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Presenter: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs Cully Stimson and Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence Lt. Gen. John Kimmons September 06, 2006 12:00 PM EDT

与五角大楼的副助理秘书Stimson和Kimmons中将的国防部新闻简报

布莱恩·惠特曼(Bryan Whitman)(公共事务国防部副助理部长):下午好,感谢您加入我们。今天,我认为您熟悉我们的简报员,但它是拘留事务副局长库尔利·斯蒂姆森(Cully Stimson)和陆军副总裁约翰·金蒙斯(John Kimmons)的副总裁。他们今天在这里向您介绍了该部门今天发布的两个文件。首先是国防部被拘留计划指令第二是Army Field Manual for Human Intelligence Collector Operations. We have a limited amount of time, so I'd like to keep it to those two topics. They have brief introductions to introduce the manuals to you and then will take some questions. But they do have another engagement, and I know we started a little late. So I'll get out of here and let -- turn it over to Mr. Stimson, who will start with the directive.
先生。STIMSON: Good afternoon, everybody. My name's Cully Stimson. I'm the deputy assistant secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs, and today I'm pleased to announce the revised and reissued国防部指令2310.01E, or echo, entitled the Department of Defense Detainee Program. This revised directive provides the overarching DOD policy guidance on detention operations conducted by DOD worldwide.
This directive, which I'll refer to as 2310, represents the culmination of over a year of discussion and debate within the department and the U.S. government in developing a solid foundation upon which to build future detention operations policy. It represents the considered effort of many people in the United States government and the various components of the Department of Defense.
It reaffirms our commitment in DOD to treat humanely those individuals under DOD control.
2310的修订需要花费时间,这花了一些时间,因为正确正确,我们确实做对了。
该指令 - 该指令历史上已经定义了该部门如何在传统战争中进行拘留行动。修订版的版本是今天之前的版本,阐明了国防部进行的所有拘留操作的政策和责任,但如我所说,我们需要灵活地与任何敌人作斗争的灵活性,而我肯定了肯定的价值观和实践的价值观和实践我们做什么。
这个指令是国防部拘留的基石policy, and that's important to understand. The Army Field Manual, for instance, falls under this DOD directive. It sets out policy guidance for all DOD detention operations that is necessary and appropriate to ensure the safe, secure, and humane detention of enemy combatants, both lawful and unlawful, regardless of the nature of the conflict. It consolidates existing direction and instructions of the president and the secretary of Defense, and incorporates the lessons we have learned over the past few years in waging the global war on terror. It does so in a number of ways. It incorporates key policy changes recommended in the 12 major investigations conducted by DOD over the past two years. In fact, by publishing this document and the Army Field Manual, we will have addressed over 95 percent of the recommendations from those 12 major investigations since Abu Ghraib.
我想突出显示2310的五个关键要素。
首先,最重要的是,该指令描述了该部门认为对确保所有被拘留者进行人道对待的核心政策至关重要,并且与被拘留者护理和治疗有关的法律得到了实施。它纳入了禁止残酷,不人道和有退化的待遇或惩罚《被拘留者治疗法》的禁令,并在国防部历史上首次表达了所有被拘留者的护理和治疗的最低标准。这些最低的护理和治疗标准可以在外壳3和4中找到。
I would ask you to put the slide up.
您应该在您面前和屏幕上都有的外壳3包含1949年日内瓦惯例的第3条文本。外壳4包含战争法的其他要求,我们认为作为一个部门,对于确保人道的护理和对所有被拘留者的治疗至关重要。综上所述,这是国防部监护和控制所有被拘留者的护理和治疗的基线标准。
除了在这两个围栏中阐明的基线护理和治疗标准外,一些被拘留者 - 显然是敌人的战俘或其他在日内瓦公约中受到保护的地位的被拘留者,也有权获得其他保护。但是,我们试图确保在这场全球恐怖主义战争中,即使与非常规部队作战,该部门也为所有被拘留者阐明了最低护理标准。
该指令中有禁令,它们如下:显然,正如我之前说的那样,残酷,不人道或有退化的待遇或惩罚;对个人尊严的愤怒,尤其是羞辱和有退化的待遇;谋杀,酷刑,体罚,肢解,劫持人质,集体惩罚,未经适当授权审判的执行;暴力的威胁或行为,包括强奸或强迫卖淫;攻击和盗窃,公众好奇心,人身伤害和报复。其他禁令包括:接受医学或科学实验,并受到感觉剥夺。
铰接在人道的标准治疗is directive reflects U.S. law and policy and provides detainees protections that reflect our values as Americans. And I'll tell you that in my opinion, that our armed forces are doing a superb job handling detainees, and the standard of care and treatment that appears in this directive is actually second nature to them, and I should commend them for the good job that they're doing.
