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第110届大会,第一节参议院报告110-57 ______________________________________________委员会委员会选定委员会核对2005年1月4日至12月8日的选择委员会
     2007年4月26日.--订购了印刷智能选择委员会John D. Rockefeller IV,西弗吉尼亚州主席克里斯托弗S. Bond,密苏里州,副主席Dianne Feinstein,California John Warner,Virginia Ron Wyden,Nebraska,俄勒冈州Chuck HagelEvan Bayh,Invena Saxby Chambliss,佐治亚州芭芭拉A. Mikulski,Maryland Orrin Hatch,犹他州罗塞尔D. Feingold,威斯康星州奥林匹亚J.雪橇,缅因哥尔·尼尔斯州,佛罗里达州理查德伯里德,北卡罗来纳谢尔顿怀特豪斯,罗德岛哈里里德,内华达州Officio Member Mitch McConnell,肯塔基州,前officio会员Carl Levin,Michigan,前officio会员Johmccain,亚利桑那州,前任职员Andrew W. Johnson,员工总监Louis B. Tucker,少数民族工作总监Kathleen P. Mcghee,首席职员本报告所涵盖的时期,智力选择委员会的组成如下:Pat Rocerts,堪萨斯董事长John D. Rockefeller IV,西弗吉尼亚州,福林舱口副主席,犹他州Mike露水,Michigan Mike露水Ine,俄亥俄州迪安费斯坦,加利福尼亚州克里斯托弗S. Bond,密苏里罗恩Wyden,俄勒冈州伦敦·赫托克,印第安纳州奥林匹亚·贝尔,印第安纳州奥林匹亚J.雪橇,缅因州Barbara A. Mikulski,马里兰州Chuck Hagel,Nebraska Jon S. Corzine,新泽西州Chambliss,Georgia Russell D. Feingold,威斯康星州*比尔德里斯特,田纳西州,前职权会员哈里里德,内华达州,前职权会员John Warner,弗吉尼亚州,前任成员James D. Hensler,Jr.,少数民族工作人员James D. Hensler Andrew W. Johnson,少数民族。员工主任Kathleen P. Mcghee,首席职员--------- * Sen.Sen.Corzine于2006年1月17日从参议院辞职,担任新泽西州的总督。被任命为2006年1月18日委任委员会的FEINGOLD。前言情报委员会在2005年1月4日至2006年12月8日之前向参议院提交本次活动。在几个地方,委员会在几个地方将简要介绍在当前国会早期采取的行动,以清除第109大会的一些物品的地位。根据第94届国会第400次第400号决议的规定,委员会负责监督美国智力共同体的计划和活动的责任。 Of necessity, most of the Committee's work is conducted in secret. Nevertheless, throughout its history, the Committee has believed that its activities should be as publicly accountable as possible. It is in that spirit that we submit this report to the Senate, just as the Committee has been doing since the year after its creation in 1976. We take this opportunity to thank all of the members of the Committee in the 109th Congress. In particular, we take special note of those of our colleagues who have completed their service on the Committee. Senator Pat Roberts was our chairman from 2003 through 2006, having begun his tenure on the Committee in 1997. Senator Mike DeWine served on the Committee from 1995 through 1999, and from 2001 through 2006 and Senator Jon Corzine served on the Committee from the beginning of the 109th Congress until January 2006 when he left the Senate to become governor of New Jersey. Also, Senator Carl Levin served as a full voting member of the Committee from 1997 through 2006. He has completed that portion of his service on the Committee and is now a nonvoting ex officio member by virtue of his chairmanship of the Committee on Armed Services. Their commitment to the work of the Committee and their contribution to a strong Intelligence Community are appreciated. We also express our deep gratitude for the work of all members of the Committee's staff during the 109th Congress. Their professionalism and dedication were indispensable to the Committee's efforts to meet its responsibilities. John D. Rockefeller IV, Chairman. Christopher S. Bond, Vice Chairman. C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Preface.......................................................... iii I. Introduction......................................................1 II. Legislation.......................................................2 A. Intelligence Authorization Bills for Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007....................................................... 2 B. USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization and Improvement........... 6 III.Oversight Activities..............................................9 A. Hearings and Briefings.................................... 9 1. Annual Worldwide Threat Overview...................... 9 2. China................................................. 11 3. Counterterrorism...................................... 11 4. Cover Issue........................................... 11 5. India-U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.............. 12 6. Iraq.................................................. 12 7. Overhead Reconnaissance Architecture.................. 13 8. Department of Treasury Intelligence Program........... 13 B. Committee Inquiries and Reviews........................... 13 1. Phase II of the Inquiry into Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq.................................... 13 2. Able Danger........................................... 14 C. Financial Accounting, Inspectors General, and Audits...... 15 1. Intelligence Community Compliance with Federal Financial Accounting Standards......................... 15 2. Oversight of Intelligence Community Inspectors General 17 3. Audits................................................ 17 a. In-Q-Tel.......................................... 17 b. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act............. 18 c. Intelligence Community Personnel Growth........... 19 d. Document Exploitation............................. 20 e. Compartmented Program............................. 20 D. Restricted Access Programs................................ 20 1. Detention and Interrogation........................... 21 2. NSA Surveillance...................................... 21 E. Review of Intelligence Related to Iran.................... 22 F. Covert Action............................................. 22 G. Independent Cost Estimates................................ 23 H. Declassification.......................................... 24 1. CIA Accountability Report............................. 24 2. Reports on Prewar Intelligence Regarding Iraq......... 26 3. Iraq WMD Retrospective Series......................... 27 4. National Archives Audit............................... 27 I. Office of the Director of National Intelligence........... 27 IV. Nominations......................................................28 A. John D. Negroponte, Director of National Intelligence..... 29 B. Michael V. Hayden, Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence............................................... 29 C. Janice Bradley Gardner, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis..................... 30 D. Benjamin A. Powell, General Counsel, Office of the Director of National Intelligence.......................... 31 E. John S. Redd, Director, National Counterterrorism Center.. 31 F. Dale W. Meyerrose, Chief Information Officer, Office of the Director of National Intelligence...................... 32 G. John Rizzo, General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency.. 32 H. Kenneth Wainstein, Assistant Attorney General, National Security Division.......................................... 33 I. Michael V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency.. 33 J. Randall Fort, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research.................................. 34 V. Support to the Senate............................................34 VI. Appendix.........................................................34 I. INTRODUCTION Immediately prior to the period covered by this report, Congress enacted the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458. The Act replaced the position of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) with two positions: the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). It assigned to the DNI two of the DCI's functions, namely, serving as head of the Intelligence Community and acting as principal adviser to the President for intelligence matters relating to national security. The CIA Director was given the DCI's other function, that of serving as head of the Central Intelligence Agency. With respect to the DNI's responsibility as head of the Intelligence Community, the Act delineated a range of budget, personnel, tasking, and other authorities. To assist in carrying out the duties of the DNI, the Act created an Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), to be composed of various deputies, the National Intelligence Council, and other offices and officials. In general, the Act provided that its provisions on restructuring the Intelligence Community would become effective no than later six months after enactment, a date that occurred in mid-June 2005. At the end of March 2005, the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, often referred to by the names of its Co-Chairmen as the Robb-Silberman Commission, issued its report, adding to the recommendations to be considered in implementing the Intelligence Reform Act. Within the six-month period provided by the Act, it fell to the President to determine the timetable for transition from old to new, the lynchpin being appointment of the first DNI. Thus, the period covered by this 2005-2006 report coincided with the initial implementation of this major reform of the Intelligence Community, including the Committee's role in the confirmation of the DNI and other officers whose appointments under the Act are subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. The Committee's work during the period of this report was also shaped by other enactments or decisions preceding the period as well as events occurring within it. The USA PATRIOT Act, enacted in October 2001, included a provision on the expiration of a number of intelligence investigation authorities contained in that Act. The sunset meant that legislative action by December 31, 2005 was required in order to extend, with changes if warranted, those authorities. The Committee's own action in February 2004, in establishing, formalizing, and expanding the Committee's inquiry into intelligence and the use of it relating to the war in Iraq, also shaped a significant aspect of its work during 2005-2006. Additionally, events that followed press reports in November 2005 about clandestine CIA prisons and in December 2005 about what was called the President's Terrorist Surveillance Program, as well as the decision of the Supreme Court in June 2006 on the lawfulness of the military commission system that had been established by Executive action, each contributed to the work of the Committee and the Senate during 2005-2006. These matters, when added to unfolding events concerning Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea plus the normal range of legislative and oversight responsibilities, presented the Committee with a broad range of tasks for the 109th Congress. II. LEGISLATION A. Intelligence Authorization Bills for Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007 In the first part of 2005 and then again in 2006, the Committee conducted its annual review of the President's budget recommendations for the civilian and military agencies and departments composing the Intelligence Community. During the 109th Congress, these budget requests were for fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 2007. They encompassed the National Intelligence Program, the Joint Military Intelligence Program, and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities programs of the Department of Defense. The latter two programs were merged and became the Military Intelligence Program in September 2005. The intelligence entities covered by those annual reviews included the ODNI, the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the intelligence capabilities of the military services (concerning which the Committee makes recommendations to the Senate Armed Service Committee), as well as the intelligence-related components of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Departments of State, Treasury, Energy, and Homeland Security, and the Drug Enforcement Administration. As part of its review in 2005 and then again in 2006, the Committee held closed budget hearings at which senior Intelligence Community officials presented testimony. Members of the Committee's staff, designated as budget monitors for particular Intelligence Community elements, also evaluated the detailed budget justification documents submitted by the Executive branch both at briefings at the Committee offices and on site at Intelligence Community agencies. On the basis of this review, the Committee prepared an annex to its annual bill and report, one each for fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 2007. Each annex contained a classified schedule of authorizations and classified directions to Intelligence Community elements that addressed a wide range of issues discerned in the course of the budget review and other oversight responsibilities of the Committee. While this budget review was in progress, the Committee also reviewed the Administration's proposals for the public part of the Committee's annual bill, consisting of new or amended legislative authority requested by the Intelligence Community, as well as legislative proposals originating in the Committee and elsewhere in the Senate. From this part of its work, the Committee produced an original bill and also a public report for each of fiscal years 2006 and 2007 that both explained the provisions of the bill and also provided comments, including directions to the Intelligence Community, that could be stated in a public, non-classified form. As a result of this extensive process in 2005 and again in 2006, the Committee reported two Intelligence Authorizations Acts with accompanying reports and classified annexes-one