencies, and agents responded to the active shooter situation with complete dedication and commitment to help the men and women of the Washington Navy Yard. They ran toward danger to protect their fellow Americans, a brave and selfless action.
在攻击之后，重要的是我们的反应要及时，强大和响应迅速。我授权为堕落和受伤的人，他们的家人，197号建筑物以及海军院子其他地方的人们以及整个海军受到影响的人的立即支持服务。当地社区和全国各地的支持是压倒性的，深深地，深深地赞赏的。
I appointed the Washington Navy Yard task force, led by Assistant Secretary of the Navy Denny McGinn, who is also here today, to ensure that that support was continuous and comprehensive. This task force will be in existence as long as needed to make sure that everyone in need has what is needed. Those who have participated in this response have been magnificent; including the casualty assistance calls officers, or CACOs, who've worked directly with the families since very soon after this event.
那些在海军院里工作的人也很宏伟。这次灼热活动仅两天后，我回到了海军院子，绝大多数人已经回到工作，确保我们继续拥有世界上最好的海军。那些受伤的人也恢复了工作。
We expect our sailors and Marines to go in harm's way. But even in a theater of war, the danger posed by an insider threat is insidious. In an office building near our nation's capital, it's almost incomprehensible, but sadly, as we saw, can be real. As Secretary Hagel said, we cannot completely eliminate this threat, but we can and will guard against these types of events by addressing these findings, even if doing so would not have prevented this attack, because it may prevent a future one. That is one objective of these reviews and investigations.
平行且同样有力的理由是为我们的海军家庭提供答案。对于他们来说，我们对他们的亲人，同事和朋友如何面对那天的可怕危险进行了清晰而透彻的审查。对于他们来说，向前看，我们将尽一切努力来维护他们的安全。
谢谢。
REAR ADMIRAL JOHN KIRBY: Okay, folks, we have three of the individuals -- the three individuals who conducted three of the reviews to come up here and take questions for you. We've got about 20 minutes to do that. Admiral Richardson, who conducted the Navy's JAG investigation, Mr. Paul Stockton, who along with Admiral Eric Olson, retire Admiral Olson, conducted the independent review, and then behind me is Mr. Marcel Lettre, who works for Mr. Vickers, and they worked on the internal review.
And I'm going to turn it over to them. I think they'll have just a couple of quick things to say at the outset, and then we'll start taking questions. I'll moderate the questions.
海军上将约翰·理查森（John Richardson）：谢谢柯比海军上将，所有人早上好。我是理查森海军上将。作为秘书秘书马布斯（Mabus）指出，我领导了贾格曼（Jagman）的调查。
This investigation began on September 25th and was completed on November the 8th. We examined during this effort the compliance with existing requirements at the time of the incident with respect to Aaron Alexis at the Washington Navy Yard. We executed the task with a team of 30 investigators and 10 support personnel. These people consisted of a range of subject matter experts, including force protection, government contracts, installation management, emergency management, medicine, and law. The investigation was given my top priority. And as I told the team, this effort was among the most important work going on in the Navy at the time.
我们沿五行组织了Jagman的调查。一条线是亚历克西斯的个人历史，包括他先前的兵役和平民就业历史。另一条线是旨在审查的人员安全计划，然后不断评估人员以获取适用于Alexis的机密材料的适用性。第三行是旨在防止未经授权访问华盛顿海军院子安全设施的部队保护计划。第四线是华盛顿海军院子的事件响应和紧急管理计划。最后，第五项努力解决了事件发生后的回应。
具体的细节拍摄,射手的s motive and the tactical response are the subject of ongoing criminal investigations and are not part of the JAGMAN. The investigation team reported out 11 major findings in five areas and made 14 recommendations. The findings address the personal security program, as it applied to Alexis, the Washington Navy Yard force protection program, the Washington Navy Yard incident response and emergency management programs, and then, as I said, post-incident response.
The 14 report recommendations encompassed immediate actions to improve the personnel security program execution by Navy organizations and contractors, to improve the Navy's capability against all threats, with the focus on the insider threat to fill critical gaps in the force protection and emergency management programs on the Navy Yard.
And in closing, finally, and perhaps most importantly, I'd like to add my condolences to those already expressed for the victims and their families. I'll turn it over to Mr. Lettre.