Number two, this directive reinforces the requirement to account for detainees by stating our policy to properly and timely register detainees. And in that context, it reaffirms our policy that the ICRC plays an important role in DOD detention operations.
Number three, it requires that all persons subject to this directive report possible, suspected, or alleged violations of the law of war or our detention operations laws, regulations or policy.
国防部拥有,我们将继续负责那些违反法律或我们的拘留政策的人。
第四,它将责任分配给DOD内的组件。例如,政策秘书副部长(USDP)负责对国防部拘留计划的政策监督。DOD组件必须与政策合作,以确保审查,协调和批准实施政策或指导。换句话说,一切都流向了我工作的政策。
它重新指定了陆军为执行代理人,该执行代理人负责确保制定政策和程序,还负责确保他们正常工作并执行。
该指令向战斗人员指挥官提供指导。它为他们提供了颁布特定于剧院的程序和政策所需的指导,以确保对战斗人员的安全,安全和人道的拘留,无论是合法和非法的敌方战斗人员,还是在传统的国际武装冲突中拘留的常规部队。
此外,该指令在医疗政策制定等其他几项辩护人的辩护人中分配责任,以确保我们的合同包括有关在国防部拘留设施中运营的承包商的拘留所的规定,情报收集操作。这个清单绝不是详尽无遗的。您可以自己阅读指令。
第五和最后,该指令提供了拘留行动所需的关键政策指导。我会注意到,陆军目前正在修订有关拘留行动的联合服务出版物,这在这里被称为AR 190-8。
作为国防部拘留行动管理的执行代理商,它是陆军秘书秘书,开发进行拘留行动的法规,培训,战术,技术和程序。同样,参谋长联合负责人正在修改适当的指示,以确保在联合行动中实施2310。
现在,当这个过程完成后,我们将在国防部内的上下拘留操作政策进行修订。
So we have accomplished a lot today by publishing 2310. It reflects the lessons we have learned in the GWOT and Iraq. It complies with the requirements of the law. It unambiguously articulates the values and traditions of our nation, values that John Adams called "the policy of humanity," which has been the cornerstone of the American ethos of warfare.
More importantly, it provides our forces in the field the policy guidance needed to ensure the safe, secure and humane detention during armed conflicts, however those are characterized.
Now I'll turn the podium over to General Jeff Kimmons for his prepared remarks regarding the Army Field Manual.
Gen。KIMMONS: Good morning. I'm Lieutenant General Jeff Kimmons. I'm the Army G-2 senior intelligence officer within the Army.
I will tell you that, by way of following Secretary Stimson, the Army has taken pretty dramatic steps over the last two and a half years to improve our human intelligence capabilities and capacity, to include interrogation, but not limited to that. And by interrogation, I really mean getting truthful answers to time-sensitive questions on the battlefield. Also military source operations, which is leveraging access which our foreign counterparts have within their own respective societies and cultures, and analysis, really making sense of all of it so that we an integrate it with other kinds of operations.
军队在未来几年内由3,000多名士兵增加了人类智能能力的规模,增加了Humint力量。现在,我们的战斗训练中心将外国角色扮演者纳入现实的训练练习和排练中,以准备我们的士兵在非常艰难,复杂的环境中为战斗行动做好准备。我们已经将战场经验纳入了我们的军事情报学校,我们的军事警察学校,我们的法律,甚至我们的战斗武器训练中心的拘留,审讯和其他人类情报培训的教学课程。现在,文化意识和语言培训是该过程中不可或缺的一部分,并且在准备部署以战斗时准备了我们的单位。
There are probably over -- there are more than 500 interrogators deployed around the world working seven days a week, 24 hours a day, to accomplish the wartime mission -- over four-fifths of those are Army soldiers -- to generate actionable intelligence of practical, tactical relevance to our combat commanders. No service has greater equity in a effective, doctrinal base or training program than does the Army. And so it's appropriate that we be executive agent for this purpose. The work which our interrogators do, of all the services worldwide, saves lives, both U.S. lives, coalition lives, and innocent civilian lives. And we're immensely proud of the accomplishments of our interrogator workforce.
