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©Journal of Peace Research, vol. 32, no. 2, 1995, pp. 213--228

This article analyzes the question of information control and how it influences the conduct and the study of international relations. Three theories are advanced as possible explanations for secrecy: The first, the External Threat explanation, suggests that government secrecy is designed to protect sensitive information from external enemies. The second explanation, the Bureaucratic Politics explanation, views secrecy as a relatively unsystematic process that results from the (collectively) irrational features in any government bureaucracy. The third explanation, the Internal Threat approach, argues that government officials use secrecy to mislead the populations of their own countries. These three explanations are applied to a case study of US information policy with regard to the Congo Crisis of 1960-61. The article concludes that the Congo case tends to support the Internal Threat explanation of secrecy.

1。在troduction

无论其更大的后果，冷战的终结都证明对社会科学家和历史学家有益。在前苏联和其他前共产主义国家中获取以前秘密的信息，已经充实了我们对这些国家在国内外政策中如何运作的理解。在过去的几年中，美国的信息访问访问的放松更大，这种访问为研究提供了令人兴奋的可能性。社会科学家才刚刚开始筛选新的，以前的秘密材料，但人们普遍认为他们将极大地影响我们对冷战的理解（Alperovitz＆Bird，1994）。

The question of access to government information is obviously one of major importance for the researcher, especially in political science and related disciplines; however the study of information policy has been somewhat uneven. During the 1960s and 1970s, there was considerable interest in the question of secrecy, among journalists, policymakers, and scholars. Many of these, to be sure were descriptive or advocacy oriented. However, there were also serious studies that systematically compared secrecy practices among Western democracies and placed secrecy in the broader perspective of public policy analysis (see for example essays in Galnoor, 1977; & Franck & Weisband, 1974). Even such prominent figures as Carl J. Friedrich (1972, 1977) and Theodore Lowi (1977) contributed to this discussion.

但是，此类研究过时，在1980年之后，对保密研究的研究明显下降。具有讽刺意味的是，对学者的保密兴趣下降，恰逢政府（尤其是美国）保密的实践实践的大幅增长。^（1）Despite its continued importance, there has been no systematic study that seeks to explain the causes of government secrecy. The present essay will analyze the causes of secrecy, especially in the areas of international relations and foreign policy. Specifically, we will consider the following questions: Why does a democratic government fail to release all of its information? Why are some government documents classified and retained as secret, while others are not? Finally, what are the implications of secrecy for methodologies of political research? The article considers these questions in the context of an empirical case study of US information policy during the Congo Crisis.

Before embarking on the empirical discussion, I present three separate explanations for government secrecy: The first, the External Threat explanation, suggests that government secrecy is designed to protect sensitive information from foreign powers and other external enemies. The second explanation, the Bureaucratic Politics explanation, sees secrecy as a relatively unsystematic process that results from the (collectively) irrational features in any government bureaucracy. The third explanation, the Internal Threat approach, argues that government officials use secrecy to mislead the populations of their own countries.

2。The External Threat Approach

This approach assumes that state officials are motivated by a concern with the national interest and, especially, national security. In order to maintain and enhance this security, officials must withhold information from potential foreign rivals. Certainly a government cannot reveal national defense plans to its enemies, at least not without grave risks. Also, intelligence agencies must protect the their sources and methods. Moreover, a state must withhold secrets, such as the details of trade negotiation strategies, even from relatively friendly countries with which it is, from time to time, in competition. So it is the governments of foreign countries, not members of the public, that are the objects of government secrecy. This External Threat explanation is widely promoted by the government itself, but some academics also subscribe to it. In his study of the Central Intelligence Agency, Rodrick Jeffrys-Jones (1989, p. 3) writes:

[A]llegations of excessive secrecy have in fact whipped up legislative fury since the early days of the Republic. Here there is real scope for misunderstanding. In keeping certain information hidden from foreign powers, the director of the CIA must necessarily refrain from instructing (and may even actually deceive) the American people.

Deception of the public is an unfortunate yet inevitable side-effect of this process. This is, by far, the most widely accepted explanation for government information policy, and it is familiar to students of strategic decision-making processes.