for fiscal year 2006 and the second for fiscal year 2007. On September 29, 2005, the Committee reported S. 1803, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006. The 2006 bill was sequentially referred, first to the Committee on Armed Services and then to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. It was returned to the Senate Calendar on November 16, 2005 to await floor action. To facilitate floor action, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of this Committee prepared a managers' amendment that accepted the recommendations of the Armed Services Committee and those of the leadership of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, as well as recommendations of individual members. No Senate floor action occurred, however, on either the Committee bill or on H.R. 2475, the House-passed Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006. On May 25, 2006, the Committee reported S. 3237, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007. S. 3237 included many of the legislative provisions that had been in the proposed 2006 authorization bill, as modified to reflect the recommendations of the Armed Services and Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committees and individual Senators that had been incorporated in the proposed managers' amendment to the 2006 bill. The 2007 bill was sequentially referred to the Committee on Armed Services, which reported it without amendment on June 21, 2006. No Senate floor action occurred on the 2007 bill, which expired on the Senate Calendar at the end of the 109th Congress together with H.R. 5020, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 that had passed the House on April 26, 2006. The 109th Congress thus became the first since the 94th Congress that did not pass an Intelligence Authorization Act. Fiscal year 2006 became the first since 1978 to not only begin but also to end without an intelligence authorization. On the budget side, this meant that all authorizations for Intelligence Community appropriations were accomplished by stop gap provisions in the Defense Department Appropriations Acts (and similar provisions elsewhere) which provided that funds appropriated by them are deemed to be authorized during the fiscal year until enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for that year (e.g., Defense Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148, ( 8092; Defense Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-289, ( 8083). The effect of the failure to act on an intelligence authorization is not limited to the authorization of appropriations. Apart from the rare major restructuring of the Intelligence Community in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, for the past nearly 30 years, the annual intelligence authorization has been the regular means for adjusting, year-to-year as needs are recognized, the legislative authorities governing the Intelligence Community. The last time that occurred was more than two years ago in the enactment in December 2004 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005. The amendments to the National Security Act of 1947, the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, the National Security Agency Act of 1959, and other laws--many of which were requested by the Intelligence Community--that were contained in the proposed fiscal year 2006 and 2007 bills are explained in the two reports that the Committee filed in the 109th Congress on those authorizations, S. Rep. Nos. 109-142 and 109-259. The 2006 and 2007 bills included:
      通过授权互动资金来改善信息共享的措施,以授权智力界的利益,并建立由隐私法管辖的信息。
       在参议院的咨询和同意的情况下,为情报界建立一个强大而独立的检查员(IG),审查社区的方案和其中要素之间的关系,并向DNI报告并向国会。
        创建国家空间智能中心,协调与空间相关的智力的所有收集,分析和传播,以及参与空间系统要求的智能群落分析。
         为了承认NSA主任的关键责任,以及NRO和NGA的董事,要求参议院确认其任命。
          规定总统任命,国会参议院中央情报局副局长,以确保在发生在导演的位置空缺,一副信心的总统和国会,可立即承担关键的领导机构。
           加强对保护来源和智能方法的责任。
            根据情报界向国会情报委员会提供及时信息的程序更改。
             通过披露整体预算要求,授权和整个情报界的拨款的公共责任。
              揭露秘密情报官员和代理人身份的处罚增加。每年授权条例草案均讨论了关于信息法案(FOIA)自由的正常问题,以智力社区记录:某些情报社区元素的“运营文件”应免除FOIA出版物,披露,搜索和审查要求还是现行立法豁免了这些义务中的CIA,NSA,NRO和NGA。理由是减轻检索和审查敏感课程的行政负担,即最终,最肯定的是,不会受到恐惧下的披露。在2006财年授权条例草案中,委员会包括一项规定,豁免豁免FOIA的出版物,披露,搜索和审查要求。豁免通过2006财政年度,PUB全国国防授权法案成为法律。L.第109-163号。该法案规定,该法案将于2007年底日落。在其2006年和2007财年的授权票据中,委员会包括一项规定,该条款将赋予ODNI的有限运营案件,该文件豁免已寻求更广泛的豁免。票据限制了从豁免出版,披露,搜索或审查要求的情报界要素的业务档案中提供给ODNI所提供的信息的豁免。他们提供了运营档案将继续进行有关美国公民或永久居民的信息,并提供有关美国公民或永久居民的信息,以及作为众议院和参议院情报委员会在内的情报监督机构调查的主题的信息。 The Committee's reports accompanying both bills did not exclude the possibility of a broader exemption but stated that before acting on that, the DNI, through the Chief Information Officer, should systematically study and report on the application of the FOIA to the ODNI. The report should include the responsibilities assigned by Congress concerning the operational files exemptions now applicable to Intelligence Community elements. In both reports, the Committee reminded the DNI and the intelligence elements that now have exemptions that the decennial reviews that are required for each must include consideration of the historical value or other public interest in categories of files and the potential for declassifying a significant amount of material in them. In addition to the issue of FOIA exemptions, the Committee's intelligence authorization bills and accompanying reports during the 109th Congress addressed a variety of other classification issues. In comments in the report on the 2006 bill, the Committee recommended that the DNI review classification rules and guidelines, and propose standards to simplify and modernize the classification system. The Committee also encouraged the President to reduce disincentives to information sharing, including over-classification. The Committee's authorization bill for fiscal year 2006 also recommended the authorization of funds for the Public Interest Declassification Board, and the accompanying report expressed the Committee's view that funds for the Board should be included in future budget requests. One item contained in the 2006 authorization bill that did not need to be carried over to the 2007 bill was a provision on establishing a National Security Division in the Department of Justice to be headed by an Assistant Attorney General for National Security. By the time that the Committee reported its 2007 bill, the Congress had established the new Division through a provision of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005. As with other legislative and oversight reports filed by the Committee during the 109th Congress, the reports (including additional views) on the two Intelligence Authorizations should be read in full to understand the Committee's proposals. Notwithstanding reservations on some matters that are evident in votes in Committee on amendments or were expressed in additional views, the vote in Committee to favorably report each of the authorization bills was unanimous. At the beginning of the 110th Congress, the Committee again reported, with only minor changes, its authorization bill for fiscal year 2007: S. 372, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007; S. Rep. No. 110-2 (2007). B. USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization and Improvement Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (Pub. L. No. 107- 56) enacted a range of enhanced surveillance and other procedures for law enforcement and intelligence investigations. Section 224 of the Act established an expiration or sunset date, December 31, 2005, for sixteen of those provisions. Section 6001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 provided for another enhanced surveillance authority--the ``lone wolf'' amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)--that would also sunset at the end of 2005. That expiration date framed a principal task for the 109th Congress--namely, to study the implementation of these enhanced procedures and to enact legislation to improve and extend them if warranted. Within the Senate, this Committee and the Committee on the Judiciary have shared jurisdiction over the FISA--involving, as it does, both foreign intelligence and judicial matters--ever since the initial period of 1976 to 1978 when the two committees worked together to secure its enactment in 1978. In the 109th Congress, both reported legislation to extend or make permanent the expiring provisions and also to modify those and other investigative authorities. This Committee held three open hearings in April and May 2005, and also a closed hearing, receiving testimony and statements from a broad range of government and non-government witnesses. The testimony at the open hearings, and related materials, are printed as S. Hrg. 109-341. At its open hearing on April 19, 2005, the Committee heard testimony from Gregory T. Nojeim, Associate Director and Chief Legislative Counsel of the American Civil Liberties Union; James X. Dempsey, Executive Director of the Center for Democracy and Technology; and Heather MacDonald, Senior Fellow at the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research. TheCommittee also placed in the record statements from Bob Barr, former Member of Congress from Georgia and chairman of Patriots to Restore Checks and Balances; former Attorney General Edwin Meese III and Paul Rosenzweig, both from The Heritage Foundation; Professor Orin Kerr of the George Washington University Law School; and Kate Martin, Director, Center for National Security Studies. At its second open hearing, on April 27, 2005, the Committee heard testimony from Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III, and CIA Director Porter J. Goss. On May 24, 2005, the Committee held a third open hearing. Prior to the hearing, the Committee provided to the witnesses a draft bill that had been prepared by committee counsel for consideration by the Committee, and asked the witnesses to comment on it. The witness on the first panel on May 24 was Valerie Caproni, FBI General Counsel. The witnesses on the second panel were David S. Kris, a former Associate Deputy Attorney General; Joseph Onek, Senior Policy Analyst at the Open Society Institute and Director of the Liberty and Security Initiative at the Constitution Project (and also a former Deputy Associate Attorney General); Daniel P. Collins, a former Associate Deputy Attorney General and Chief Privacy Officer at the Department of Justice; and James X. Dempsey, Executive Director of the Center for Law and Technology. The Committee also placed in the record a letter setting forth the views of Professor Richard A. Seamon of the University of Idaho College of Law. On June 16, 2005, the Committee reported an original bill, S. 1266, to permanently authorize various provisions of the PATRIOT Act, clarify certain definitions in the FISA, and provide additional tools for intelligence investigations. The bill was accompanied by a report, S. Rep. No. 109-85, with additional and minority views. The vote to favorably report the bill was 11 ayes to 4 noes. The main elements of S. 1266 included:
               与PATRIOR法案第II项II中的九个情报有关当局的永久授权。这些包括关于信息共享(第203条)的规定,粗线窃听(第206条),笔寄存器和陷阱和跟踪权限(第214节),商业记录(第215节),FISA集合的阈值测试(第215节),即“重要目的”'是获得外国情报信息(第218部分),以及根据法院命令提供信息,设施或技术援助的通信提供商损害的免疫力(第225条)。
                为“2009年12月31日,为”2004年12月31日,为2004年的情报改革法案“的四年延期,扩大了外国权力代理人的定义(因此,FISA)为了包括对国际恐怖主义或准备的个人进行监督,无论与国际恐怖主义小组还是其他外国权力都有知名的联系。这项规定仅适用于非美国人员。
                 修改《外国情报监视法》(FISA)中外国情报信息的定义,将包括通过刑事起诉等执法手段保护国家安全的情报。
                  根据“爱国者法”第215条修订,向FISA的职位提供诉讼的经营记录的修正案,以规定订单的收件人可以披露他或她的律师,以获得法律咨询或援助,联邦调查局正在寻求记录。该修正案还规定了在法院的司法审查方面,要求生产文件和禁止政府正在寻求信息的披露。
                   关于国家安全邮件封面的FISA的新标题。邮寄职位将根据联邦调查局的要求提供,包括负责外地办事处的特殊代理人,邮政服务应提供与授权调查相关的信息,以获得外国情报信息或防止国际恐怖主义或秘密情报活动。这些信息将在任何邮件的外部封面上或法律授权的任何未密封邮件的内容记录。
                    国家安全调查中的行政传票上的FISA新标题。新标题将授权授权书长或指定官员(包括指定联邦调查局外地办事处的特殊代理商)发行行政话汇。该子开发赛可能要求生产与授权调查有关的任何相关记录,以获得对美国人员的外国情报,或者防止国际恐怖主义或秘密情报活动。标题将为司法执行司法执行,并由收到的人或实体对其进行司法审查。提交了几套额外和少数群体意见,并纳入了第1266号报告。这些观点更详细地解释了委员会成员的各个观点,并涉及上述许多规定以及未通过的修正案委员会。司法委员会还报告了一项条例草案,重新授权美国Patriot Act,1389年。在房子通过其重新授权法案后,参议院领导力选择对司法委员会报告的条例草案进行行动。该法案通过了参议院,并是与房子会议的基础。该委员会的法案仍持续,直到大会末,参议院日历。为了认识到委员会对外国情报监测立法的历史和司法局部利益,委员会主席和副主席被选中加入司法委员会作为会议参议院管理人员的领导。 Five of the Senate's 10 conferees were members of this Committee. On December 8, 2005, the conference committee submitted a report, H.R. Rep. No. 109-133. The House agreed to the conference report. After an unsuccessful cloture vote in the Senate, Congress postponed until February 3, 2006, the expiration of provisions scheduled to sunset. A second act extended the sunset until March 10, 2006. On March 1, 2006, the Senate passed S. 2271, the USA PATRIOT Act Additional Authorizing Amendments Act of 2006, which resolved three objections to the conference report. That enabled invocation of cloture on H.R. 3199 and its passage in the Senate, after which the House agreed to the additional amendments by passing S. 2271. The two measures were signed by the President on March 9, 2006, as Pub. L. Nos. 109-177 and 109-178. In sum, the PATRIOT Act reauthorization accomplished a number of objectives of great interest to the Committee, including:
                     制作16个爱国者行动当局的第14届,加上2004年情报改革法案的“孤狼”权威。