The Field Manual 2-22.3, which, as the secretary mentioned, is Human Intelligence Collector Operations, was recently approved for distribution to our forces worldwide, and it replaces our 1992 Field Manual on interrogation. The new manual is broader in scope and incorporates hard-won wartime lessons learned since 9/11 across
审讯,军事源运作,分析,筛查,汇报,文件剥削等等。
We have used straightforward language in the Field Manual for use by soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines. It is not written for lawyers. The new Field Manual is wholly unclassified. It can be shared with our coalition partners. And it establishes the DOD-wide interrogation standard, consistent with law, the Geneva Convention, and Department of Defense policy.
The new Field Manual incorporates a single standard for humane treatment, as was alluded to, for all detainees, regardless of their status under all circumstances, in conjunction with all interrogation techniques that are contained within it -- and there are no others. That is as a matter of law, to include the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, in accordance with the Geneva Conventions, to include Common Article 3, as well as Department of Defense policy and service doctrine.
The Field Manual explicitly prohibits torture or cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment or punishment. To make this more imaginable and understandable to our soldiers -- and I use that in a joint context -- we have included in the Field Manual specific prohibitions. There's eight of them: interrogators may not force a detainee to be naked, perform sexual acts or pose in a sexual manner; they cannot use hoods or place sacks over a detainees head or use duct tape over his eyes; they cannot beat or electrically shock or burn them or inflict other forms of physical pain -- any form of physical pain; they may not use water boarding, they may not use hypothermia or treatment which will lead to heat injury; they will not perform mock executions; they may not deprive detainees of the necessary food, water and medical care; and they may not use dogs in any aspect of interrogations. As you know, dogs can be used legally by our military police for security, but not as an adjunct part of the interrogation process.
The interrogation approach techniques in this Field Manual have undergone favorable interagency legal review and been judged to be consistent with the requirements of law, Detainee Treatment Act, and the Geneva Conventions, as well as policy. The Field Manual was reviewed and endorsed by senior DOD figures at the secretarial level, by the Joint Staff, by each of the combatant commanders and their legal advisers, by each of the service secretaries and service chiefs and their legal advisers, in addition to the Director of Defense Intelligence Agency and the Director of National Intelligence, who coordinated laterally with the CIA. It's also been favorably reviewed by the Department of Justice. The Field Manual contains 19 interrogation approaches. No other techniques are authorized within the Department of Defense. Sixteen of these are traditional interrogation approaches which were enshrined in the old Field Manual 34-52.
Based on battlefield lessons learned, we have added two additional approaches to the main body of the field manual, and those are Mutt and Jeff, good cop/bad cop, and false flag, portraying yourself as someone other than an American interrogator. Those were added for general-purpose use across all detainee categories.
这18种技术被授权使用国防部 - 无论身份如何,都可以使用。
Our four-star combatant commanders also specifically requested, based on battlefield experience, that we include one restricted technique called separation, for use on a by-exception basis only with unlawful enemy combatants. That is, it's not authorized for use on prisoners of war and other protected persons.
Separation allows interrogators to keep unlawful enemy combatants apart from each other as a normal part of the interrogation process, so they can't coordinate their stories and so that we can compare answers to questions that interrogators have posed to each other without there having been collusion. It's for the same reason that police keep murder suspects separated while they're questioning them, although this is within an interrogation context.
Separation meets the standard for humane treatment, the single standard that exists across DOD, and it is enshrined in this manual. But the Geneva Conventions afford additional protections -- privileges, if you will -- to legal or to lawful combatants above and beyond the humane standard. It authorizes lawful combatants to receive mail and send packages. It authorizes them to receive pay for work that they perform. It also protects them from being separated from their fellow prisoners of war with whom they were captured, without their express consent.
These additional -- additional -- privileges above and beyond the humane standard are not an entitlement which our unlawful combatants enjoy.
您可以想象,出于实际原因,我们为什么要保持非法战斗人员(包括恐怖分子)彼此分开,尽管在人道的环境中。
Nonetheless, special interrogator training and certification is required for our interrogators to use this restricted approach. A very high level of command oversight is also required. Four-star combatant commanders must approve the use within their respective theaters of operation. A second general officer, or flag officer, must review and approve each interrogation plan which incorporates the use of separation. And typically, a number of techniques will be included in any given interrogation plan.