The methodological implications of this External Threat approach should be somewhat encouraging to the researcher. The approach implies that the government will make no effort to withhold information if the information is already known by the enemy powers. Moreover, the government will not usually withhold documents for very long periods, and as soon as certain practices or strategies are fully obsolete, the government will declassify the relevant documents. Above all, it is assumed that governments will not withhold information simply because the information might embarrass state officials or generate public opposition. Thus, the External Threat approach implies that secrecy will necessarily be limited in scope and circumscribed with regard to the types of information that are useful to the social scientist. Excepting researchers who focus on military or intelligence history (especially those who focus on the details of specific strategies), the social scientist should not be unduly impeded by government secrecy.

3。官僚政治

Most theories assume that foreign policy, whatever its basis, is the result of a coherent strategy that is designed to achieve some assigned objectives. The Bureaucratic Politics approach challenges this assumption and argues that policy-making in all areas -- including information policy -- is rarely quite so simple. One of the most basic aspects of any bureaucratic entity is adherence to standard operating procedures, and this adherence can sometimes result in suboptimal or irrational outcomes (Allison, 1971; see also the critique by Bendor and Hammond, 1992). Bureaucracies are accordingly viewed as lumbering, rule-ridden, mechanisms incapable of decisive, coherent action (Joseph, 1981, p. 25), and they tend to act in particular ways because they have always acted in such ways. Another aspect of bureaucratic functioning is competition among various agencies, subagencies, and personalities. In its most extreme form, the Bureaucratic perspective implies that there is no guiding objective in government activity; policy formulation results from inertia and from incoherent maneuvering among diverse agencies.

让我们将此观点应用于保密。在某些外交政策机构中，保密是标准操作程序。例如，情报机构经常将广泛的文件分类仅仅是因为机构规则要求进行这种分类，即使这些机密材料的大部分必须肯定涵盖学者，记者，公众，外国敌人，外国敌人，外国成员，公众，外国成员，或其他任何人。使用政府档案的研究人员可以很容易地证明许多先前分类的材料几乎没有重要的信息。

Moreover, the rigors of interagency competition can influence document classification procedures. Government officials (or agencies) will seek to deceive each other, and bureaucratic conflict may be a significant factor in the process of document classification. Sometimes, officials will withhold documents in order to gain advantage in inter-bureaucratic competition or, in other cases, because of personal feuds among officials. Paul Anderson (1981, pp. 745--47) applies the Bureaucratic Politics model to the question of government information practices. He notes that, even in private meetings, officials must tailor their arguments in order appear more persuasive and to be consistent with acceptable standards of policy-making etiquette.

例如，安德森（Anderson）指出，政府官员可能是由狭och的官僚因素，利益集团压力或其他政治考虑的动机。但是，公认的官僚讨论标准不允许官员根据这些事情来构架他们的论点，而是要求援引国家利益以证明所有外交政策是合理的。官员们将一方面始终面对政治压力的现实之间的紧张关系，另一方面需要压抑这种压力。安德森（Anderson）并没有明确讨论保密，尽管很容易看出保密人会在他描述的过程中发挥作用：官员们将寻求隐藏提示政治而不是国家利益动机的信息，以提倡他们主张的立场。因此，保密的目标既不是公众也不是外国敌人，而是竞争的政府官员或机构。

Overall, the Bureaucratic explanation suggests that much of the material that is inaccessible to researchers are classified only because of arcane feuds or operating procedures. And the degree of secrecy will be circumscribed. All states (except, perhaps, those on the verge of disintegration) must have a significant degree of interagency coordination, and the need for such coordination will constrain the practice of bureaucratic rivalry, as well as the associated secrecy. The irrationalities of standard operating procedures result in a more or less random classification of documents;^（2）在此过程中，不幸的是，某些具有分析重要的材料可能会被扣留，但是几乎没有systematic扣缴历史相关资料。The methodological implications of the bureaucratic perspective are therefore encouraging for the researcher.

