[国会纪录：2009年6月2日（参议院）] [Page S5950-S5951]提交决议______参议院第164页 - 修订参议院第400号决议，第94大会和参议院第445号决议，提高智力活动的国会监督。在美国，提供强大，稳定，能干的国会委员会结构，为智力界酌情提供智力境界，支持和领导，并实施国家恐怖主义袭击委员会对美国先生的关键建议（为自己，Burr先生，Bayh先生，斯诺姆女士和麦凯恩先生）提交了以下决议;委员会提交了规则和管理委员会：S. Res。164虽然国家恐怖主义委员会对美国（以下简称“9/11委员会”）对2001年9月11日的恐怖主义袭击事件和情况进行了漫长的审查，包括有关的恐怖主义袭击事业和情况对情报界，执法机构以及国会监督和资源分配的作用;虽然在最终报告中，9/11委员会发现，国会监督美国的情报活动是功能失调的;虽然在最终报告中，9/11委员会进一步发现，根据参议院和代表的议员在报告完成后，国会委员会负责监督智力活动的监督缺乏权力，影响和持续的能力，以满足美国情报界面临的艰巨挑战;虽然在最终报告中，9/11委员会进一步发现，只要这种监督受参议院和代表所规则的管辖，美国人将不会得到他们想要和需要的安全; Whereas in its final report, the 9/11 Commission further found that a strong, stable, and capable congressional committee structure is needed to give the intelligence community of the United States appropriate oversight, support, and leadership; Whereas in its final report, the 9/11 Commission further found that the reforms recommended by the 9/11 Commission in its final report will not succeed if congressional oversight of the intelligence community in the United States is not changed; Whereas in its final report, the 9/11 Commission recommended structural changes to Congress to improve the oversight of intelligence activities; Whereas in its final report, the 9/11 Commission further recommended that the authorizing authorities and appropriating authorities with respect to intelligence activities in each house of Congress be combined into a single committee in each house of Congress; Whereas Congress has enacted some of the recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission and is considering implementing additional recommendations of the 9/11 Commission; and Whereas the Senate adopted Senate Resolution 445 in the 108th Congress to address some of the intelligence oversight recommendations of the 9/11 Commission by abolishing term limits for the members of the Select Committee on Intelligence, clarifying jurisdiction for intelligence- related nominations, and streamlining procedures for the referral of intelligence-related legislation, but other aspects of the 9/11 Commission recommendations regarding intelligence oversight have not been implemented: Now, therefore, be it Resolved, SECTION 1. PURPOSES. The purposes of this resolution are-- (1) to improve congressional oversight of the intelligence activities of the United States; (2) to provide a strong, stable, and capable congressional committee structure to provide the intelligence community appropriate oversight, support, and leadership; (3) to implement a key recommendation of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the ``9/11 Commission'') that structural changes be made to Congress to improve the oversight of intelligence activities; and (4) to provide vigilant legislative oversight over the intelligence activities of the United States to ensure that such activities are in conformity with the Constitution and laws of the United States. SEC. 2. INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT. (a) Authority of the Select Committee on Intelligence.-- Paragraph (5) of section 3(a) of Senate Resolution 400, agreed to May 19, 1976 (94th Congress), is amended in that matter preceding subparagraph (A) by striking the comma following ``authorizations for appropriations'' and inserting ``and appropriations,''. (b) Abolishment of the Subcommittee on Intelligence.-- Senate Resolution 445, agreed to October 9, 2004, (108th Congress), is amended by striking section 402. Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I am introducing today, along with Senators Burr, Bayh, Snowe and McCain, a resolution that will implement a key recommendation of the 9/11 Commission-- [[Page S5951]] the granting of appropriations authority to the Senate Intelligence Committee. This effort to reform and improve congressional oversight has a long bipartisan history. It began as an amendment offered by Senator McCain to the 2004 reorganizing resolution that accompanied the intelligence reform bill. And, in the last Congress, this resolution was introduced by Senator Burr. It should also be noted that it has the same bipartisan set of cosponsors as it did last year, despite the change of administration. This underscores the principle that effective congressional oversight is neither a partisan nor political issue and that it has nothing to do with who the President is. It is about ensuring that the Intelligence Community is keeping America safe, complying with the Constitution and laws of our country, and using taxpayer dollars in an appropriate manner. Next month will mark the 5th anniversary of the release of the 9/11 Commission's report. The country is by now familiar with the many recommendations of the Commission that have been implemented, including the establishment of the DNI and the National Counterterrorism Center. Yet, the Commission stressed that, ``Of all our recommendations, strengthening congressional oversight may be among the most difficult and important.'' In November 2007, Lee Hamilton, the former Vice Chairman of the Commission testified to the Senate Intelligence Committee on behalf of himself and former Chairman Tom Kean and again emphasized what needs to be done. He testified that: The single most important step to strengthen the power of the intelligence committees is to give them the power of the purse. Without it, they will be marginalized. The intelligence community will not ignore you, but they will work around you. In a crunch, they will go to the Appropriations Committee. Within the Congress, the two bodies with the jurisdiction, time and expertise to carry out a careful review of the budget and activities of the Intelligence Community are the Senate and House intelligence committees. Yet all of us have to live by the Gold Rule: That is, he who controls the Gold makes the Rules. The testimony of the former Chairman and Vice Chairman highlighted three practical examples of why this particular reform is so critical. First, if and when the U.S. goes to war, the decision will ride largely on intelligence--and oversight is critical to ensuring that the intelligence community gets it right. Second, oversight is necessary to safeguard the privacy and civil liberties of Americans in an age of enhanced collection capabilities and data mining. Third, the success of intelligence reform requires sustained congressional oversight. Vigorous, effective, independent congressional oversight is fundamental to the checks and balances of our constitutional system. In recent years, we have seen outright contempt for this oversight, particularly as the previous administration sought to hide the CIA's detention and interrogation and the NSA's warrantless wiretapping programs from Congress. But the inauguration of a new president has not removed all impediments to effective oversight, nor is it a guarantee that serious abuses won't occur in the future. That is why the implementation of this reform is just as important as ever and why this resolution has bipartisan support. In the end, this reform is not just about our constitutional system, as important as that is. It is about how best to protect the American people. As Lee Hamilton testified, ``the strong point simply is that the Senate of the U.S. and the House of the U.S. is not doing its job. And because you are not doing the job, the country is not as safe as it ought to be, because one of my premises is that robust oversight is necessary for a stronger intelligence community.'' The implementation of this reform is long overdue. It has been more than seven and a half years since the attacks of 9/11, almost 5years since the 9/11 Commission made this recommendation, and a year and a half since the Senate Intelligence Committee heard directly from former Chairman Hamilton and former Vice Chairman Kean. There should be no more excuses, or delays. ____________________