We've built mandatory safeguards for interrogation into all of the interrogation approach techniques in the Field Manual to ensure humane application. The Field Manual also includes many examples of correct usage of these techniques. It tries to leave as little to the imagination as possible without being overly prescriptive, and we think we've done a good job.
野外手册阐明了军事情报和军事警察的角色,这些角色是互补的,但在某些重要方面是离散的。军警察不参加审讯。他们没有设定条件。他们不会软化我们的被拘留者。这是明确写入现场手册中的,并将接受培训。
The Field Manual also defines the roles and functions which healthcare providers may perform within the context of interrogations, which is very limited and essentially limited to normal precautionary medical inspection and care as well as emergency services. But they are not authorized to assist -- directly assist interrogators.
现场手册重申了国防部指令3115.09建立的标准,以严格控制非DOD人员,其他政府机构或其他外国政府,基本上要求联合工作队指挥官或剧院指挥官批准该访问权限,如果授予访问权限,则必须由训练有素的,经过认证的国防部成员对非DOD机构进行护送和观察,并且非DOD机构必须同意遵守保障措施的规定,并使用这些技术,仅使用这些技术,并且只有所涉及的技术本字段手册。
The Field Manual makes clear that commanders of forces which conduct detention operations or interrogation operations are directly accountable and responsible for humane detainee treatment in addition to their other command responsibilities. It emphasizes the responsibility of every service member to report observed, suspected or alleged detainee abuse, and it tells them how to do it. It also gives them guidance on how to report if they suspect their chain of command is complicit.
最重要的是,这是一本非常好的现场手册。我们的士兵,水手,飞行员和海军陆战队需要它来完成这项艰巨的工作,我们需要不得不进一步延迟将其放在他们的手中。
现在我想做的是邀请部长Stimson back up and we'll take your questions.
从这里开始。
Q Sir, are you concerned, as an intelligent officer, that specifying exactly the 19 techniques that can be used, and not having anything else classified, will hinder your troops' ability to gather the intelligence that they need?
Gen。KIMMONS: That's a good question. And it's one that we, frankly, wrestled with for several months. We initially considered taking the additional techniques I described, the three new ones, and putting them into a classified appendix of some sort to keep them out of the hands of the enemy, who regularly reads our field manuals as a matter of course.
We weigh that against the needs for transparency and working openly with our coalition partners who don't have access to all of our classified publications, and also the need to be as clear as we can be in the training of these techniques to our own soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines as to reduce the risks of inadvertent migration from a classified domain into a(n) unclassified text by virtue of them being separated.
We also felt that even classified techniques, once you use them on the battlefield over time, become increasingly known to your enemies, some of whom are going to be released in due course. And so on balance, in consultation with our combatant commanders, we decided to go this route. We're very comfortable with it; so are our combatant commanders.
现在,我只是补充说,本手册将进行修订 - 或至少每年进行修订。这与任何其他教义出版物没有什么不同。基于所学到的战场经验教训,可能会出现的新政策,我们可能会修改下游,因此我认为我们有灵活性可以根据需要进行调整。
Please.
问,为什么决定将这些categories -- the separate categories of detainees? You have traditional prisoners of war and then the unlawful enemy combatants. Why not treat all detainees under U.S. military custody the exact same way?
Gen。金蒙斯(Kimmons):嗯,实际上,这种区别是通过日内瓦大会在日内瓦(Geneva)进行的,该公约描述了囚犯 - 诸如敌方战俘之类的囚犯(例如他们拥有的敌人战俘)的标准 - 穿着制服,为政府而战,公开双臂,依此类推。所有这些都在日内瓦内部相当精确地阐明了。
Geneva also makes clear that traditional, unlawful combatants such as in the -- 50 years ago, we would have talked about spies and saboteurs, but also now applies to this new category of unlawful -- or new type of unlawful combatant, terrorists, al Qaeda, Taliban.
他们显然不符合战俘地位,合法战斗人员身份的标准,因此他们无权获得 - 因此获得日内瓦提供的额外保护和特权。先生。斯蒂姆森:让我也跳进去。重要的是要记住,在国防部历史上第一次,我们在这里为所有被拘留者建立,无论其法律地位,护理和治疗的基准标准,这些都是围栏3和4中宣布的标准,因此,第3条以及外壳4中阐明的其他保护措施。
So with respect to how they're treated at a minimum, there is no difference. But people earn their rights in the certain categories in the Geneva Conventions. And as the general said, an enemy prisoner of war is a person who abides by, among other things, the laws of war, fights for a country, open arms, wears the uniform, et cetera. And -- but you have to differentiate between legal status and then standard of care and treatment.