4.内部威胁方法，变体I

对保密性的这种解释认为，政府官员使用保密（至少部分地）作为误导公众并确保精英对外交政策的控制权。在许多关于国际关系的现实主义文献中，通常暗示了这种观点。可以肯定的是，没有详细的，演绎的现实主义政府保密理论，实际上，现实主义传统中没有任何作家以任何明确的方式解决了政府保密问题。但是，在现有文献中，对保密的现实观点是暗示的。例如，汉斯·摩根豪（Hans Morgentha）（1967，pp。142-43）指出，良好的外交政策要求与公众舆论的偏好之间的冲突是事物的本质并继续：

。。政府必须意识到，这不是公众舆论的奴隶。这种公众舆论不是要发现的静态事物……这是一个充满活力的，不断变化的实体，可以通过知情和负责任的领导来不断地创建和重新创建和重新创建；断言这一领导是政府的历史使命。

摩根索认为这部小说的宣传武器, which can be used to manipulate public opinion. Secrecy is not directly mentioned here but it is certainly implied; the use of secrecy and the selective dissemination of one-sided information will help the statesman to assert informed and responsible leadership, which realists like Morgenthau advocate.

Selective information dissemination, advocated by Morgenthau, may sometimes involve deliberate misrepresentation.⁽³⁾在other instances, misrepresentations will be eschewed and only partial or distorted -- rather than outright false -- information will be disseminated, while any unfavorable information will be suppressed. The easiest way to suppress information is to mark it secret, to classify it.⁽⁴⁾

根据现实主义者的说法，什么是激励官员秘密采取行动？考虑到该主题缺乏明确的讨论，这个问题的答案必须是暂定的。但是，现实主义文学意味着官员们试图提高国家利益和安全（参见Krasner，1978）。⁽⁵⁾it is this commitment to the national interest that motivates them to mislead the public and to conceal information. Some writers note that secrecy and deception can produce positive results. Thomas Bailey, for example, states with approval that Franklin Delano Roosevelt systematically acted to deceive the US public about his efforts to lead the country into World War II (cited in Novick, 1988, p. 308). Friedrich (1972, p. 179), more explicitly, states that secrecy is eminently functional in many government operations, in both the domestic sphere but especially in matters of foreign and military policy.⁽⁶⁾在short, realists insist on the need for elite control of foreign policy, even in a democratic form of government; secrecy is sometimes a necessary means for achieving such elite control.

现实主义的批评者，例如Noam Chomsky（1989，pp。16--17），挑战了这些观点，以精英和不民主。伍德罗·威尔逊（Woodrow Wilson）也批评政府保密（至少这是他进入政府服务之前的观点）。在Congressional Government（在弗里德里希（Friedrich），1972年，第181页中引用），他断言没有任何合法隐私[即保密]关于政府事务。政府必须...在影响它的一切方面绝对是公开的 - 威尔逊对外交政策也不例外。然而，现实主义者长期以来一直认为，这种理想主义的观点，无论其意图如何，都不适合严格的国际冲突。⁽⁷⁾在short, the realists view secrecy and public deception as vital tools for an effective foreign policy.

内部威胁方法，变体II

在现实主义方法的批评家中，一些人提出了对保密性的基本解释。大卫·萨德夫斯基（David Sadofsky）（1990年，第84--85页）暗示，国家利益通常是一个核心，是一种浅薄的合理化。根据萨德夫斯基（Sadofsky）的说法，政府保密，不是保护国家安全，而是保护政府决策者的利益。因此，萨德夫斯基（Sadofsky）提出了对保密性的独特且显然是竞争的解释。

It is interesting to note that Sadofsky's hunch -- that governmental self interest motivates secrecy -- is quite consistent with the extensive literature on rational action in government (see Bartlett, 1973; Buchanan, 1975; Downs, 1967; and Niskanen, 1975). There is a wide consensus among major studies of the subject, that government officials are motivated at least partly (though not, for most analysts, exclusively) by the desire to advance their own interests and their respective agencies. From the standpoint of rational action, the significance of secrecy can be easily established: Rational officials will classify information if such classification advances the officials' interests. However, bureaucrats will not necessarily pursue their interests in a consciously cynical fashion; it is well established that individuals and groups tend to allow their conceptions of the public good to be influenced by their own interests. Karl Mannheim (1936) has convincingly shown that human beings or even whole social groups rationalize behavior and assume that their own interests are really universal interests, while George Orwell (1954) has argued that language can obfuscate this process of rationalization. The present discussion may appropriately be considered in ideological terms, and bureaucrats may be expected to rationalize self interested behavior in all areas, including the use of secrecy and deception.

