斯佩克特先生(本人、托里切利先生、瑟蒙德先生、拜登先生、格拉斯利先生、法因戈尔德先生、海尔姆斯先生、舒默先生和塞申斯先生):美国2089年．修订1978年《外国情报监视法案》的法案[[Page S800]]修改了与出于外国情报目的的监视和搜查命令以及其他目的有关的程序;提交司法机构委员会。2000年反情报改革法案SPECTER先生。总统先生，我希望通过立法纠正《外国情报监视法》规定的程序。我代表托里塞利参议员、瑟蒙德参议员、拜登参议员、格拉斯利参议员、法因戈尔德参议员、赫尔姆斯参议员、舒默参议员和塞申斯参议员提出这项法案。这项立法旨在纠正一个非常紧迫的问题。该法案完善了《外国情报监视法》，使其能够对间谍活动进行适当的调查，以避免李文和博士在调查期间犯下的非常严重的错误。提及李博士的调查，只是为了说明本法例旨在纠正的程序问题。至于李文浩是否有罪，将由他被起诉的地方有管辖权的法院来决定。在李先生的保释听证会上，有一些信息被公开，这凸显了这个特殊案件的巨大重要性。斯蒂芬博士年轻,核武器在洛斯阿拉莫斯实验室主任助理,李博士的保释听证会上作证12月13日,1999年,说:这些代码及其相关数据库和输入文件,结合的人知道如何使用它们,可以,在我看来,错误的手,改变全球战略平衡。很难有比改变全球战略平衡更重要的事情了。 Dr. Younger further testified: They enable the possessor to design the only objects that could result in the military defeat of America's conventional forces. . . They represent the gravest possible security risk to . . . the supreme national interest. Again, it is hard to find more forceful language as to the seriousness of this particular matter than the potential military defeat of America's conventional forces. During the course of this investigation, there were very serious time lapses while the FBI sought to get a warrant on Dr. Lee under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The FBI made the FISA request in June of 1997. It was refused by the Department of Justice on August 12, 1997, and then FBI Director Freeh sent FBI Assistant Director John Lewis to talk personally to Attorney General Reno. Attorney General Reno then appointed a Department of Justice subordinate named Daniel Seikaly, who reviewed the matter and rejected it. Attorney General Reno, as she conceded in1999年6月8日向司法委员会提交的证词，没有跟进此事，这一非常重要的请求被拒绝。拟议的立法将要求，当联邦调查局局长提出FISA搜查令请求时，总检察长必须亲自决定是否应将FISA搜查令请求提交法院采取行动。该立法还规定，当总检察长拒绝向法院提交FISA申请时，必须以书面形式予以拒绝。可以说，这将为联邦调查局局长提供一个路线图，说明向法院提交逮捕令请求需要哪些额外信息。在司法部拒绝向法院提交FISA逮捕令后，FBI对该案的调查在大约16个月内没有进行。从1997年8月到1997年12月，联邦调查局总部就FISA的请求向联邦调查局阿尔伯克基外地办事处发出了一封信，该办事处一直休眠到1998年11月。从FISA申请未提交法院到联邦调查局阿尔伯克基办公室最终采取行动，大约16个月过去了。这16个月对李博士的活动至关重要。这项立法进一步规定，当司法部长以书面形式拒绝FISA申请时，联邦调查局局长有义务亲自监督此事。随后，能源部以一种非常不寻常的方式启动了李博士的测谎仪，自那以来一直受到总统外交情报咨询委员会的批评。能源部表示，李博士通过了测谎仪，而事实上，他没有通过。能源部长甚至在国家电视台上宣布，李博士通过了测谎仪，而事实上他没有通过。这使FBI偏离了轨道，认为通过测谎仪可以免除嫌疑犯的责任。这项立法规定，能源部等机构不得对测谎仪采取行动，这些事项应交由联邦调查局处理，联邦调查局拥有调查这些事项的最高权力。联邦调查局随后进行了另一次测谎，但直到1999年2月10日，也就是他据称通过测谎的6周后。尽管李博士未能通过第二次测谎，但直到3月8日才采取行动终止李博士。在此期间，他删除了许多有争议的文件。这些删除发生在1月20日、2月9日、11日、12日和17日，所有这些都可能对美国造成偏见。李博士直到4月9日才被执行搜查令，而在采取任何官方行动之前，这是一段很长的时间。该立法还规定，当嫌疑人被留在原地进行调查时，联邦调查局必须以书面形式提出这一要求，并向该机构提出这一要求。该机构，如能源部，必须在30天内制定一项计划，以确定如何将嫌疑人留在原处，同时最大限度地减少向此人披露机密信息。司法部拒绝接受FISA申请的原因之一是，李博士“目前”没有从事令人反感的活动——用温和的话来说。本法案将这一要求更改为总体情况下的可能原因。这是这项立法的简要概述。本条例草案的提案国认为，向前推进是非常重要的，以便在悬而未决的间谍调查中，我们不会出现在这一非常重要的案件中出现的失误。我很高兴知道，司法小组委员会的所有成员都参与了这项立法的共同提案。我感谢我的同事托里切利参议员的合作。参议员瑟蒙德、参议员格拉斯利和参议员塞申斯都是共和党成员的共同赞助者，除了参议员托里切利外，参议员费恩戈尔德和舒默也是如此。拜登参议员曾被专门征询过意见，他是共同赞助者，因为他早在1978年就制定了《外国情报监视法》。赫尔姆斯参议员要求加入为共同赞助者，他已经同意了。小组委员会在“分娩”痛苦方面遇到了一些实质性困难；由于小组委员会没有得到资助，它还没有真正诞生。我们确实是从自己的私人员工那里工作的。我们有三名研究员和一名特勤人员。我们完成了一份长达65页的非常详细的报告，这是多曼·麦克阿瑟先生与托里切利参议员的工作人员和其他工作人员合作，为我的工作人员所做的非凡工作的成果。我们仔细阅读了这份长达65页的报告，以确保其准确无误，不披露任何机密信息。应弗里主任的具体要求，小组委员会推迟了原定于12月举行的李文和事件听证会。迪雷克tor Freeh met with Torricelli and myself and requested that the hearings on Dr. Lee not go forward substantively, which might cause some problem with the pending prosecution. We do have hearings scheduled on the legislation for March 7, 8 and 21. I have already informed FBI Director Freeh of our intentions to proceed with those hearings, which will be on the substance as to how the act should be reformed. We have given notice to Director Freeh that we would appreciate his presence as a witness. He has said he would be glad to attend. That is a very brief statement of a very complex matter. It is my hope we will have the final clearance from the [[Page S801]] Department of Justice to be able to file the full 65-page report which will elaborate upon the brief summary which I have presented. I am delighted to yield to my very distinguished colleague from New Jersey, Senator Torricelli, the ranking member of the subcommittee. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey is recognized. Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. President, I thank Senator Specter for yielding time to me. I also thank him for his perseverance and diligence in working on this issue over the course of the last several months. I also express particular thanks to Senator Biden who in reviewing this legislation made very important additions and allowed us to proceed on a bipartisan basis for what I think is an important and worthwhile change in the laws dealing with foreign intelligence surveillance. The origins of this legislation--part of the Judiciary Committee's oversight--is the question of how the Department of Justice handled allegations of Chinese espionage at our most important National Laboratories. The focus of this review, of course, had to do with the case of Dr. Wen Ho Lee, a scientist who was charged in December with 59 counts of illegally removing secrets from computer information at the Los Alamos Laboratory. It appears that Dr. Lee was the subject of interest or investigations for espionage for over 17 years. He was dealing with the most important weapons secrets possessed by his government critical to the security of the United States. It would be difficult for anyone in this Government to explain to the American people why, despite 17 years of investigation and some reasons for considerable doubt all during this time, he was permitted to continue with his job and retain access to highly classified information. Much is still to be learned about this case. A criminal case is proceeding and an investigation. That is for, in some instances, others to deal with. That does not mean we do not already know some things that can change the conduct in this Government and the laws under which we govern ourselves. We have learned through this investigation that this was all made possible by a series of procedural and investigative errors that gave Dr. Lee this opportunity to download this highly classified material to an unsecured computer. In truth, we do not yet know whether or not, when this unguarded material was in an unsecured computer, in fact it got to foreign agents or other interested parties other than people with proper clearance in the U.S. Government. We do not know. We may never know. But we do know this after interviewing many witnesses and thousands of documents: There was a startling, almost unbelievable failure of coordination and communication between the Department of Justice, the FBI, and the Department of Energy in dealing with this matter, and only through that lack of coordination was an allegation of possible espionage able to lead to 17 years of continued access and the possibility that this information was compromised. As early as 1982, the FBI was aware that Dr. Lee was engaged in suspicious activities. Yet both at that time and in the years that followed there was no action taken to limit access to classified material. The Department of Energy detected Dr. Lee transferring an inordinate number of systems from a secured system to an unsecured system in 1993 and 1994. Personnel responsible for reporting that information failed to do so. In 1997, the FBI had an opportunity to stop Dr. Lee, but they were stymied by the denial of the Department of Justice of a request submitted by the FBI for a warrant to further investigate Dr. Lee. It is this failure that brings us here today. The evidence supporting a FISA request for their warrant was overwhelming. It had been building for years. No single piece of evidence may have been sufficient to warrant a criminal case, but they were more than sufficient to raise a proper level of suspicion to support the issuing of a warrant. Now we know that the request for this warrant, a FISA application, was never even considered by the Attorney General of the United States. When the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mr. Freeh, sent a personal representative to meet with the Attorney General to express his concern about the warrant application, which he was right and proper to do, the Attorney General delegated the matter to a subordinate who was unfamiliar with the matter and who had never processed a similar request--no experience, no knowledge, no involvement--and the final disposition of the matter, therefore, was predictable. The request was denied. The warrant was not issued, and an opportunity potentially to either