Q Does the directive change the policy on detention operations or merely define it more clearly?
先生。STIMSON: The directive lays out the overarching policy guidance to combatant commanders and the Department of Defense. It clarifies the older, 1994 policy. The 1994 policy was written mainly with enemy prisoners of war in mind, not this category of non-state actors with global lethality, here unlawful enemy combatants. And so it incorporates those lessons learned; it is applicable to today, moving forward. So that's the answer to that question.
Q So follow up, it's no different, it's just defined more broadly?
先生。Stimson:该政策纳入了经验教训,现在考虑到我们今天正在战斗的敌人,也许将来可能不是一个非国家演员,例如恐怖分子。在法律地位方面有区分这些类别,但无论法律地位如何,都非常明确地表达了所有被拘留者的基线护理和治疗标准。这就是2310的重要方面。
问:先生,一些普通第3条的法律专家表明,单独的监禁是反对的 - 在人类尊严和其他规定的侮辱中,普通第3条禁止。您是否有信心根据第3条第3条允许分离?
先生。STIMSON: Yes.
Q And the --
先生。STIMSON: Not only am I satisfied, because it doesn't matter necessarily what I think, the service JAGs believe that, the Department of Justice, also legal counsel, believes that, the combatant commanders believe that through the advice of their legal counsel, and the various departments within the United States government who have looked at this also believe that.
Q Does separation mean solitary confinement, or is it a different -- does it mean a different thing?
先生。STIMSON: Separation does not mean solitary confinement. Separation, as anticipated and announced in Appendix M of the Army Field Manual, is a specific interrogation technique. And I'd ask Jeff to sort of explain how we got there. GEN. KIMMONS: We have always segregated enemy combatants on the battlefield at the point of capture and beyond, to keep them silent, segregate the officers from the enlisted, the men from the women, and so forth. That's traditional; it goes back to World War II and beyond.
Once they get back to a point where they can be interrogated -- that could be fairly far forward or it could be further back in the chain -- and an interrogator devises an interrogation plan to question that person, it's no longer a matter of battlefield evacuation and segregation. And so we chose consciously not to be cute with this thing; we chose to bring it into the Field Manual as an explicit interrogation technique so that we could train it to standard and we could build in safeguards and a high level of command oversight, which otherwise, if it wasn't addressed at all, would have been left up to the discretion of people on the ground.
That does them a disservice, and it places the burden at a level where it shouldn't be.
Q One follow-up. Several months ago, the Defense Department was considering not including Common Article 3 within the directive but just saying that it will adhere to the principles. And I as told that there were some concerns that the use of humiliating and degrading conduct could be used by detainees to argue that they were being mistreated. What was the argument within DOD? What were the concerns about Common Article 3? And how did you overcome them?
先生。STIMSON: I'm not going to do a rewind of the internal discussions within the department or in the U.S. government regarding of the development of 2310. Suffice to say that it was a robust discussion, that there were people who believed that this war that we're in was of an international character.
If I polled all of you a month before the Hamdan decision, I bet most of you would raise your hand and say that this was a war of international character. Well, the Supreme Court would have said you're wrong.
And so the debate was robust, it was important, and it produced ultimately the document which is before you today, which obviously embraces not only Common Article 3, which the Supreme Court said applied to al Qaeda, but additional protections that are included in Enclosure 4. So we have gone beyond what the Supreme Court said with respect to al Qaeda in the Hamdan decision.
Q手动是否设置了使用分离,时间限制的限制?还是它指定了如何确保这不会长期变长 -
Gen。KIMMONS: Yes, it does. We have -- that was one of the reasons we brought it into the manual. Not only does it require a high level of command, four-star commander, general officer review, but also it -- there are -- and you can read it for yourself -- I mean, there's limitations in terms of how long someone can be separated and what the process and procedures and approval levels are if you want to extend that as a function of military necessity.
先生。STIMSON: Josh?
Q General and Mr. Stimson, the -- some of the tactics that were used in particular in Guantanamo Bay that were considered by investigators to be abusive when used together are now prohibited -- for example, the use of nudity, hooding, that sort of thing.