PRINCIPLE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MARCEL LETTRE: Thanks, Admiral. As I was introduced, I'm Marcel Lettre. I'm the principal deputy undersecretary of defense for intelligence, Mike Vickers' deputy. Mike -- Dr. Vickers is the undersecretary for intelligence who is unavailable today. He's on an overseas assignment this week.
We were asked by Secretary Hagel on September 30th to conduct one of two reviews commissioned by Secretary Hagel, an internal review led by the USDI organization, and I want to thank Tim Davis, Steve Lewis and Theresa Ramsey, our director, deputy director and senior adviser in our Security Directorate, who led this review for us.
As Dr. Stockton will mention in a minute, Secretary Hagel also commissioned a second review, an independent panel that Dr. Stockton and Admiral Olson worked through over the last few months. Our focus was on two areas, installation security and on personnel security and the role of security clearances and security investigations. And as Secretary Hagel mentioned, we had four main recommendations, which he outlined.
In addition, most of the recommendations from the independent panel we found consistent with the work that we had concluded. And so a lot of those are not only consistent with, but incorporated into our four main points, as Secretary Hagel elicited in his opening comments.
Three additional recommendations that the independent panel put forward we have accepted as recommendations for further analysis. Again, Secretary Hagel mentioned those. It's been six months since the tragic events of September 16th last year when we lost members of our DoD family. In our view, it's unacceptable to have another event such as that occur. We're committed to reducing the risk of insider threat across the Defense Department and look forward to working hard, putting our best efforts forward to do so, and look forward to your questions.这样，我将其移交给保罗·斯托克顿（Paul Stockton），以简要介绍独立小组。
博士保罗·斯托克顿：谢谢，马塞尔。
正如马塞尔（Marcel）所提到的那样，任命退休的海军上将埃里克·奥尔森（Eric Olson）和我对其中一些相同的问题进行独立审查，并更大的仔细研究对改变美国的安全许可过程的挑战进行了更大的了解。金博宝正规网址我们首先提出论点 - 我敦促您获得报告的副本，因为我只在今天最少的概述条款中谈论它，国防部应替换基本的前提安装和人员安全背后。几十年来，该部门从外围的角度接触了安全性。如果我们加强外围，如果您愿意的话，请建立围栏，以防止另一侧的威胁，我们会很安全。这种方法已过时，破坏了，部门需要替换它。
Increasingly, threats -- cyber, kinetic, all threats -- they're inside the perimeter. What the Department of Defense should do is build security from within.
Admiral Olson and I in our independent review entirely concurred with the recommendations made by Undersecretary Vickers. As you heard from Secretary Hagel, we also went further and recommended three additional initiatives that the department will now be considering. First of all, it was our assessment that in the Department of Defense, far too many people have security clearances. Since 9/11, the number of those eligible for security clearances in the Department of Defense has tripled. And the department has gotten away from determining that personnel have a need to know that they need access to security clearance in the positions that they occupy.
我们敦促国防部继续前进，重新评估特定工作人员是否真的需要这些安全许可，我们认为可以在国防部清算人口的整体规模中大大减少，因此可以大大减少为了对仍然有许可的人进行评估和监视，我们将能够集中精力，并遵循Marcel和副部长Vickers建议的所有出色建议。
Second, we believe that there is more that can be done to further de-stigmatize those in the Department of Defense who seek mental health care. We need to do everything we can to ensure that personnel who want such care get access to it and are not punished for it.
独立审查有许多建议，以了解如何沿着这条道路继续前进，并进一步加强退伍军人管理局与国防部之间已经良好的关系，以确保我们的退伍军人获得所需的医疗保健。
And then, finally, we reached the conclusion that the department should reassess whether it wants to continue depending on the Office of Personnel and Management to conduct investigations, the background investigations that constitute the key step forward in granting security clearances. OPM is already making important improvements in the oversight that they conduct for the private-sector contractors that conduct these investigations. We believe that the department should take a deep look at the other models that exist, including the State Department's decision to be responsible for its own investigations.
There are big structural advantages to walking down that path, and so we've urged that the Department of Defense consider taking back to itself responsibility for conducting background investigations as the key step forward in granting security clearances.