apprehend someone committing a criminal act or to have prevented further damage, if any occurred, was lost. Unfortunately, this problem was compounded in that when the FBI was denied this warrant, in my judgment, the matter should have been appealed but it was allowed to languish, and then further hampered by the Department of Energy which conducted a polygraph of Dr. Lee, and then, incredibly, unbelievably incorrectly concluded that he had passed the test. It is a series of compounded errors of procedure and judgment. It is difficult for the Congress to legislate good judgment for the proper execution of responsibilities. If we cannot do so, we can at least design the laws to provide for greater accountability. That is, indeed, what is being done by my colleagues. Under the legislation we are now introducing, Senator Specter and I have written amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to provide that upon the personal request of the Director of the FBI, the Attorney General must personally review the FISA requests--no subordinate, no uninformed associate. This is a matter of national security. The Attorney General has no greater responsibility than protecting the secrets of the U.S. Government. This matter belongs on the Attorney General's desk, and under this legislation that is where it will rest. There are those who may argue that making the Attorney General directly responsible will somehow provide an avalanche of work, that they will not be able to deal with all of these matters. Appropriately, the legislation has been designed so this provision is triggered only by the personal request from the Director of the FBI--no subordinate, no associate, no one else in the Government. So the number of cases will be extremely limited. But when asked by the Director of the FBI, one person, and one person in this Government alone, will have direct responsibility. Second, the legislation requires that if the Attorney General decides not to forward a FISA application to the court, that decision must be communicated in writing to the FBI Director along with specific recommendations as to what investigative steps should be undertaken to meet the probable cause requirements. Matters of national security on this level cannot fall in departmental cracks--not get lost somewhere between Justice and the FBI. This will ensure that in those cases when the Attorney General has personally rejected this request the reasons will be stated, the FBI will be told why and then given a chance to return having met the appropriate probable cause standard. Third, the legislation requires that the FBI Director must personally supervise the implementation of the Attorney General's recommendations to ensure once again that in the highest levels of the U.S. Government these unusual but critical cases of national security dealing with foreign espionage are dealt with not by subordinates, but that this Congress can hold people for which it has responsibility, oversight, and votes to confirm--such as the Attorney General and the FBI Director--directly accountable. I believe these are appropriate responses to what we have learned to date out of this investigation. But I conclude by saying both what this legislation is and what it is not. This legislation is not an attempt to lower the probable cause standard for what is required for a warrant and a FISA application. Probable cause is a standard of law. It should be taken seriously. The rights of no citizen should be violated by an intrusive or curious government. The standard remains. What is being changed here is accountability, not a lessening of civil [[Page S802]] liberties. We simply want to know that the standard which has always existed of probable cause will be used, that procedures will be followed, that people will be held accountable, not that the Government is any more or any less intrusive. The probable cause standard remains the cornerstone of American liberties to ensure that the Government has reason and merit as a matter of law to involve itself in the privacy of our citizens. I proudly offer this legislation with Senator Specter. I believe it is a good and appropriate response. I thank the