                      延伸四年,直到2009年12月31日,剩下的两次受到了落日的落日落日的日落 - 那些在第i型法案的第206条下罗对丝网和商业纪录下的商业记录订单下载,正如“爱国者法案”第215条修订的那样。
                       修改商业记录标题,以规定所寻求的记录必须与授权调查相关,该申请包括表现出合理理由的事实陈述,以相信,该命令只需要生产可以通过宏伟陪审团传票或者提供的事物的生产其他法院命令,并有最小化持有和传播所获得的信息的程序。
                        进一步修改FISA业务记录标题,以提供关于申请订单的收件人的司法审查,以制定收到订单的文件或酒吧披露,以及为申请国大会提供高级联邦调查局批准和统计报告用于生产图书馆,书籍,税收,枪支销售和教育记录。
                         包括有关国家安全信件(NSL)的修正案,以便在申请政府申请的司法执法,或者在收件人的申请中,为生产现有五个NSL法规涵盖的任何文件的任何类别的NSL或司法审查NSL的订单禁止披露。
                          根据2007年底,要求在2007年底完成两个阶段的司法IG部门的全面审核。在商业纪录下为联邦调查局提供的调查机构提供了有效性和使用,包括任何不当或非法使用FISA的标题。另一个具有类似的跨度,涉及司法部颁发的NSL的使用。每次审计的第一阶段已于2007年3月完成并提交给大会。
                           在司法部建立国家安全部门,由助理律师担任国家安全律师,该律师将作为DNI的司司长首次联络。新部门汇集了该部门的主力智能监督办公室,情报政策和审查办公室及其主要用户情报信息,负责反恐和抵消起诉的犯罪部分。III。监督活动A.听证会和简报1.年度全球威胁概述是委员会的长期惯例,以便在审查情报界对当前和预期的国家安全威胁对美国的评估中,委员会的长期惯例。第109大会的听证会涵盖了广泛的问题,并在开放和封闭的会议上举行。金博宝正规网址听证会提供各种整流解析机构的负责人有机会通知委员会和美国公众关于国家面临的威胁以及其组织提供有关和反击此类威胁的能力。2005年2月16日,委员会就目前和预计的美国威胁举行了开放的聆讯。在委员会之前作证是搬运工J. Goss,DCI;罗伯特S. Mueller,III,FBI主任;副海军上将洛厄尔E. Jacoby是Dia; Admiral James Loy, Deputy Secretary, Department of Homeland Security; and Carol A. Rodley, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research. The transcript of the Committee's February 16, 2005 open hearing, ``Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States,'' was printed and is available to the public as S. Hrg. 109-61 (2005). Director Goss identified widely dispersed terrorist networks as one of the most serious challenges to U.S. security interests at home and abroad. In Iraq, the insurgency remained a serious threat to creating a stable representative government. He highlighted continuing proliferation challenges from North Korea and Iran. North Korea claimed to have made new nuclear weapons from reprocessed fuel rods previously stored under International Atomic Energy Agency monitoring at its Yongbyong reactor and continued to develop, produce, deploy, and sell ballistic missiles of increasing range and sophistication. While Britain, Germany, and France were seeking objective guarantees from Iran that it would not use nuclear technology for nuclear weapons, Tehran publicly announced that it would not give up its ability to enrich uranium, and continued its pursuit of long-range ballistic missiles. Director Goss also noted that China'smilitary modernization and military buildup was tilting the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait and that improved Chinese capabilities threaten U.S. forces in the region. On February 2, 2006, the Committee held an open hearing on the current and projected threats to the United States. This was the first open threat hearing since the confirmation of the new DNI and Director John D. Negroponte presented a consolidated statement on behalf of the Intelligence Community. He was accompanied by Porter J. Goss, Director of the CIA; Robert S. Mueller III, Director of the FBI; General Michael V. Hayden, Principal Deputy DNI; Lieutenant General Michael Maples, Director of the DIA; Charles E. Allen, Chief Intelligence Officer, Department of Homeland Security; and Carol A. Rodley, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research. The record for this hearing has not yet been printed. In his February 2006 statement to the Committee, Director Negroponte explicitly identified terrorism as ``the preeminent threat to U.S. citizens, Homeland, interests, and friends.'' He said that al-Qa'ida, ``battered but resourceful,'' remained the top concern. Al-Qa'ida had inspired other Sunni jihadist groups, which, though posing less danger to the homeland, increasingly threatened U.S. allies and interests abroad. He added that unaffiliated individuals, groups, and cells represented a different kind of threat, which nonetheless posed a serious intelligence challenge. The future terrorist environment would be influenced both by the outcome in Iraq and in the world-wide debate between Muslim extremists and moderates. Director Negroponte identified the ongoing development of dangerous weapons and delivery systems in North Korea and Iran as the second major threat posed to the nation, U.S. troops, and U.S. allies. 2. China The Committee conducted considerable oversight of intelligence collection and analysis of China in the 109th Congress. The Committee held an oversight hearing on June 23, 2005 to provide members with assessments of China's military modernization, as well as to gain an understanding of how the analytic community assesses intelligence sources and gaps that may exist in forming their judgments. The Committee was especially focused on the community-wide organizational structure for maximizing collection efforts on China. Committee staff traveled to China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Japan to make independent determinations. Committee staff received regular briefings from most key collector agencies and groups on China, including from the ODNI, CIA, DIA, State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Office of Naval Intelligence, NSA, NGA, and FBI, as well as from non-governmental and academic experts on China. 3. Counterterrorism The Committee maintained a consistent focus on counterterrorism issues throughout the 109th Congress. In addition to open hearings on Worldwide Threats and the Patriot Act, the Committee held more than two dozen formal briefings on counterterrorism related topics. The Intelligence Community regularly provided Committee members with briefings on current intelligence about terrorist threats to the United States. The Committee devoted extensive attention to ensuring that the Intelligence Community received both the resources and authorization needed to combat violent extremists. For example, the Committee focused on further developing potent human intelligence capable of penetrating terrorist networks and increasing the number of intelligence officers in the field. The Committee also reviewed the effectiveness of programs focusing on terrorist finances and communications. Following the enactment of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which included the statutory authority for the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the Committee confirmed Vice Admiral Scott Redd to serve as the new NCTC Director and closely followed the development of the organization. Committee oversight of counterterrorism initiatives was not confined to formal hearings. Committee Members traveled to the detention facilities in Guantanamo Bay, examined counterterrorism efforts in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and devoted extensive attention to Intelligence Community efforts in Southeast Asia and Africa. 4. Cover issue Since 1997, when the Committee staff conducted its first cover audit, the Committee has been concerned about the Intelligence Community's ability to maintain cover for clandestine operations. To improve cover, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 provided the Intelligence Community with enhanced cover authority. Official cover and non-traditional cover of clandestine officers continue to be challenged by the increased sophistication of commercial and technological programs. The Committee held numerous briefings and, in June 2005, held a hearing on cover issues. The Committee included language in the Classified Annex to the fiscal year 2006 authorization bill designed to focus Intelligence Community resources and management attention on this critical intelligence challenge. 5. India-U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreement On July 18, 2005, President Bush announced that the Administration would seek to create a new relationship with India that would allow for cooperation in civil nuclear energy. India, not a member of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, exploded its first nuclear device in 1974 and exploded a device as recently as 1998. In anticipation of the debate on legislation to implement the agreement, and in addition to ongoing oversight of relevant Intelligence Community analysis of this subject, the Committee held a briefing for members on March 29, 2006. At that hearing,the National Intelligence Officer for Weapons of Mass Destruction and Proliferation and the National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia testified about the Intelligence Community's analysis of intelligence issues related to the passage of this change in our bilateral relationship, and the effect of this change on India's military nuclear program. The briefing also covered issues related to the current division between Indian civilian and military nuclear development, understanding Indian leadership's views of strategic nuclear issues and the effect of this agreement on that thinking, the effect on this agreement on India's options to test nuclear devices in the future, and India's record as a responsible actor in global proliferation. The Senate passed H.R. 5682, The United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006 by 85-12 on November 16, 2006, and the President signed the bill into law on December 18 (Pub. L. 109-401). 6. Iraq In addition to exhaustive review of prewar Iraq intelligence as part of the Committee's Phase II investigation, the Committee conducted regular briefings at the member and staff levels on current activities in Iraq. The Committee received testimony from the National Intelligence Officers with analytic responsibilities for the Near East and Military Issues and reviewed a large number of reports on conditions and trends in Iraq. The Committee also had numerous meetings with analysts and collectors from the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, military services, and technical collection agencies concerning their views and activities related to the ongoing conflict in Iraq. In addition, numerous members of the Committee visited Iraq throughout the 109th Congress. These members not only increased their knowledge of the situation in Iraq but were able to make independent assessments of the contribution of the Intelligence Community to the effort. 7. Overhead reconnaissance architecture The Committee conducted numerous staff briefings and interviews, and one hearing with senior Intelligence Community officials, to discuss our nation's satellite reconnaissance architecture. These sessions dealt with agreements between the Department of Defense and the then fledgling Office of the Director of National Intelligence; cost concerns relating to major system acquisition; ongoing studies about an objective architecture and investments related to achieving that architecture; and concerns over the agencies' fiscal discipline. In the Classified Annexes to the annual Intelligence Authorizations bills, the Committee expressed concern over the rising costs of ill-defined or poorly managed programs; continued ``stovepiped'' acquisitions; inadequate investment in foundational capabilities; inadequate functional management of the broader intelligence enterprises; and an apparent reluctance to embrace new and more cost-effective technologies. 8. Department of Treasury Intelligence Program On May 11, 2006, the Committee conducted a hearing with the Department of the Treasury on the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program. The program involves the issuance of subpoenas to collect information from a company that operates a worldwide messaging system used to transmit bank transaction information. The information obtained is searched for counterterrorism purposes. The program was publicly acknowledged on June 23, 2006. Subsequent to the hearing, Committee staff conducted several briefings on the program. In addition, the Committee held a hearing on July 20, 2006, on terrorist financing. B. Committee Reviews 1. Phase II of the inquiry into the prewar intelligence assessments on Iraq In June 2003, the Committee began a review of U.S. intelligence related to the existence of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, Iraq's ties to terrorist groups, Saddam Hussein's threat to stability and security in the region, and his violations of human rights including the actual use of WMD against his own people. In February 2004, the Committee voted unanimously to authorize formally the ongoing review and to expand the scope of the work as previously described by the Chairman and Vice Chairman in June 2003. It was the stated intention of the Chairman to produce an initial report covering areas that were near completion. The expanded scope along with questions related to the accuracy of prewar WMD and terrorism assessments became the five topics in a second phase of the Committee's Iraq Review. The other topics in Phase II were to be prewar intelligence about postwar Iraq, whether prewar public statements were substantiated by intelligence information, the Intelligence Community's use of information provided by the Iraqi National Congress, and intelligence activities within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The Phase I report--the Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, S. Rep. No. 108-301--was submitted to the Senate on July 9, 2004. On September 8, 2006, the Committee submitted to the Senate redacted unclassified reports on two Phase II matters: (1) Postwar Findings About Iraq's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments, S. Rep. No. 109-331 (``Accuracy Report''); and (2) The Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress, S. Rep. No. 109-330 (``INC Report''). Unredacted classified copies of the reports are available to all members of the Senate for reading at the Committee. The Committee's vote to adopt the findings and conclusions of the Accuracy Report was 14 ayes and 1 no. The Committee vote to adopt the findings and conclusions of the INC Report was 11 ayes and 4 noes. Language offered in the form of amendments was incorporated in thereports. The Committee Actions section of both reports includes a description of each amendment offered and action taken on the amendment. Several sets of additional and minority views to each report were filed by Senators. All of those views are printed in the reports. At the end of 109th Congress, the Committee was continuing its work evaluating prewar intelligence about post-invasion Iraq, and whether prewar public statements were substantiated by intelligence information. In early 2007, the Committee received a report from the Department of Defense IG on the intelligence activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy that had been requested by the Committee Chairman in August 2005. 