报告中很多。我敦促您看看它。最重要的是，我要感谢奥尔森海军上将和我本人为解决这个关键问题的机会和荣幸，以确保我们能尽力而为，我们能够对华盛顿海军院子从未发生过的那种袭击，这是为了解决这个关键问题的机会和荣幸再次发生。谢谢。
后方。KIRBY: Okay, thanks. We've got time for some questions. We'll start with you, Bob.
问：鲍勃用AP燃烧。斯托克顿先生，一个问题，因为您提到了这一点，这是一种过时的建筑栅栏方法的一般概念，而不是在劳动力内寻找威胁。我的意思是，这使我成为一课，应该在某些方面回到9/11。这不是以前出现的东西吗？还是这对您来说是一个全新的概念？
博士斯托克顿：这不是一个新概念。我很荣幸能帮助领导对胡德堡事件的调查，并提出建议的发展，例如加强联邦调查局与国防部之间的信息共享。因此，已经取得了重大改进，包括秘书黑格尔已经做出的那些。这里的挑战是威胁继续加剧。也就是说，我们内部有网络威胁的内部，我们在国防部历史上没有历史的动力学威胁构成了我们应对的政策和计划。
We need to continue to strengthen those insider security initiatives in order to match -- in order to exceed efforts by our adversaries to attack us from within.
Q: Why do you say it's growing? Because of cyber -- why is the threat growing inside?
博士STOCKTON: Cyber threats are especially important. And here's a classic example, Bob. As the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security and other federal departments make sure that their perimeter security against SQL and other forms of cyber attack get stronger, then the incentives grow for adversaries to attack from within.
问：谢谢。
Q: Dion Nissenbaum of the Wall Street Journal. This is probably for Marcel. In terms of -- can you explain a little bit about how this continuous evaluation process would work? Does this affect everybody with any kind of security clearance? Is it going to be the kind of thing where if someone gets a restraining order or gets a divorce, that that will be flagged, and then they will be evaluated? And does this need some sort of approval from ODNI or somebody else before it can go forward?
在第二节下。LETTRE: Yeah, I'll mention a couple things, and then, Admiral Richardson, if there's anything from the Navy perspective to add, please feel free to.
只是从部门的角度莫re broadly, our current system of personnel security is based on a periodic re-investigation basis, five years, 10 years. The assessment is that that approach limits our ability to understand the evolution that may occur in a person's life that may have them evolve from a trusted insider to an insider threat.
通过持续的评估方法，我们将拥有一个系统，该系统将部分基于IT，但部分将依靠主题专家以及在调查能力上链接的能力，以便能够不断评估通过许多适当的渠道流入并在一个地方收集的信息，以确保可以获得洞察力，这可能与认为某些内幕威胁有关。
So I think it's important to mention that the continuous evaluation recommendation comes in conjunction with the recommendation to build up a DITMAC, a defense insider threat management and analysis center, where the function of conducting that evaluation would occur, as well as the necessary training and potential education for the workforce.
至于 - 关于这只是仅仅是国防部的方法还是在政府范围内更宽泛的方法，政府认为这是一种需要在政府范围内接受的方法。这就是为什么当您研究OMB今天发布的报告时，您会看到OMB报告中明确的重点是在政府之间运用连续的评估惯例以及强大的领导角色，即使不是确保有效实施此项的主导作用，在国家情报主任办公室。
Q: But does that affect everybody with clearance?
在第二节下。LETTRE: It is intended to affect everybody with clearance, yes, which in the DOD context, as you know, currently about 2.5 million individuals hold active security clearances. Implementation will have to occur over time. We have up to now studied continuous evaluation through research and development and through a pilot approach. We envision, as we build out the implementation of this, needing to continue to do pilots on an expanded basis and phase it in over time.
后方。KIRBY: (OFF-MIC)
Q: For any of the three of you, can you go into more specifics on how exactly DoD can de-stigmatize this issue of, you know, appealing for mental health help?
在第二节下。LETTRE: Paul, do you want to start from the perspective of the independent panel, and we can join in afterwards?