Senator for his patience in the drafting. I listened to my colleagues, particularly on this side of the aisle, with relatively modest changes we have recommended, all of which the Senator has incorporated. I look forward to the committee and then the Senate enacting this legislation. Mr. BIDEN. FISA, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, is a very vital part of our arsenal to combat terrorism and espionage. For 20 years, it has enabled the FBI to keep track of major threats to our security while preserving the constitutional rights of Americans. Basically, it provides for a sort of super search warrant, allowing the FBI, under certain unique circumstances, to eavesdrop upon activities, after showing a probable cause to a Federal judge, without having to disclose this eavesdropping in ways that they would have to under a normal warrant for a wiretap or a physical search. FISA has been very useful to deal with terrorism, and also with espionage cases. Senator Specter has undertaken an effort to look into what may or may not have transpired at our National Laboratories in the celebrated case of Wen Ho Lee and others. This has been the subject of some very legitimate discussion, and occasionally some partisan discussion. But knowing Senator Specter as long as I have, I do not doubt his desire to look into these cases that have transpired, and the consequences of any leakage of classified information from any of our National Laboratories, for the primary purpose of seeing to it that it does not happen again, if in fact it did happen, as well as to determine what did happen. Senator Specter and Senator Torricelli have been looking into these recent cases, especially, as I said, the case of Wen Ho Lee at Los Alamos National Laboratory. As a result of that inquiry, Senator Specter is proposing what I think is a very important series of sensible amendments to this act we call FISA. I am pleased to cosponsor this bill, having been an original author of that legislation in 1978, along with Birch Bayh and others. The initial bill with which Senator Specter approached me and others had a few areas where I thought it could be improved. I wish to publicly thank Senator Specter for agreeing to the changes I suggested in his proposed legislation. One of the dilemmas that exists, in the debate about whether the Attorney General and the Justice Department and/or the FBI were reading from the same page in the hymnal on how to investigate the Wen Ho Lee case, is the issue of whether the FBI communicated enough information to the Attorney General so that, under the reading of the FISA law, the Attorney General could conclude that there was sufficient reason to get a search or electronic surveillance court order. There has been a little bit of disagreement, at a minimum, between the FBI and the Justice Department as to who said what, when, and what request was made when. It has led to a serious political controversy. I think it has also led, as a consequence, on both sides of the aisle, to some posturing and partisanship about a significant national security issue. One of Senator Specter's most important ideas in this bill, one which is going to seem commonsensical to most Americans, is to make it clear that if something is of such consequence that the Director of the FBI believes there should be a FISA hearing and authority granted to allow the FBI to use invasive measures to eavesdrop upon conversations and/or get records, for example, from computer data and the like, if it is that important, the FBI Director can, under this new amendment to FISA, put that request in writing to the Attorney General and the Attorney General, whoever that may be, then has to personally sign off or not sign off, so we avoid this debate that is taking place now about whether second level people or third level people made the right judgment or wrong judgment, and whether or not there was any malfeasance. So this is a very practical solution. If this legislation had been in place 3 years ago, 5 years ago, there would be no doubt as to what happened. Had the FBI said this is critical and this is national security, the Attorney General personally would have had to