国会记录:2004年2月23日(参议院)页S1436-S1437有缺陷的情报评估莱文先生。总统女士，政府内部的主要武器核查员证实，在入侵伊拉克之前的几个月里，情报部门对伊拉克的大规模杀伤性武器进行了有严重缺陷的评估。在我看来，有关伊拉克大规模杀伤性武器的错误情报和政府夸大事实，是为了使威胁显得更加迫在眉睫，使对伊拉克采取军事行动的理由显得更加紧迫。然而,不管一个想法迫在眉睫的威胁还是不像我们那样单方面出发,我们的智力是到目前为止从马克和进一步的描述,情报的政府的,为了这个国家的未来安全,我们不仅需要对情报进行独立评估，还需要对情报管理部门的特征进行描述。今天，我想提出一个相关的问题:在战前，中央情报局局长乔治·特纳特(George Tenet)在我们与联合国核查人员分享美国情报信息的情况上是如何误导美国人民的。在长达12个月的无可辩解的拖延之后，特尼特局长最近缓和并解密了我要求的材料，这表明他在国会就美国与联合国在伊拉克大规模杀伤性武器项目上共享情报的程度所做的公开证词是错误的。开战前，美国中央情报局(CIA)在伊拉克确认了550处可能拥有大规模杀伤性武器或被禁止的大规模杀伤性武器材料或设备的地点。它们被称为“可疑地点”。总统女士，其中150个网站是所谓的"头号嫌疑人"网站中情局认为在这些网站更有可能找到这些物品。 The 150 top suspect sites were, in turn, divided into three categories: High priority, medium priority, and low priority. At two public hearings shortly before the war on February 11 and February 12, 2003, I pressed Director Tenet on the issue of how many suspect WMD sites were shared with the United Nations. On February 12, Director Tenet said the following: When the inspections began, we drew up a list of suspect sites which we believe may have a continuing association with Iraq's WMD programs. The list is dynamic. It changes according to available intelligence or other information that we receive. Of this set number of suspect sites, we identified a specific number as being highest interest, highest value, or moderate value because of recent activities suggesting ongoing WMD association or other intelligence information that we received. And here is his bottom line: As I said yesterday, we have briefed all of these high value and moderate value sites to UNMOVIC and the IAEA. Mr. Tenet did not say "some;" he did not say "most;" he said "all." We have briefed "all" of these high value and moderate value sites to the U.N. I told Director Tenet at the time in two public hearings that he was wrong and that classified numbers told a different story. On March 6, 2003, Director Tenet again stated in writing that: We have now provided detailed information on all of the high value and moderate value sites to UNMOVIC and the IAEA. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice made the same representation in a letter to me on March 6, 2003, in which she said: United Nations inspectors have been briefed on every high or medium priority weapons of mass destruction, missile, and UAV-related site the U.S. intelligence community has identified. On2004年1月20日，中情局经过一年的抵抗，最终解密在伊拉克战争之前，美国中央情报局与联合国核查人员共享信息的“高、中优先级‘头号’大规模杀伤性武器地点”的数量。在这样做的过程中，他们最终承认，在CIA名单上的105个高级和中等优先级的头号嫌疑人地点中，有21个在战前没有与联合国共享。所以现在的记录很清楚，特尼特局长在战前就此事两次向公众和国会提供虚假信息。2004年1月20日，美国中央情报局的信函阐明了他们的立场。中央情报局的立场是，它向联合国提供了“我们认为在他们的搜寻中会有成果的情报”。历史和彻底的调查将决定这一说法的准确性。但公众现在可以判断特尼特主任在战前公开声明的准确性，即所有高、中优先级的顶级可疑地点都与联合国共享。所有这些网站都没有被分享，特纳的反复声明是错误的。去年2月，特纳局长本可以诚实地回答说:“我们没有向联合国核查人员提供所有高、中优先级的头号可疑地点，这就是原因，参议员。”相反，他选择了一条不同的道路，错误地陈述了事实。 I can only speculate as to Director Tenet's motive. If he had answered honestly and said that there were 21 high and medium priority top suspect sites that we had not yet shared with the United Nations, it would have put an obstacle in the path of the administration's move to end U.N. inspections and proceed to war. It would have been more difficult for the administration to proceed to war without first having shared with the U.N. our intelligence on all high and medium priority top suspect WMD sites and it would have reinforced widely held public and international sentiment that we should allow the U.N. to complete their inspections before going to war. In other words, honest answers by Director Tenet might have undermined the false sense of urgency for proceeding to war and could have contributed to delay, neither of which fit the administration's policy goals. For the last year, I have attempted to have declassified the number of high and medium priority top suspect sites that the U.S. did not share with the United Nations. The CIA stonewalled doing that for no reason that I can think of except that the facts are embarrassing to them. Surely, that is no reason to withhold information from the American people and to give inaccurate information repeatedly to Congress in public testimony. We rely on our intelligence agencies to give us the facts, not to give us the spin on the facts. The accuracy and objectivity of intelligence should never be tainted or slanted to support a particular policy. What is badly needed and what is lacking so far is candor about how we were so far off in the assessments of Iraq's possession of WMD. The lack of candor is one of the many reasons an independent commission should be appointed by Congress, not just by the President, to look at not just how the intelligence came to be so flawed but [[Page S1437]] how that flawed intelligence came to be further exaggerated by the administration in order to support its decision to initiate military action. One small part of this picture is这是中情局最近的一封信最终明确了真相。