2. Able danger The Committee began a review of a Department of Defense program, Able Danger, in August 2005, when certain allegations relating to the program gained prominence in the media. Able Danger was the unclassified name for a 1999 effort directed by then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry H. Shelton, U.S. Army, to develop a campaign plan against transnational terrorism with an initial focus on the al Qa'ida terrorist network. Committee staff examined four specific claims made in the media about the Able Danger effort: Claim 1: The Able Danger program had linked Mohammed Atta and three other September 11 hijackers to al Qa'ida on a chart prepared almost two years prior to September 11, 2001. Claim 2: Soon after the September 11 attacks, the pre-September 11, 2001 chart with Mohammed Atta's picture was passed to then-Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley. Claim 3: Defense Department lawyers prevented Able Danger team members from sharing Able Danger's findings with the FBI. Claim 4: Defense Department lawyers wrongly interpreted intelligence oversight law and issued legal guidance that unnecessarily restricted the Able Danger effort and caused the destruction of Able Danger program data. Committee staff interviewed numerous individuals who had worked on the Able Danger program or had knowledge of the issues surrounding its activities, including each of the five individuals who claimed to have seen Mohammed Atta's name and picture on an Able Danger chart produced prior to 9/11. In September 2005, Committee staff briefed Committee members about this inquiry. Following that brief, Committee staff conducted additional interviews and document reviews. In September 2006, the Department of Defense IG completed a report examining many of the issues that the Committee staff had been reviewing plus additional areas of inquiry. The Committee staff met with the IG and reviewed the report in detail. In December 2006, Chairman Roberts and Vice Chairman Rockefeller wrote to the members of the Committee to inform them that the Committee staff had concluded its work and judged that Able Danger did not identify Mohammed Atta or any other 9/ 11 hijacker at any time prior to September 11, 2001. The Chairman and Vice Chairman reported further that Committee staff found no evidence to support the allegation that Able Danger team members were prevented from pursuing contact with the FBI to share terrorism related information found by the Able Danger program; no evidence that the Able Danger program produced any actionable intelligence or any information which would have warranted sharing with the FBI; and the Committee staff concluded that Department of Defense lawyers correctly interpreted intelligence oversight law and issued appropriate legal guidance on the collection, retention, and destruction of information. The text of the letter from the Chairman and Vice Chairman is available on the Committee's website at http:// intelligence.senate.gov/. C. Financial Accounting, Inspectors General, and Audits The Committee's rules provide that within its staff there ``shall be an element with the capability to perform audits of programs and activities undertaken by departments and agencies with intelligence functions. Such element shall be comprised of persons qualified by training and/or experience to carry out such functions in accordance with accepted auditing standards.'' During the 109th Congress, the name of the staff element was changed from Audits and Investigations to Audits and Evaluations. In addition to audits, this element has responsibility for assisting in the Committee's oversight of Intelligence Community compliance with financial accounting standards and also the Committee's interaction with the various IGs whose work includes or covers the Intelligence Community. 1. Intelligence community compliance with Federal financial accounting standards During the 109th Congress, the Committee continued to closely monitor the Intelligence Community's financial management practices. The foundation for these activities is the 1990 Chief Financial Officers Act, which requires public sector agencies to report financial information in a structured and uniform manner. One goal of the Act was to establish a process to provide reliable, useful, and timely financial information to support decision making and accountability regarding the use of federal funds. The Act requires independent audits of agency financial information to evaluate performance against this goal. The results of these audits are public information. Since the enactment of the Chief Financial Officers Act, the federal government has made substantial progress in strengthening financial management and accountability. In fiscal year 2004, 16 of the original 24 federal agencies required to comply with the financial statement auditrequirement received unqualified opinions on their financial statements. According to the Government Accountability Office, the underlying trend at these 16 agencies was that they embraced the idea of obtaining auditable financial statements, as opposed to giving reasons why it would be too costly or difficult to achieve the requirement. The elements of the Intelligence Community were not included in the original 24 agency pilot program. In its report accompanying the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2002, S. Rep. No. 107-63, at 15-16 (2001), this Committee required that the DCI, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, direct a statutory IG to perform audits of the ``form and content'' of the fiscal year 2001 financial statements for the NSA, DIA, CIA, and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, since renamed the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and report the audit findings to the Intelligence Committees by April 1, 2002. The Committee further directed that the DCI, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense ``ensure that all agencies in the DoD-NFIP [Department of Defense National Foreign Intelligence Program] aggregation, including the CIA, receive an audit of their financial statements by March 1, 2005.'' The fiscal year 2001 form and content reviews were not comprehensive audits; rather, they were intended to prepare the agencies to undergo a comprehensive financial statement audit of their fiscal year 2004 data. The IGs completed the form and content reviews but the agencies were unable to meet the 2004 audit requirement, a deadline that has been extended several times. In December 2006, when it became evident that the NSA, NGA, and DIA were still unable to comply, the Chairman and Vice Chairman granted another extension, providing that the fiscal year 2007 financial statement audits for all Intelligence Community agencies shall be completed by November 15, 2007, and that by March 1, 2007, the DNI, in consultation with the Office of Management and Budget, shall submit to the Committee a plan for Intelligence Community compliance with the financial statement audit requirement. Beyond the need to satisfy the existing financial statement audit requirement, the Committee remained concerned throughout the 109th Congress that the agencies of the Intelligence Community cannot quantify their cost of doing business nor demonstrate a tangible plan to improve financial management. In its May 2006 report on the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, the Committee directed the DNI and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to develop a plan to transform Intelligence Community financial management. One objective is the preparation of a strategic plan for a single Intelligence Community financial management system, including a consolidated financial statement for the National Intelligence Program for fiscal year 2009. The Committee directed that the plan should address development of a common accounting code and standard business processes for the Intelligence Community. S. Rep. No. 109-259, at 44. 2. Oversight of Intelligence Community Inspectors General During the 109th Congress, the Committee continued to monitor the activities of the Intelligence Community IGs. This oversight included: review of numerous IG products, including audit reports, inspection reports, reports of investigation, and semi-annual reports of IG activities; numerous visits to IG offices for updates on plans and procedures; and attendance and participation at several IG conferences. In addition to a number of Committee hearings on issues reviewed by the IGs, staff conducted a number of briefings with Intelligence Community program officials and IG personnel in order to follow up on the status of IG recommendations. Examples include employee grievances, management of operational activities, contracting procedures, employee recruitment and security processing, the CIA's Working Capital Fund, and effective use of resources on new technology. During the 109th Congress, the Committee continued its work to ensure the effectiveness and independence of the administrative, non-statutory IGs at the NRO, NSA, NGA, DIA, and the ODNI. The Committee reinforced the importance of the IG function through its regular interaction with agency directors, the IGs, and their staffs. The administrative IGs also submitted annual reports to the Committee detailing their requests for fiscal and personnel resources, and the plan for their use. These reports included the agency programs and activities scheduled for review during the fiscal year, comments on the office's ability to hire and retain qualified personnel, any concerns relating to the independence and effectiveness of the IG's office, and an overall assessment of the agency's response to the IG's recommendations during the previous year. These annual reports served as a basis for Committee oversight throughout the 109th Congress. Additionally the Committee included provisions in the fiscal years 2006 and 2007 Intelligence Authorization bills to add the IGs at the NRO, NSA, NGA, and DIA to the Section 8G of the Inspector General Act of 1978. This statutory designation will provide the IGs with additional authorities to conduct investigation including the ability to compel the production of information. Both years' Authorization bills also included a provision amending the National Security Act of 1947 to establish a statutory charter for the DNI IG. 3. Audits During the 109th Congress, the Committee's audit staff completed audits of the CIA's In-Q-Tel venture and the implementation of the FISA, and made substantial progress toward completing three other audits. a. In-Q-Tel In-Q-Tel was established in 1999 as an independent, private, not-for-profit company to identify and deliver cutting-edge information technology solutions to the CIA. In May 2005, in response to the Committee's concerns about the success of In-Q-Tel in achieving this goal, theChairman and Vice Chairman asked the Audit and Evaluations Staff to conduct an audit. The audit staff examined the success of In-Q-Tel, specifically in terms of the commercial technologies actually reaching the CIA. In April 2006, the final report of the audit was transmitted to the DNI for dissemination within the Intelligence Community. The audit determined that while In-Q- Tel has not revolutionized the way the CIA does business, the venture capital model has produced some successes, primarily in the area of analytic tools. The CIA's aging information technology infrastructure and bureaucratic software accreditation process have hindered In-Q-Tel technology transfer. The audit concluded that the Committee should continue to support the In-Q-Tel program while encouraging the CIA to upgrade its infrastructure to better enable In-Q-Tel commercial technology infusion and to place a higher priority on transferring In-Q-Tel products to CIA end users. b. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act The Committee has periodically reviewed the implementation of the FISA since the law was enacted in 1978. The last Committee audit of the FISA process, prior to the audit completed in the 109th Congress, was conducted in 1998. Since then, Congress had made numerous important changes to the statute that warranted review of their implementation. While the Committee's Audit and Evaluations Staff began its formal review of the FISA process in the 108th Congress, the final audit report on procedures, practices, and use under the FISA was completed in the 109th Congress in support of the Committee's deliberations regarding the USA PATRIOT Act. The classified report was provided to the DNI for distribution to appropriate Intelligence Community elements. In its June 2005 report to accompany its PATRIOT Act bill, the Committee described the audit, which was then nearing completion, to be ``one of the most thorough reviews of Executive branch activities under the FISA since the USA PATRIOT Act was enacted.'' S. Rep. No. 109-85, at 2. The audit included a review of the backlog of requests for FISA coverage, an analysis of the impact of the temporary FISA provisions that were included in the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, and an assessment of the resource requirements associated with FISA activities. The audit report made a total of 43 recommendations. Twelve recommendations were addressed to the Committee; of these, ten were the subject of legislation that was ultimately approved by the Congress. In conducting its review, the Committee noted that some delays in processing FISA warrants were attributable to inadequate staffing levels, inefficient organizational structures within the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR), and differences of opinion between the FBI and the OIPR. The Committee offered several recommendations to address these delays including the drafting of a Memorandum of Understanding that outlines each organization's responsibilities for FISA applications. The Committee also examined the use of new technology to enhance administrative aspects of the FISA process throughout the Intelligence Community. Using technology to improve the connectivity between the FBI and the OIPR would enhance access to relevant documents, thereby decreasing the amount of time necessary to process a FISA request. During the course of the audit, it came to the Committee's attention that most FBI field divisions did not have sufficient Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities to house national security personnel and provide ready access to secure communications equipment and resources. The Committee recommended that the FBI Director take immediate steps to address this shortfall. Finally, the Committee recommended that the Attorney General develop new FISA minimization procedures to reflect modern target profiles and communication capabilities, as well as information processing technologies. c. Intelligence community personnel growth The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) recommended that the Director of the CIA emphasize rebuilding that agency's analytic and human intelligence collection capabilities. President Bush endorsed this recommendation and, in November 2004, directed the CIA to increase its number of all source analysts and case officers by 50 percent, increase the number of language qualified officers by 50 percent, and double the number of personnel doing research and development. Although the President's directive focused on the CIA, there have been significant personnel increases in other agencies as well. In February 2005, the Committee initiated an audit to examine the full scope of the activities and resources that would be necessary to support the proposed personnel growth. During the 109th Congress, the Audit and Evaluations Staff reviewed whether the Intelligence Community has in place the practices and procedures necessary to properly recruit, train, equip, field, and retain the additional personnel, and to determine the associated funding levels necessary to implement this growth in personnel. While the audit was not issued and provided to the Intelligence Community until early 2007, it essentially was complete at the end of 2006. The findings indicate that the projected growth of new personnel across the Intelligence Community has not been well defined. The requirements for the additional personnel have not been documented and there has been limited planning for a comparable growth in support functions. Specifically, the audit has identified the following issues:
                            招聘流程不足以满足人员目标
                             培训能力和安全办公空间的重要短缺
                              规划行政,物流和技术支持不足
                               在使用承包商的支持为解决本次审计发现的顾虑最小控制,委员会在拟议情报授权法案为2007财年该围栏与人才成长相关的基金和需要DNI提供全面的人才发展战略的语言。随机附带的授权法案的报告,委员会注意到人事增长审核,并指出,情报界面临着实施拟议增长显著的挑战。天。文件利用在2005年12月,该委员会的审计和评估工作人员开始收集,处理,翻译,以及从公开地捕获和/或秘密获取的纸张文档和电子媒体获得的信息报告的做法进行审查。这个总体活动,称为文档和媒体剥削或``DOCEX“”是自2001年以来实现,因为它提供了两个战术行动和战略分析的有价值的情报信息,资金的快速增长的努力。委员会关切的是过程,翻译变化和不同情报部门的倡议,并利用拍摄的文档和电子媒体。审计工作分析的各种文档和媒体开发力度及相关技术开发项目的成本。审计还评估这些努力并维持了长期的这些举措的预算问题得到的情报价值。建立在这种持续的审核,该委员会的初步结果,在伴随其2007财年的法案2006年5月的报告,鼓励DNI任命为国家情报计划DOCEX努力的项目经理,制定国家DOCEX战略,形成了DOCEX技术投资委员会,以指导和制定协调以社区广泛的研究和发展战略。 e. Compartmented program The Committee's Audit and Evaluation Staff conducted a review of a compartmented Intelligence Community program. Given the significant amount of time and money that had been invested in that program, the Committee was concerned about the termination of a major program element and whether the Committee had been adequately informed about the program's overall status. The audit examined the series of events and activities that led to the current program status, as well as the associated cost. This audit will be completed in early 2007 and will guide the Committee in making future funding decisions regarding this program. D. Restricted Access Programs During the 109th Congress, public disclosures of two previously highly classified programs focused attention on the Executive branch practice of providing notification of certain intelligence activities to only a limited number of members of Congress. This practice is sometimes known as a ``Gang of Eight'' notification because of the procedure contained in Section 503(c)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947. That section authorizes the President, in extraordinary circumstances, to limit notification of covert action findings to eight members of Congress--the Chairman and ranking members of the intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and the majority and minority leader of the Senate. In the case of these two programs, once they were disclosed they became the subject of intense legislative interest although very few members were knowledgeable of the details of either. 1. Detention and interrogation In November 2005, press stories appeared describing a program of clandestine detention facilities in various foreign locations being run by the CIA. On September 6, 2006, the President acknowledged the existence of a CIA program to detain and question suspected terrorists outside the United States. He also announced the transfer of 14 individuals detained under this program from these foreign sites to the U.S. military facility at Guantanamo Bay. According to the President, these 14 were the only individuals detained in the overseas CIA facilities at the time of the announcement. This Committee had been briefed in a general way about the existence of a CIA detention program from its inception. Key aspects of the program, however, were briefed to the Chairman and Vice Chairman. In November 2006, the information that had been restricted previously was provided to the full membership of the Committee. At the same time the President acknowledged the existence of the CIA detention program, he announced his intention to send a legislative proposal to the Congress to establish military tribunals to try terrorism suspects and also ``to ensure that the CIA program goes forward in a way that follows the law.'' Several bills on this topic were introduced and debated. On September 28, 2006, S. 3930, the Military Commissions Act of 2006 passed the Senate. It passed the House the next day and was signed by the President as Pub. L. No. 109-366. On signing the bill, the President reiterated that he had ``one test for the bill Congress produced: Will it allow the CIA program to continue?'' The Military Commissions Act addresses a number of matters of interest to the responsibilities of the Committee. It establishes rules on the protection and introduction of classified information in military commission. It specifies the conduct that would constitute grave breaches of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and be subject to U.S. criminal penalties. It authorizes the President to promulgate administrative regulations regarding violations of the Geneva Conventions and to publish interpretations on the meaning and application of the Conventions in the Federal Register. It provides that the President shall take action to ensure compliance with the prohibition on cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment that had been enacted in the Detainee Treatment Act, including through the establishment of administrative rules and procedures. 2. NSA surveillance In December 2005, press reports described an NSA program to collect electronic communications intelligence inside the United States absent a warrant issued under the FISA. The Executive branch subsequently disclosed that knowledge of this program had been limited to very few members of Congress--the Gang of Eight plus senior members of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittees and a few other members of the congressional leadership. The Chairman and Vice Chairman sought to have member access to this program expanded for the members of this Committee. In March 2006, the Committee reached agreement with the Executive branch to establish an ad hoc subcommittee of seven members, including the Chairman and Vice Chairman, to oversee the program. In May 2006, the restriction was further modified and all members of this Committee were given access to information about the NSA program. Following resolution of the access question, the Committee, and three members of the staff, received several briefings about the legal parameters and operation of the program. The program generated significant interest in the Congress. Different pieces of legislation related to the program were introduced. Three of these bills were reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee and others were placed on the Senate Calendar without referral to a committee, but no floor action occurred in the Senate. Early in the current Congress, this Committee announced its intention to examine carefully legislative proposals on surveillance matters. E. Review of Intelligence Related to Iran In the 109th Congress, the Committee initiated a Community- wide review of how well our intelligence agencies are collecting and analyzing information about Iran, including its WMD programs. The review has focused on mapping the Community's efforts in order to establish a baseline of what the various agencies of the Community are doing to collect information on Iran, what their analytic judgments on Iran are, and how well grounded those assessments are. The Committee has designated a staff team to undertake this review, which has had briefings from, or meetings with, various agencies on their Iran programs, including the CIA, DIA, NGA, NSA, ODNI, Department of Energy, Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research, NCTC, U.S. Special Forces Command, and National Intelligence Council. The review is also looking at how well the various intelligence agencies work together under the DNI on Iran matters. This includes to what extent lessons learned, as identified in the Committee's 2004 report on the performance of the Intelligence Community before the Iraq War, have been applied to current issues such as Iran. It is anticipated that the review will result in recommendations to improve U.S. intelligence capabilities concerning Iran and in general. F. Covert Action Under the National Security Act, the DNI shall keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all covert actions that are the responsibility of, are engaged in by, or are carried out for or on behalf of any department or agency of the United States, including significant failures. The National Security Act defines a covert action to be an activity of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the U.S. Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly. The DNI shall furnish the committees with any information concerning covert actions that is in the possession of any U.S. Government entity and which is requested by either intelligence committee in order to carry out its responsibilities. The only qualification on this reporting responsibility is consistency with due regard for protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters. Under the Committee's rules, the Staff Director shall ensure that U.S. Government covert action programs receive appropriate consideration by the Committee no less frequently than once a quarter. Every quarter, the Committee receives a written report on each covert action that is being carried out under a presidential finding. Committee staff then devote several sessions, often over a couple of days, to review with Intelligence Community personnel the reports on each subject, and often pose follow up questions and receive further briefings or written answers. As the Committee has written in past reports, the purpose of these reviews includes to ensure that their means and objectives are consistent with U.S. foreign policy goals, were conducted in accordance with U.S. law, produce or can be expected to produce reasonable benefits for the resources expended, and are consistent with U.S. ideals and principles. There is often questioning about the effectiveness of the programs. G. Independent Cost Estimates During the 109th Congress, the Committee continued its efforts to address the growth in major acquisition costs by the Intelligence Community. The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 formalized the process for developing independent cost estimates for major Intelligence Community acquisitions. The Act required the preparation of an independent cost estimate of the full life-cycle cost of development, procurement, and operation of any system projected to cost more than $500 million. The Act further required the President's budget request to reflect the amounts identified in the independent cost estimates, or if it did not, to explain why it differed. Prior to Committee action to address the growth in acquisition costs, the budget for major systems generally reflected cost estimates prepared by the Intelligence Community component responsible for acquiring and operating the system. The magnitude and frequency of cost growth in major systems indicated a systemic bias within the Intelligence Community to underestimatethe costs of such acquisitions. The Committee recognized that the use of independent cost estimates prepared by offices outside the acquiring and operating components had resulted in more accurate projections of the costs of major systems. Throughout the 109th Congress, the Committee continued to monitor compliance with this Act, including prohibitions on the obligation or expenditure of funds for the development or procurement of major systems without statutory independent cost estimates. Committee staff reviewed independent cost estimates for major program acquisitions in the National Intelligence Program. The Committee relied on the independent work done by the Department of Defense and Intelligence Community Cost Analysis Improvement Groups (CAIGs). The Committee has reviewed several independent cost estimates from the Department of Defense and Intelligence Community CAIGs relating to major National Intelligence Program acquisitions. These estimates have been very useful tools for the Committee in its ongoing effort to instill fiscal discipline into the Intelligence Community's budget. H. Declassification During the 109th Congress, the Committee dealt with a number of issues related to declassification of information. 1. CIA accountability report The December 10, 2002, Report of Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 of the Senate and House intelligence committees included a three-part recommendation on accountability. First, the DCI should report to the Committees in 2003 on steps taken to implement a system of accountability throughout the Intelligence Community. Second, in the confirmation process for Intelligence Community officials, Congress should require an affirmative commitment to the implementation and use of strong accountability mechanisms. Third, a review of whether employees deserved awards for outstanding service or should be accountable for failing to satisfactorily perform their duties should be conducted. With regard to accountability, the recommendation stated: . . . the Inspectors General at the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, and the Department of State should review the factual findings and record of this Inquiry and conduct investigations and reviews as necessary to determine whether and to what extent personnel at all levels should be held accountable for any omission, commission, or failure to meet professional standards in regard to the identification, prevention, or disruption of terrorist attacks, including the events of September 11, 2001. S. Rep. No. 107-351 and H. Rep. No. 107-792, Recommendation 16 (2002). Each of the IGs listed in the recommendation completed and submitted a report to the Committee. In July 2004, the Department of Justice IG completed a 421- page classified report entitled A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Relating to the September 11 Attacks. This report was provided to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) and to the House and Senate Judiciary and Intelligence Committees. In June 2005, at the request of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Department of Justice IG publicly released an unclassified, redacted version of that report, on all matters except Zacharias Moussaoui, against whom criminal proceedings were then pending in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. In June 2006, after the conclusion of the Moussaoui case, the IG released the full unclassified report, including the section on the FBI's handling of the Moussaoui matter. The total length of the Department of Justice IG unclassified report was 370 pages, amounting to approximately 87 percent of the original classified report. In the introduction to the unclassified report, the Department of Justice IG noted that the review of the FBI's handling of information about two September 11 hijackers, Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdar (who entered the United States in January 2000 and first resided in San Diego), required obtaining a significant amount of information from the CIA about its interactions with the FBI on that matter. The report notes that the IG Office at the Department of Justice had to rely on the cooperation of the CIA in providing access to CIA witnesses and documents, and that while they were able to obtain CIA documents and interview CIA witnesses they ``did not have the same access to the CIA that [they] had to Department of Justice information and employees.'' The Department of Justice IG noted that CIA IG was conducting his own inquiry into CIA actions regarding al Mihdar and al Hazmi. The CIA IG report was completed in June 2005 and delivered to the Committee as a classified document in August of that year. In contrast to the Department of Justice IG report, no part or summary of the CIA IG report has yet been made public. In August 2005, Chairman Roberts wrote to then-CIA Director Porter Goss and requested that the CIA IG report be declassified ``as soon as practicable and to the maximum extent possible.'' Chairman Roberts repeated this request in a second letter the following month, stating: ``I believe that the deaths of nearly 3,000 citizens on September 11, 2001 gives the American public a strong interest in knowing what the IG found and whether those whose performance was lacking will be held accountable.'' Although Director Goss responded to both letters, he did not make any commitment regarding declassification of the report. In January 2006, Senator Wyden wrote to Director Goss, again requesting that the report be redacted and declassified. In an April 2006 reply, Director Goss declined to commit to releasing the report. The issue was raised during the confirmation hearing for the new CIA Director, General Michael Hayden, who stated in a May 2006 letter to Senator Wyden that he intended to examine the issue. In June 2006, Committee staff prepared a proposed redacted version of the Executive Summary of the report which Chairman Roberts sent to General Hayden for comment. In August 2006, General Hayden notified the Committee that he did not intend to declassify the report. In September 2006, Chairman Roberts forwarded the proposed redacted Executive Summary to DNI Negroponte, and requested that he work with the Committee to determine what redactions would be necessary in order to release the report. In a November 2006 reply, Director Negroponte declined to do so. In January 2007, upon the organization of the Committee in the current Congress, Chairman Rockefeller, Vice Chairman Bond, and Senator Wyden wrote to Director Negroponte with their comments on his November letter. Because the letter completes the exchange with Director Negroponte, we describe it here. The letter begins by describing the importance of the CIA IG report: This report provides a unique perspective on one of the defining events in American history, and we believe that, while the body of the report is reviewed for later release, the Executive Summary should be declassified without further delay and released to the public. We recognize that the report contains some sensitive national security information, and this information must be redacted from the Executive Summary before the Summary is released. The letter states that if the DNI has particular concerns about the proposed redaction of the Executive Summary prepared at the Committee, he should ``propose specific further redactions that are based on particular classification grounds.'' It notes that one reason advanced in the DNI's November 2006 letter for declining action on declassification is not a valid basis for classification under current law and executive orders. While it is possible that some high-profile intelligence officials could be identified by their title alone, that possibility has not prevented those officials from being described in other public reports. To the extent that the DNI expressed concern about damage to the reputation of high- profile intelligence officials whose identities could be revealed in the report, the letter encourages the DNI to permit release of redacted versions of their responses to the IG report. Finally, the letter notes that the Department of Justice IG had produced a similar report and that most of it had been appropriately declassified and released, ``providing a clear example to be followed.'' 2. Reports on prewar intelligence regarding Iraq In September 2006, as described above, the Committee released two reports on prewar intelligence regarding Iraq. In the introduction to its report on the accuracy of prewar assessments of Iraqi WMD and links to terrorism, the Committee expressed disagreement with the Intelligence Community's decision to classify certain portions of the report and concluded that this decision was not justified. Seven members of the Committee wrote to the then recently- constituted Public Interest Declassification Board to request that it review the documents and make recommendations regarding their classification. In an interim response, the Board indicated that it might not be able to conduct such a review without White House authorization. This was followed by a letter from six senators in October, expressing their disagreement with the Board's interpretation of its mandate and requesting that the Board begin its review. Chairman Roberts and Vice Chairman Rockefeller repeated this request in a November letter. These letters are available at the National Archives website (http://www.archives.gov/declassification/ pidb/declassification-requests.html). In December 2006, the Board wrote to the Chair of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, requesting that the statute authorizing the Board be clarified to establish that the Board could begin, without approval by the White House, a declassification review requested by the Congress. In January 2007, that Committee reported legislation to achieve this objective. 3. Iraq WMD Retrospective Series The Committee's report on the accuracy of prewar intelligence on Iraqi WMD included an appendix that briefly described five papers that the CIA had published, starting in January 2005, as part of its Iraq WMD Retrospective Series. A sixth retrospective was in progress. The series addressed the CIA's current post-Operation Iraqi Freedom understanding of Iraq's WMD and delivery programs. The Committee stated that it was evident that ``the retrospective series will be an important source of information about the history of these times. For that reason, the Committee has asked the CIA to declassify the retrospectives to the extent consistent with national security.'' That declassification has not yet occurred. 