say yes or no. That is where the record is unclear in the Wen Ho Lee case. This bill would eliminate such doubt in future similar cases if and when they arise, and they surely will arise. Section 2 of this bill permits the judge to consider the past activities of the target of an investigation--that is, the person upon whom they want to eavesdrop and/or whose records they want to secretly examine. So, for example, the Attorney General would be able to say, in a closed FISA hearing: Your Honor, not only do we think this is justified because of some current activity, but we can show you evidence that in 1991 they were engaged in this suspicious activity, in 1993 they were engaged in that, in 1995 they were engaged in this, therefore lending greater credibility to the argument that a FISA court order should be issued by the judge. Again, in this Wen Ho Lee case, and other cases that Senator Specter has examined, there has been discussion of the fact that sometimes these folks had been under investigation before. Would that not lend greater weight to the need for this FISA request to be granted? So we clear that up in this legislation, rather than only allowing the target's current activity to be brought up. Section 3 of this proposal requires the FISA court to be told if the target of a proposed search or surveillance has a relationship with a Federal law enforcement or intelligence agency. This came up in this case as well. The case is being investigated. It turns out at some point one of the persons in the past had been also a source for the FBI. The FBI had gone to this person and said: Will you be a source for us, looking into the possibility of some illegal activity? Then that very person becomes the target, and that very person is never able to tell, nor does the FBI or the CIA say: By the way, Your Honor, we were working with them. That is why they went ahead and did the following. Up to now, when the Federal Government has asked for a FISA court judge to give this surveillance authority, it has not been required to say: By the way, Your Honor, this person in the past had worked with us as a source, as a person cooperating with us. This is a new and useful protection for Americans, because the conduct that might seem suspicious could be a result of what the law enforcement agency had actually asked them to do. It seems only fair to the target to be able to have that information known to the judge. This is typical of the Senator from Pennsylvania, that he looks out for individual rights as well as the interests of law enforcement. There are several other interesting provisions in this bill, including some to improve relations between the FBI and other agencies, and I am sure there will be further refinements in this bill when it is considered by the Judiciary Committee. The important thing is that Senator Specter is working, I think effectively and in a bipartisan manner, to ensure that his inquiry into the Wen Ho Lee case leads to useful changes and not just to partisan recriminations. I compliment him on that, because the purpose of oversight is not only to find out who struck John but, in the national interest, to find the best way to prevent something such as this from happening again. So I compliment him and again thank him for acceding to the more than several changes I asked for in this legislation. I think the amendments to existing law that this bill will enact are good amendments. I think America will be well served, and I would argue that the individual rights of Americans will be in no greater jeopardy after this passes than they ever were. They are protected; they will continue to be protected; and some of these changes will [[Page S803]] even help to further protect the rights of individual Americans. I yield the floor.

第106届大会

2 d会话

美国2089年

修订1978年的《外国情报监视法案》，修改与外国情报目的监视和搜查命令以及其他目的相关的程序。

在美国参议院

2000年2月24日

斯佩克特先生(包括他本人、托里塞利先生、瑟蒙德先生、拜登先生、格拉斯利先生、法因戈尔德先生、赫尔姆斯先生、舒默先生和塞申斯先生)提出了以下法案:读了两遍后提交司法机构委员会

帐单

修订1978年的《外国情报监视法案》，修改与外国情报目的监视和搜查命令以及其他目的相关的程序。

第一节。简称。

秒。2.根据1978年《外国情报监视法》，确定发布电子监视命令可能原因的情况。

秒。3。1978年外国情报监视法案下的电子监视命令。

秒。4.1978年《外国情报监视法》下的实体搜查令。

秒。5.为执法目的披露根据1978年《外国情报监视法》获得的信息。

秒。6.与联邦调查局协调反情报工作。

秒。7.可分割性。