In looking at those particular tactics and now not being able to use them, does that limit the ability of interrogators to get information that could be very useful? In particular, on one detainee in Guantanamo Bay, those -- some of those tactics that are now prohibited were deemed to be very effective in getting to that information.
Also, are there going to be safeguards to prevent whether it be interrogators or commanders from interpreting the tactics that are approved in ways that could be considered abusive, as those were -- some of those tactics were derived from standard interrogation tactics?
Gen。KIMMONS: Let me answer the first question. That's a good question. I think -- I am absolutely convinced the answer to your first question is no. No good intelligence is going to come from abusive practices. I think history tells us that. I think the empirical evidence of the last five years, hard years, tell us that.
,此外,任何的情报啊btained under duress, under -- through the use of abusive techniques would be of questionable credibility. And additionally, it would do more harm than good when it inevitably became known that abusive practices were used. And we can't afford to go there.
Some of our most significant successes on the battlefield have been -- in fact, I would say all of them, almost categorically all of them have accrued from expert interrogators using mixtures of authorized, humane interrogation practices, in clever ways that you would hope Americans would use them, to push the envelope within the bookends of legal, moral and ethical, now as further refined by this field manual. So we don't need abusive practices in there. Nothing good will come from them.
先生。Stimson:还有乔什,让我再添加另一件作品。显然,由于2005年《拘留待遇法》,现在的《陆军现场手册》实际上是法律,《土地法》。我可以告诉你 - 我不是审讯专家,我只是一个碰巧从事政策工作的律师 - 但是作为检察官,我的前世,当我在关塔那摩花时间与那里的询问者会告诉您,他们从被拘留者那里获得的情报是通过一段融洽的建筑,长期融洽的建筑的时期来得出的。审讯计划是适当,经过审查的,通过金蒙斯将军正在谈论的所有渠道,然后与该特定被拘留者建立融洽关系。
因此,这不像电视节目中的Sipowicz,他们将它们带到后室。据我了解,您不会从被拘留者那里获得值得信赖的信息。这是通过有条不紊,全面,审查的,合法的,现在在技术方面透明的 - 允许审讯者获得所需的信息类型。
Q What about safeguards for interpretation, as again some of those tactics originally were derived from very standard, straightforward approaches? Is there something in the Field Manual that deals with that?
Gen。KIMMONS: We've infused into it a number of text boxes. For example, there's one on impermissible coercion. I can coerce you to stand in the corner. It's not impermissible; it's authorized. So we try to describe those I guess what you'd call gray areas as best we can. In fact, we've discussed back and forth and polished the wording on those to make it as clear and crisp and unambiguous as possible. And I think we've done a pretty good job.
Q General, going on that point, where you're talking about making it as clear as possible, can you touch on some of the approved interrogation techniques and how you put it from lawyers' terms to soldiers' terms so they can understand them?
Gen。Kimmons:嗯,我的意思是,我们已经注入了这个例子。
I mean when we describe a technique, you will see repeatedly in the Field Manual in the text where it says, "for example." Tells you, you know, what to do and what's approved, and it describes the use of a technique, and then it says, "for example," and then it talks to a real world example of when something has worked, where it's been proven to be effective and when it's -- or proven to be ineffective or counterproductive.
Q Can I get examples of the 16 techniques that are still approved?
Gen。金蒙斯(Kimmons):哦,旧现场手册中的所有技术都已获得批准。有17;我们将其中两个结合在一起。这就是为什么有16个载有的原因。但是,如果您拥有旧字段手册的副本,则它的技术完全相同。我们所做的只是扩展它们,并使它们更加全面,如果您愿意的话。然后我们添加了我之前描述的三个。
先生。WHITMAN: We just have time for a couple more, I'm afraid is all.
Q General, as an expert in interrogations, do you believe that sensory deprivation was abusive, or did it ever prove to be helpful in interrogation?
Gen。KIMMONS: Sensory deprivation is abusive and it's prohibited in this Field Manual, and it's absolutely counterproductive, in my understanding of what we have used productively. Sensory deprivation, just to be clear -- and we define it in the Field Manual, but basically, it comes down to the almost complete deprivation of all sensory stimuli, light, noise, and so forth, and to the point where it can have an adverse mental, psychological effect on a -- disorienting effect on a detainee.