中央情报局未分享伊拉克的所有最高嫌疑人WMD网站，董事宗旨在与U.N的战争中公开两次公开。更有证据表明智力塑造，以适应政府的政策目标。我请求一致同意，即我在此问题上提到的中央情报局的来信是在纪录中印制的。没有异议，物料被命令在记录中打印，如下：中央情报局，华盛顿特区，2004年1月20日。Carl Levin，武装服务委员会，美国参议院，DC。亲爱的参议员莱文：我正在回应2003年10月23日和2004年1月8日关于智力社区（IC）分享关于伊拉克武装武器（WMD）地点的信息的具体信息的拒绝（联合国）的武器武器（联合国））检查员。我想首先通过确保对伊拉克嫌疑人的WMD网站号和联合国视察员分享这一信息的迄今为止，对伊拉克迄今为止的较远的相互理解进行了相互了解。在2003年5月23日的信中，我们提供了近似伊拉克嫌疑人威斯特中心智力委员会的遗址550;而且，检查员更有可能在其他网站上找到的嫌疑人的网站数量超过其他网站。在我们2003年7月11日的信中，我们提供了向联合国检查员提供的嫌疑人WMD网站包的数量67。在我们的9和 13 May briefings to the SSCI staff, we explained that this number represented the number of site packages shared with the UN inspectors at the IC initiative. The 67 number does not include site packages provided pursuant to UN inspectors' requests, Your most recent letters concern three specific requests: The number of high and medium priority sites on the IC's 150-site top suspect site list. Answer: High: 37; Medium: 68. The number of high and medium priority sites where the IC shared information with the UN, including briefing packages. Answer: High: 33; Medium: 51. The number of high and medium priority sites where the IC shared briefing packages with the UN. Answer: High: 21; Medium: 30. The 21 high and 30 medium site packages provided to the UN inspectors represent site packages provided at the IC's initiative and pursuant to UN inspectors' requests. The number of high and medium site packages provided to the UN inspectors solely at the IC's initiative are 20 and 25, respectively. These numbers have been declassified. However, in order to ensure that the numbers are accurately characterized, it is important to reiterate what has been previously provided in earlier correspondence to you regarding the suspect WMD site information shared with the UN inspectors. I specifically call your attention to the Director of Central Intelligence's 11 July 2003 letter, signed by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, which states: ". . . CIA provided UNMOVIC with the intelligence that we judged would be fruitful in their search for prohibited material and activities in Iraq. We did not have and we never claimed to have, smoking-gun information that would lead the inspectors to a quick find. We selected the best sites we had that we judged would have the best chance of finding something. It is important to remember that we had given the UN a vast amount of data in the 10-plus years we cooperated with them on inspections, including data on many of the sites long suspected of containing illicit activity. Thus, when inspections resumed last year, we wanted to focus our effort on giving the UN new data that we had not told them previously. We started by considering about 150 sites that seemed promising--we further refined that list because many of these sites were already known to the UN inspectors, had been the subject of previous discussions by CIA and those organizations, and on which we had no new information. By the time inspections stopped, we had developed site packages for 67 sites. These included the sites on which we had the best intelligence--on which we had pertinent and possible `actionable' information. We would not have helped the UN inspectors by giving them large volumes of data they already had. The UN relied on us to prioritize the information rather than simply to give them everything we had on every possible site in Iraq." We ask that the numbers and text be used in tandem when discussing Iraqi WMD suspect sites and site packages provided to the UN inspectors. I believe that with this response all your requests for declassification of Iraqi suspect site numbers have been addressed. Sincerely, Stanley M. Moskowitz, Director of Congressional Affairs. Mr. LEVIN. I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. BUNNING. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. [...]