Admin Threatens Veto Over GAO Role in Intel Oversight

One of the simplest, most effective ways to strengthen congressional oversight of intelligence would be for Congress to make increased use of specially cleared investigators from the Government Accountability Office. This is such a straightforward step towards improving oversight that it was even championed by CIA Director Leon Panetta when he was a Congressman.

But the Obama Administration told Congress on Monday that new language to reinforce the GAO’s role in intelligence oversight was among several provisions in the pending FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act that were objectionable to the White House and that might prompt a presidential veto of the bill.

“三类规定是如此严重，以至于总统的高级顾问会建议否决该法案，如果将账单纳入以签名为签名的法案，”白宫管理和预算办公室的彼得·奥尔萨格（Peter Orszag）3月15日的信(pdf). He cited a requirement to increase congressional notification of covert actions beyond the “Gang of 8”; the proposed GAO language; and a proposed reduction in the budget authorization for the Office of the DNI. The letter also expressed lesser opposition to numerous other provisions.

争端增加作用强度高lligence oversight is particularly illustrative of the disparate and conflicting interests of the legislative and executive branches. Should Congress use all the tools at its disposal to improve its oversight of intelligence? Or is the status quo good enough? The White House letter implied that the current arrangement is already optimal and that any revision would be destabilizing.

“通过允许GAO进行情报监督，这些规定将通过情报监督委员会从根本上改变对IC [情报界]监督的法定框架，并改变IC与情报委员会成员和员工之间的长期关系和信息流程，” Orszag先生wrote.

If one believed that the long-standing relationship between the IC and the intelligence committee members and staff was altogether satisfactory, this might be a compelling argument. But if one concluded that the existing structure has been woefully inadequate, then other options would merit consideration.

Sen. Daniel Akaka (D-HI), Rep. Anna Eshoo (D-CA) and others have repeatedly argued that the GAO could usefully supplement the intelligence oversight process without detracting anything. “It is Congress’s responsibility to ensure that the IC carries out its critical functions effectively and consistent with congressional authorization. For too long, GAO’s expertise and ability to engage in constructive oversight of the IC have been underutilized,”Sen. Akaka saidlast year.

In 2008, Sen. Akaka chaired a Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs小组委员会听证会（我testified[pdf]) on the feasibility and utility of GAO intelligence oversight. “Congress must redouble its efforts–that is what we are trying to do–to ensure that U.S. intelligence activities are conducted efficiently, effectively, and with due respect for the civil rights and civil liberties of Americans, and I will work to see that it does,” Sen. Akaka said then.

Amazingly, an earlier version of the proposal for an expanded GAO role in intelligence oversight was introduced in 1987 by then-Rep. Leon Panetta, who is now the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

According to Rep. Panetta’s proposed“CIA Accountability Act of 1987”(pdf) (H.R. 3603 in the 100th Congress), “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Comptroller General [who directs the GAO] shall audit the financial transactions and shall evaluate the programs and activities of the Central Intelligence Agency” either at his own initiative or at the request of the congressional intelligence committees.

Today, DCIA Panetta is presumably among those senior advisers who would advise a veto of the proposal he once advocated.

在2009年1月22日confirmation hearing(pdf) of Adm. Dennis C. Blair to be Director of National Intelligence, Adm. Blair also acknowledged a role for GAO in intelligence oversight.

Sen. Ron Wyden asked him: “If the GAO is conducting a study at the direction of one of the intelligence committees using properly cleared staff, will you give them the access they need to do their work?”

Adm. Blair replied: “Senator, I’m aware that the direction of GAO studies and the terms of them are generally subject to talk between the two branches of government for a variety of reasons, and subject to having those discussions, ultimately I believe the GAO has a job to do and I will help them do that job.”

但是，奥巴马政府现在表示，如果这意味着加强其法律权力来做到这一点，这将无济于事。

可以说，政府在试图最大程度地减少对其情报活动的独立监督方面采取合理行动。谁会自愿寻求独立的审计师来看着他的肩膀？但这使国会以同等或更大的决心追求自己的机构自身利益，并最大程度地利用了其可用的情报监督工具，包括适当使用GAO。

一位国会官员告诉保密新闻：“我们已经同意放弃大量的（在Orszag信中）确定为问题的规定。”他拒绝透露GAO监督语言是否是如今废弃的规定。