Q So could there be deprivation of light alone for extended periods of time, as opposed to complete sensory deprivation?
Gen。KIMMONS: I think the total loss of an external stimulus, such as deprivation of light, would not fit what we have described here as -- for example, if you're hinting about separation, separation does not involve the darkness or lack of that type of sensory stimulation.
Q That wasn't the question, though. Would sensory -- would the deprivation of light alone be permitted under the current manual, as opposed -- because you described sensory deprivation as total deprivation --
Gen。Kimmons:这是更正。
Q -- of all senses. So deprivation of light alone for extended periods would be permitted?
Gen。KIMMONS: I don't think the Field Manual explicitly addresses it.
It does not make it prohibited. And it would have to be weighed in the context of the overall environment. If it was at nighttime during sleep hours, then it would make personal sense to turn the lights off.
Q You know what I'm talking about. I'm trying to get at -- because you said specifically total sensory deprivation -- so deprivation of any one sense might be permitted. Like light, for example. They could be kept in the dark for extended periods of time beyond the usual nighttime hours.
先生。Stimson:吉姆,这样的问题是要问的好问题。重要的是要记住的是,审讯计划被放在一起是有原因的,因此不仅一个人可以决定自己想做什么,然后逃跑并做到这一点。他们被审查了。布置了他们如何审查。金蒙斯将军可以详尽地介绍这一点。通常,据我所知,金蒙斯将军会有一个锯齿 -
Gen。KIMMONS: That's correct.
先生。Stimson: - 必须对此进行审查。它通过各种命令链上升。因此,您知道,必须提出此类问题的类型,然后在该过程中进行审查。
Q Okay. And so how does this affect the attempt to gain real-time, actionable intelligence during, like, for example, battlefield interrogations?
Gen。KIMMONS: Well, interrogations can occur at any level where there's a trained and certified interrogator, and that could be at the point of capture, although more commonly it's further back in the process.
每个士兵,无论他的技能或军事职业专业如何,都可以进行直接的询问。因此,步兵可以直接质疑他们被拘留的人 - 您是谁,您来自哪里,您的家人在哪里,无论是直接还是在语言上,也可以通过使用口译员。这不是审讯。这是所有士兵都有能力做的战场练习。
好吧,如果您超越了这一点,并纳入了混合所涉及的任何这些技术的审讯计划,那么您必须 - 超越审讯。
Q Just one final, quick question. If any soldier violates any of these guidelines, are they then subject to prosecution under the UCMJ?
Gen。Kimmons:本手册是学说,因此这不是执法机制。但是,它构成了命令和指示的基础,在违反这些命令和指示中,可以使士兵,水手,飞行员或海军陆战队受到UCMJ的惩罚。而且由于这项涵盖法律 - 2005年的《被拘留者待遇法》,日内瓦公约违反了这些法律,以至于那些违反指令,SOP和合法命令的范围可能会导致惩罚。
问一般?
Gen。KIMMONS: Yes, ma'am?
Q Are there any --
先生。惠特曼:这将是最后一个问题,好吗?
问:在我看来,当关塔那摩的人们正在寻找当前标准的例外时,这一切都在滚动。本字段手册是否可以防止这种情况再次发生?与您谈论的年度评论完全分开 - 是否有可能有人再次来到国防部长,说,看,我们需要更多的纬度?
Gen。KIMMONS: I'd defer to the secretary. There's no provision for exceptions to this Field Manual.
Q Was there a provision for the exception -- was there provision in the last Field Manual? And how did we get here from there?
Gen。KIMMONS: Well, I think we got here, if you're talking about the transgressions and mistakes that were made in the past, those were not people complying with the old Field Manual, those were people who were abusing prisoners, sometimes in conjunction with interrogation and sometimes outside of the interrogation envelope, in a willful, malicious manner. I mean --
Q But I think that they thought that they were doing it not in a willful, malicious manner. They went to OSD and said we need extra latitude.
斯廷森先生:记住,因为囚犯混乱关系atment Act of 2005, this Field Manual is law. And the directive and the Field Manual have no provisions for waivers from the Detainee Treatment Act.
Q And were there provisions for waivers before? I'm just unclear as to what the status of this was before.
先生。STIMSON: I'm aware that waivers were asked for, but I don't know the answer exactly to your question, how you phrased it.
先生。惠特曼:谢谢。
Gen。KIMMONS: Thanks very much.