博士STOCKTON: It'd be a pleasure. The department has made great strides in de-stigmatizing the search for mental health treatment. I believe that the current standard security form, SF-86, some of us have filled those out, that asks you whether you seek mental health care, I believe that this question ought to be drastically changed. I believe that despite the best efforts of those who do the security clearance process to de-stigmatize those who seek mental health care, despite their best efforts, that question I don't believe gives us reliable answers. I believe self-reporting is inherently unreliable. There's no evidence that it's a valid way of understanding the degree to which mental health care is needed by a particular person.
And then, secondly, I believe we need to do more to reach out to those members of the Department of Defense community and ensure that they know that when they seek help for mental care issues, that is not -- repeat, not -- going to in any way affect their ability to serve. We need to go the extra mile, especially in today's environment, to ensure that that message gets through. Thanks.
在第二节下。LETTRE: I'll just add briefly, the department very much appreciates the work that Dr. Stockton and Admiral Olson did to incorporate some of this analysis into the independent panel's work. It is important as we move forward to think about the services that we can provide to both our military and our civilian workforce to help them as they determine they may need to seek mental health counseling. And we need to make sure that we do that in conjunction with, in parallel with the other efforts that we've undertaken here to deal with the insider threat challenge.
后方。柯比：斯宾塞？
Q: Thanks. Spencer Ackerman with the Guardian. To go back to Dion's question, what are the appropriate inputs for continuous evaluation? Will there be something that's limited to, you know, criminal arrests, that sort of thing, something more -- more than that? And what happens for those clearance-holders who over the course of, say, two years, five years, 10 years don't have any criminal arrest record or anything like that? Are they just monitored like they would normally be monitored right now?
在第二节下。lettre：最重要的是将进入连续评估系统的输入是在定期重新调查模型下将发生的相同的适当输入，因此我们有一个定期重新投资模型，可以重新审视该数据每五到十年设置一次。我们将在其第一个阶段进行连续的评估方法，在该方法中我们可以按需拉力来查询数据库。然后随着时间的流逝，随着系统的成熟，转移到模型和一种技术，该技术将允许在任何清除的个人上进行更多实现的时间拉或推动数据，以提高潜在的旗帜，以提高其成果和分析。为了...
Q: So you're not looking at additional inputs? You're just looking at a more efficient manner of accessing the data that you currently collect?
在第二节下。LETTRE：目前，我们是 - 我们将从当前模型下现在可以使用的输入开始。并不是说随着时间的变化，随着技术的变化，政府所推论的是对安全许可过程的有用意见，因为随着时间的流逝，我们要确保我们构建一个可以适应这些变化和实践的系统。
博士斯托克顿：我可以对此加一个点吗？您会在独立的评论中看到，我们确实提出了一个问题，即是否应该支持此持续评估过程的其他数据来源。我们提出了强有力的建议，如果国防部走下了这一途径，则采取了其他步骤，以进一步加强该过程中对隐私和公民自由的尊重，以及公平的信息原则制度，透明度，我们所拥有的相同原则在联邦政府总体上采取的FIP方法中，如果我们要提高我们评估人员的适用性或保留安全许可的程度，我们需要确保我们还继续加强对隐私和隐私保护和公民权利。
Q: Andrew Tilghman with Military Times. Admiral Richardson, can I ask, in your JAGMAN report, does it identify any particular individuals that were found to be negligent of performing their duties as described in the existing regulations in an unsatisfactory way that contributed to this? Or was this basically that you just identified some flawed policies?
amRICHARDSON: Well, what our report did -- our investigation did identify is that the primary responsibility and accountability for this incident rests with Aaron Alexis, who used his access to get inside the defenses and do harm to our -- his fellow workers.
Beyond that, the investigation was primarily focused on where the gaps in compliance were with -- as I said, with the personal security program, force protection, physical security, and incident response. We did identify gaps in all of those areas and laid those out in our findings according to three categories. The highest category would be those findings that if the proper procedures had been followed, the change of events that led up to the shooting on the 16th of September would have been interrupted.