4. National Archives audit In early 2006, a National Archives' Information Security Oversight Office audit disclosed that records had been removed from public access at the National Archives for classification reasons. In April 2006, the officials from Information Security Oversight Office briefed Committee staff on the results of the audit. The audit found that a large number of documents had been improperly classified, declassified, or reclassified, and made a number of recommendations for improvement of the classification process. The audit and recommendations were publicly released and can be found on the web page of the National Archives (http://www.archives.gov/declassification/). I. Oversight of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence Following confirmation of John Negroponte as the first DNI in April 2005, Committee staff conducted oversight of the establishment of the ODNI and the implementation of the Intelligence Reform Act. Committee staff met with and received numerous briefings from components of the ODNI, including the offices of the four Deputy Directors authorized by the Intelligence Reform Act. The DNI used that authority to establish Deputy Directors for Analysis (who also serves concurrently as the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council), Collection, Management (including development and execution of the National Intelligence Program budget), and Requirements. The Committee staff also received briefings from the DNI's NCTC, National Counterproliferation Center, the Mission Managers for Iran and North Korea, the DNI IG, the Chief Information Officer, the Chief Financial Officer, and the Civil Liberties and Privacy Officer, among others. The ODNI submitted numerous reports and strategy documents to the Committee during 2005 and 2006. For example, the ODNI provided the National Intelligence Strategy, the National Intelligence Priorities Framework, the Annual Report of the United States Intelligence Community, semiannual progress reports on the implementation of the DNI's budget authorities, the Implementation Plan for the Information Sharing Environment, the Intelligence Community's Annual Report on the Hiring and Retention of Minority Employees, a report on efforts to address foreign language shortfalls, a report describing reviews of analytic products, the report of the Future Overhead SIGINT Architecture Panel, and updates on the activities of the Office of Analytic Integrity and Standards & Ombudsman. IV. NOMINATIONS During the 109th Congress, ten nominations were referred to the Committee, nine directly upon receipt in the Senate and one sequentially after referral to and reporting by another committee. The Committee held hearings for nine of the ten nominees and recommended to the Senate that it give its advice and consent to each of those nine nominations, which was done. Throughout the Congress, referrals to the Committee were governed for the first time by Section 17 of S. Res. 400 of the 94th Congress, which had been added by S. Res. 445 of the 108th Congress and was further augmented during the 109th Congress. As a result of S. Res. 445, all nominations to advice and consent positions in the Intelligence Community are referred to this Committee, even when they are positions--such as the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis or the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research--that are within departments which are primarily under the jurisdiction of other Senate committees. Four of the nominations were for positions created by the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 that were being filled for the first time: DNI; Principal Deputy DNI; the Director of the NCTC; and the General Counsel, Office of Director of National Intelligence. Three nominations were for positions, also filled for the first time, that were created by other legislation in the 108th or 109th Congress: Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis, established by the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (December 13, 2003); Chief Information Officer, ODNI, established by the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (December 23, 2004); and Assistant Attorney General for National Security, established by the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (March 9, 2006). A primary task of the Committee during the 109th Congress was to examine in detail, for the first time in the setting of a nomination, the responsibilities of these new leadership positions in the Intelligence Community. The Committee accomplished this not only through questioning the nominees at their confirmation hearings but also through extensive prehearing questions, the responses to which have been or will be printed in the hearing volumes for these nominations. During the 109th Congress, the Committee also received and acted on a nomination for Director of the CIA, but not as an immediate consequence of the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004. In a formal opinion in January 2005, the Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice concluded that when the Intelligence Reform Act took effect (within six months of its enactment in December 2004), the then-current DCI would not require a new appointment to the office of the Director of the CIA should the President wish him to serve in that position. In accordance with that opinion and the President's wish, the DCI, who was then Porter Goss, served as Director of the CIA until his resignation in May 2006, at which time the President nominated and the Committee and Senate acted on the nomination of General Michael Hayden to be Director the CIA. The following were the nominations referred to the Committee during the 109th Congress, listed in accordance with the date of the nomination: A. John D. Negroponte, Director of National Intelligence As described earlier in this report, the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 created the position of DNI and assigned to the DNI the responsibility of serving as the head of the Intelligence Community and acting as the principal adviser to the President for intelligence matters relating to national security. The Reform Act provides that any individual nominated to be appointed as DNI shall have extensive national security experience. Among the position's duties and responsibilities, the DNI is charged with determining the annual National Intelligence Program budget and ensuring the effective execution of it. The DNI is to determine requirements and priorities for the collection, analysis, and dissemination ofnational intelligence. The DNI shall ensure compliance with the Constitution and laws by the CIA and, through their host departments, by the other elements of the Intelligence Community. On March 17, 2005, the President nominated John D. Negroponte, then serving as U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, to be the first DNI. In the course of a long diplomatic career, he had served as U.S. Ambassador to Honduras, Mexico, and the Philippines, and, immediately before Iraq, as the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations. He had also served in the White House as a Deputy National Security Adviser and in the State Department as an Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs. After receiving Ambassador Negroponte's responses to the Committee's standard questionnaire, and responses to the Committee's prehearing questions about his understanding of the duties and responsibilities of the office to which he had been nominated, the Committee held a nomination hearing on April 12, 2005. Following the hearing, members also posed additional questions in writing. Ambassador Negroponte's testimony and answers to the written questions are printed in S. Hrg. 109-79. The Committee reported the nomination favorably on April 14, 2005, by a vote of 14 to 1. The Senate confirmed Ambassador Negroponte's appointment to be DNI on April 21, 2005, by a vote of 98-2. B. Michael V. Hayden, Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence The Intelligence Reform Act established the position of Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence (PDDNI) to assist the DNI in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the Director under the National Security Act. The Act provides that the PDDNI shall exercise the powers of the DNI during the DNI's absence or disability, or in the event of a vacancy. It also provides that an individual nominated for appointment as PDDNI shall not only have extensive national security experience (a requirement applicable to the DNI as well) but also management expertise. It contains a sense of Congress that under ordinary circumstances, one of the persons serving as DNI or PDDNI shall be a commissioned officer in active status or have, by training or experience, an appreciation of military intelligence. On April 11, 2005, the President nominated Lieutenant General Michael V. Hayden, USAF, who was then serving as the Director of the NSA, to be the first PDDNI. General Hayden entered active duty in 1969. During his career, he served as Commander of the Air Intelligence Agency and Director of the Joint Command and Control Warfare Center, Deputy Chief of Staff, United Nations Command and U.S. Forces Korea, and then, beginning in 1999 as Director of NSA for six years. The Committee held a nomination hearing on April 14, 2005. General Hayden's testimony and his responses to the Committee's questionnaire and prehearing questions are printed in S. Hrg. 109-270. The Committee reported the nomination favorably that day, by a unanimous vote of 15 to 0. On April 21, 2005, the Senate agreed by voice vote to the nomination, together with General Hayden's nomination to be a full General, which had been reported by the Committee on Armed Services. C. Janice Bradley Gardner, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 created the Treasury Department's Office of Intelligence and Analysis to replace the Office of Intelligence Support. The Office of Intelligence and Analysis is responsible for the receipt, analysis, collation, and dissemination of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information related to the operation and responsibilities of the Treasury Department. Janice Bradley Gardner was nominated by the President to the position on May 16, 2005. She served for more than twenty years as an intelligence officer, entering on duty at the CIA in 1983. For a decade she worked as an analyst focusing on East Asia issues, followed by service as the Chief of the CIA's Persian Gulf Branch, as the DCI Representative to the National Security Council, as Special Advisor to the Vice President for Foreign Affairs, and then as Deputy Director of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, before beginning as a Senior Intelligence Officer at the Department of the Treasury in 2002. In May 2004, Ms. Gardner assumed the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis to stand up the office that Congress had then just established. Ms. Gardner is the first person named to fill the position of Assistant Secretary. On June 16, 2005, the Committee held a public hearing on the nomination. The nominee's testimony and responses to the Committee's questionnaire and prehearing questions are printed in S. Hrg. 109-269. The nomination was reported favorably by the Committee on July 26, 2005, by unanimous consent. She was confirmed by the Senate on July 28, 2005, by voice vote. D. Benjamin A. Powell, General Counsel, Office of the Director of National Intelligence The position of General Counsel for the ODNI was created by the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004. The Act provides that the General Counsel is the chief legal officer of the ODNI and shall perform such functions as the DNI may prescribe. The explicit law-related function of the DNI is to ensure compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States by the CIA and ensure such compliance by other elements of the Intelligence Community through their host executive departments. Benjamin A. Powell was nominated by the President to the position on June 9, 2005. Since July 2002 and at the time of his nomination, Mr. Powell served as Associate Counsel and Special Assistant to the President. Prior to that, he served as a corporate counsel and as a lawclerk for United States Supreme Court Justices Byron White and John Paul Stevens. Mr. Powell is the first person named to fill the position of General Counsel. On July 19, 2005, the Committee held a public hearing on the nomination. The nominee's testimony and answers to the Committee's questionnaire and prehearing questions are printed in S. Hrg. 109-242. His nomination was reported favorably by the Committee on July 26, 2005, by unanimous consent, but not acted on by the Senate in the first session of the 109th Congress. Mr. Powell received a recess appointment by the President on January 4, 2006, and was nominated again on February 10, 2006. Following filing of a cloture motion on April 5, 2006, the Senate approved his nomination on April 6, 2006, by voice vote. E. John S. Redd, Director of the National Counterterrorism Center The Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 established, within the ODNI, a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The Act provides that the NCTC Director has two reporting responsibilities: to the DNI on NCTC's budget and programs, the activities of its Directorate of Intelligence, and the conduct of intelligence operations implemented by other elements of the Intelligence Community; and to the President on the planning and progress of joint counterterrorism operations other than intelligence operations. The Act provides that NCTC is the government's primary organization for the analysis of counterterrorism and terrorism intelligence, except for intelligence pertaining solely to domestic terrorism. Beyond analysis, it is to conduct strategic operational planning for counterterrorism activities, integrating all instruments of national power, including diplomatic, financial, military, intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement. It is to assign roles and responsibilities to lead agencies, but not direct the execution of resulting operations. It is to ensure that agencies receive the necessary intelligence support to fulfill their own operational or intelligence missions. The Director of NCTC serves as the principal adviser to the DNI on counterterrorism operations. On June 30, 2005, the President nominated retired Vice Admiral John S. Redd to be the first Director of the NCTC. Admiral Redd had most recently served as Executive Director of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, often referred to as the WMD or Robb-Silberman Commission. Immediately prior to that, he served as Deputy Administrator and Chief Operating Officer for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. A retired Navy veteran, Admiral Redd held a number of senior military positions, including Commander of the Navy's Fifth Fleet in the Middle East. The Committee held a nomination hearing on July 21, 2005. Admiral Redd's testimony and his answers to the Committee's standard questionnaire and prehearing questions are printed in S. Hrg. 109-241. The Committee acted favorably on Admiral Redd's nomination on July 26, 2005, by unanimous consent. The Senate confirmed his appointment on July 28, 2005, by voice vote. F. Dale W. Meyerrose, Chief Information Officer, Office of the Director of National Intelligence The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (December 23, 2004) established an additional Senate-confirmed position, that of Chief Information Officer (CIO), within the ODNI. It provided that the new official would serve as the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community. Among the CIO's responsibilities are managing activities relating to the information technology infrastructure of the Intelligence Community and directing and managing all information technology-related procurement for the Community. The CIO has the responsibility to ensure that all expenditures for information and research and development activities are consistent with the Intelligence Community enterprise architecture and the strategy of the DNI for that architecture. On September 8, 2005, the President nominated Major General Dale W. Meyerrose to be the first Intelligence Community CIO. During the course of the nomination process, he completed his retirement from active duty. Over a thirty-year career in the Air Force, General Meyerrose had extensive information technology, communications, and information sharing experience. He was a Chief Information Officer of three Air Force major commands and three joint combatant commands, including the North American Aerospace Defense Command and the U.S. Northern Command. On November 17, 2005, the Committee held a public hearing on the nomination. (As of the filing of this report, the hearing record had not been printed). Following the hearing that day, the Committee favorably reported the nomination by unanimous consent. The Senate confirmed General Meyerrose on December 17, 2005, by voice vote. G. John A. Rizzo, General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency On March 15, 2006, the President nominated John Rizzo to be General Counsel of the CIA. The position of General Counsel had become vacant on August 1, 2004, upon the resignation of Scott Muller. During the period of the vacancy, Mr. Rizzo has served as the Acting General Counsel. No hearing on the nomination was scheduled during the 109th Congress. On December 9, 2006, upon the final adjournment of the 109th Congress, the nomination was returned to the President under the provisions of Rule 31.6 of the Standing Rules of the Senate. Mr. Rizzo has been renominated in the 110th Congress. H. Kenneth L. Wainstein, Assistant Attorney General, National Security Division, Department of Justice As described earlier in this report, the National Security Division at the Department of Justice and the position of Assistant Attorney General for National Security were created by Congress in the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, which became law on March 9, 2006, in an effort to coordinate national security investigations and prosecutions within the Department of Justice. The Assistant Attorney General serves as the Attorney General's principal legal advisor on national security issues and is the primary liaison for the Department of Justice to the DNI. On March 13, 2006, the President nominated Kenneth L. Wainstein, who was then the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, to fill the new position. Previously, he had served in two capacities at the FBI, as the General Counsel and as the Chief of Staff for the FBI Director. For approximately nine years, he had served as an Assistant United States Attorney in the District of Columbia. Under a procedure established in the PATRIOT Act Reauthorization, and incorporated in Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress on this Committee's jurisdiction and procedures, nominations for the position are referred first to the Judiciary Committee and then sequentially to this Committee. The nomination was reported favorably by the Judiciary Committee on June 15, 2006. It was then referred sequentially to this Committee which held a public hearing on May 16, 2006. (As of the filing of this report, the hearing record had not yet been printed.) The Committee reported the nomination favorably on June 22, 2006, by unanimous consent. The Senate confirmed Mr. Wainstein on September 21, 2006, by voice vote. Upon the confirmation, the new National Security Division commenced operation. I. Michael V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency As the head of the CIA, the Director is responsible, under the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, for collecting intelligence through human sources, evaluating and disseminating intelligence related to the national security, and for providing overall direction and coordination of the collection of national intelligence outside the United States. The Act provides that the Director shall report to the DNI regarding the activities of the CIA. On May 8, 2006, the President nominated General Hayden, then serving as the PDDNI, to fill the vacancy created by the resignation of Porter Goss as Director of the CIA. On May 18, 2006, the Committee held a public hearing on the nomination. The Committee reported the nomination favorably on May 23, 2006, by a vote of 12 to 3. The nominee's testimony and responses to the Committee's questionnaire and prehearing questions are printed in S. Hrg. 109-808. The Senate considered and approved the nomination on May 26, 2006, by a vote of 78- 15. J. Randall Fort, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research The State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), a member of the Intelligence Community, was established in 1946. It is not a collection agency; rather, it provides intelligence support to the Secretary of State and other Department policy makers on issues that fall within the purview of the Department, as well as being the source of high level analysis for the entire community. On June 12, 2006, the President nominated Mr. Randall Fort to be the Assistant Secretary of State for INR. From 1996 through 2006, he had been employed in various capacities by the global investment bank Goldman Sachs. He previously served for four years as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Functional Analysis and Research at INR. From 1987-1989, he was the Special Assistant to the Secretary for National Security and Director of the Office of Intelligence Support at the Department of the Treasury. On July 27, 2006, the Committee held a public hearing on the nomination. Mr. Fort's nomination was reported favorably by the Committee on August 2, 2006, by voice vote. (As of the filing of this report, the hearing record had not yet been printed.) The Senate considered and approved the nomination on August 3, 2006, by voice vote. V. SUPPORT TO THE SENATE The Committee undertook a number of activities to support the Senate's deliberations. In addition to its unclassified reports, the Committee has sought to support Senate deliberations by inviting the participation of members outside the Committee in briefings and hearings on issues of shared jurisdiction or interest. The Committee has made available for the Senate intelligence information regarding topics relevant to current legislation. Members outside the Committee have frequently sought and received intelligence briefings by members of the Committee staff. Members have also requested and received assistance in resolving issues with elements of the Intelligence Community. Finally, the Committee routinely invites staff from other Committees to briefings on intelligence issues of common concern. VI. APPENDIX Summary of Committee Actions A. Number of meetings During the 109th Congress, the Committee held a total of 125 on-the-record meetings, briefings, and hearings, and numerous off-the-record briefings. There were 13 oversight hearings, 11 confirmation hearings, seven hearings on the Intelligence Community budget, and four legislative hearings. Of these 35 hearings, 12 were open to the public and 23 were closed toprotect classified information pursuant to Senate rules. The Committee also held 62 on-the-record briefings and 28 business meetings. Additionally, the Committee staff conducted 106 on- the-record briefings and interviews and numerous off-the-record briefings. B. Bills and resolutions originated by the Committee S. Res. 22--An original resolution authorizing expenditures by the Select Committee on Intelligence. S. 1266--A bill to permanently authorize certain provisions of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, to reauthorize a provision of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, to clarify certain definitions in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, to provide additional investigative tools necessary to protect the national security, and for other purposes. S. 1803--Intelligence Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2006. S. 3237--Intelligence Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2007. C. Bills referred to the Committee S. 640--To amend title 10, United States Code, to provide for the establishment of a unified combatant command for military intelligence, and for other purposes. S. 2175--To require the submittal to Congress of any Presidential Daily Briefing relating to Iraq during the period beginning on January 20, 1997 and ending on March 19, 2003. S. 2408--To require the DNI to release documents captured in Afghanistan or Iraq during Operation Desert Storm, Operation Enduring Freedom, or Operation Iraqi Freedom. S. 2660--To amend the National Security Act of 1947 to require notice to Congress of certain declassifications of intelligence information, and for other purposes. S. 3536--To ensure oversight of intelligence on Iran, and for other purposes. S. 3968--Intelligence Community Audit Act of 2006. D. Publications S. Print 109-12--Rules of Procedure (Amended January 26, 2005). S. Print 109-22--Rules of Procedure (Amended March 15, 2005). S. Report 109-85--Report to accompany S. 1266. S. Hrg. 109-61--Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States (February 16, 2005). S. Report 109-142--Report to Accompany S. 1803. S. Hrg. 109-79--Nomination of Ambassador John D. Negroponte to be Director of National Intelligence. S. Hrg. 109-241--Nomination of Vice Admiral John Scott Redd to be Director, National Counterterrorism Center (July 21, 2005). S. Hrg. 109-242--Nomination of Benjamin A. Powell to be General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (July 19, 2005). S. Hrg. 109-269--Nomination of Janice B. Gardner to be Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis (June 16, 2005). S. Report 109-259--Report to accompany S. 3237, FY 2007 Intelligence Authorization Bill. S. Hrg. 109-341--USA PATRIOT Act hearings (April 19, April 27, and May 24, 2005). S. Hrg. 109-270--Nomination of Lieutenant General Michael V. Hayden, to be Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence. S. Report 109-331--Report of the SSCI on Postwar Findings about Iraq's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments. S. Report 109-330--Report of the SSCI on the Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress. S. Hrg. 109-808--Nomination of General Michael V. Hayden, to be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.