这些发现主要涉及对亚伦·亚历克西斯（Aaron Alexis）工作的承包商的责任员工适合访问安装或信息的适用性，在这种情况下，应将这些问题确定为海军，并且这些要求未得到满足。他们确实观察到了这些行为，但没有提出这些报告，因此海军不可能对该信息采取行动。ReportsReports
The second category of findings concerned those that were the approximation of the finding was not as direct as in category A, where if proper procedures had been followed that may have interrupted the chain of events, those findings concerned oversight of the contractors' execution of the security program, earlier application of the personnel security program, early in Alexis' career.
然后，最终类别是这些发现，即使已经完成了适当的程序，它们也不会打断16日的事件链，而这些事件主要涉及力量保护，反恐措施，华盛顿海军场，以及紧急响应计划和事后响应。
后方。KIRBY: (OFF-MIC)
问：海军上将，菲尔·尤因（Phil Ewing）与Politico。我可以快速跟进吗？在此攻击之前描述供应商的行为以及他们在Jagman中描述的这种不稳定的行为的能力，您的理解是他们知道这一点并积极决定不告知海军吗？或者，他们看到了这种行为，以告诉他们，您知道 - 他们在服务中与之打交道的人。
am理查森：对。这些细节很难确定地到达它，但是我们的理解是，对于专家，他们确实对这种异常行为有很好的了解，并决定不提出该报告。有了惠普 - 帕卡德，这还不太确定。
后方。柯比：我们还有时间再花几个。
Q: (OFF-MIC) BBC News. Can I ask about the security clearances? You mentioned that the figure has tripled since 9/11, but based on the way (OFF-MIC) government (OFF-MIC) country changing, what would have been a normal kind of path of growth? And in trying to cut 10 percent of people who have -- it was 10 percent people that started security clearances going forward, where will they come from? What sector are you looking at? Is there one that you can see where you can lose 10 percent?
后方。KIRBY: Paul?
博士斯托克顿：我们建议在我们的报告中，国防部对需要知道的需求进行了彻底的重新评估，也就是说，在国防部占据特定职位的个人是否真的需要访问机密信息。
Such a review has not happened in a long time. It's my working assumption that given the terrific growth in the number of those who hold security clearances, in the absence of such standards, that we have folks with security clearances who don't need them. And in an era of terrific pressure on the defense budget, anything we can do to downsize the number of people with security clearances so that only those who require them can then get this intensive, more capable, continuous monitoring, that's a great way of proceeding.
在第二节下。LETTRE: I'll just add, if I could, as Dr. Stockton has mentioned to you, this was put on our task list to look at thanks to his work and Admiral Olson's work with the independent panel as part of the implementation phase of our work going forward that Secretary Hagel has asked us to do.
We owe Secretary Hagel answers by June on a number of different topics, implementation on the four recommendations that he articulated and considered departmental judgments on the three recommendations that we accepted from the independent panel for further review, to include the possibility of a 10 percent reduction to the security -- the secret level security-cleared workforce.
海军少将科比:好的,这将是最后一个。All the way in the back?
Q: James Rosen, McClatchy Newspapers. Am I correct that from the time the first shot was fired -- this is about the immediate incident response -- from the time the first shot was fired -- this is perhaps for Admiral Richardson -- from the time the first shot was fired to the time the last shot was fired on that tragic day, am I correct that it was over an hour?
amRICHARDSON: No. Well, the response was carried out over the course of over an hour, yes. But in terms of those shots which resulted in fatalities that was a much shorter time.
问：那是多长时间？
amRICHARDSON: That was, we assess, about 23 minutes.
Q: OK. And just a quick follow-up question. On the military base, I think, you know, a lot of Americans might ask, on any military base in the world, particularly one in Washington, D.C., is it acceptable that a shooter, even an insider threat could fire fatal shots for 23 minutes before being taken down?
am理查森：好吧，我想说的任何类型的事件永远不可接受。这就是为什么秘书黑格尔和秘书马布斯都尽可能地向前前进的原因，以确保我们最大程度地减少了将来再次发生这种情况的可能性。
Q: Is there any criticism of the length of time that the fatal shots were fired in the report?
am理查森（Richardson）：不。但是，这种战术反应并非如此 - 详细的战术反应并不是我们的贾格曼（Jagman）的权限。这是目前正在进行的刑事调查的权限，因此我们没有研究这些细节。
后方。KIRBY: Thanks, everybody. Appreciate it.
来源：Department of Defense