根据理性行动的观点，保密与自我利益的考虑交织在一起。理性的决策者将有选择地发布对自己及其官僚有利的信息，并将扣留损害信息。如果官员采取不称职或非法行动，或者官员以与公认的行为标准不一致的方式行事，则可能会遵守此类信息。正如安东尼·唐斯（Anthony Downs）（1967年，第77页）所述：。。所有类型的官员都倾向于夸大数据，这些数据对自己有利，并最大程度地减少那些揭示自己缺点的数据。

It seems reasonable to assume that self interested bureaucratic behavior must at least sometimes conflict with the interests of the public (and this would hold true for any definition of public interest). Government officials have a major advantage in such conflicts: they control much or nearly all the relevant information (Niskanen, 1971, pp. 29--30, 39--40). Government officials can pursue questionable actions that would be difficult to justify in public and can then classify the relevant documentation. Officials can plausibly assert that classification advances the public interest, and since members of the public cannot see the classified documents they cannot contradict the officials' assertions. The classification system is, by its very nature, well suited to official self interest.

6。The Internal Threat Approach: A Synthesis

保密是理性的行为角度,many obvious ways, contrary to the realist approach. The two perspectives have very different views of the motivations of policy-makers. The realists assume that policy-makers generally act to further the national interest, while the rational action perspective assumes, in contrast, that policy-makers often act to further their own interests. The difference between the rational action and realist approaches to secrecy may be illustrated with a recently declassified document, which makes reference to radiation experiments conducted by the US government during the early period of the Cold War (see US Atomic Energy Commission, 1947). The document in question is a memorandum written in 1947 and declassified in 1994, and it directed government employees as follows: It is desired that no document be released which refers to experiments with humans and might have adverse effects on public opinion or result in legal suits. Documents covering such work field should be classified "secret."' The document also authorized the release of any information pertaining to radiation research that could bebeneficial为人类疾病和疾病（添加了重点）。

The rational action approach would view classification in this case as an effort by government officials to protect themselves and their agencies against public embarrassment, budget cuts, or even criminal prosecutions. The realist approach, in contrast, would interpret these events somewhat differently. Realists would argue that such classification was intended to serve the national interest, since the radiation experiments being described were vital to national security and -- in the context of the Cold War -- it was sometimes necessary to undertake actions that conflicted with ordinary conceptions of morality. As David Charters notes (1985, p. 334): The dark underside of international affairs is inherently untidy and unpleasant. It leaves little room for comfortable moral, political, or operational positions.

Despite all of these differences, the realist and rational action perspectives have a crucial feature in common: They both agree that government officials withhold information in order to deceive the public. The two perspectives differ with regard to why secrecy takes place and, concomitantly, they differ in the way they analyze the motivations of policy-makers; but they agree that the public is the target of secrecy policies.⁽⁸⁾

本文的其余部分,我将结合Variants I and II and term this hybrid simply the Internal Threat approach. The defining feature of the Internal Threat approach is that the general public is considered the principal target of government secrecy. The practical implications of this perspective are disturbing for the researcher. First, the perspective implies that the range of classified information would be broad; even information that is known to enemy powers may remain classified -- since it is the public, not enemy powers, that is the principal target according to this explanation. Secondly, we would expect classification periods to be of long duration. Documents pertaining to events that had long ceased to be active foreign policy concerns may remain classified, since exposures can discredit government activities in general. Finally, the Internal Threat perspective assumes that governments will often withhold information that may be of great interest to researchers. By its very nature, the Internal Threat perspective assumes that officials make special efforts to conceal information on controversial actions -- such as the radiation tests cited above -- and such controversial material is often historically important. Thus governments do not randomly suppress information; on the contrary, they systematically suppress some of the most historically relevant information. If the Internal Threat approach is correct, then much of our research is and must be conducted without important or even vital information.

Comparison of Theories

At this point, several qualifications are needed. It should be apparent that there is significant overlap among these various theories and that the above three categories are not mutually exclusive. Many realists would no doubt subscribe to aspects of both the External Threat and the Internal Threat explanations, while advocates of rational action might concur simultaneously with the Internal Threat approach and the Bureaucratic Politics approach. However, this discussion will treat the three perspectives separately, in order to simplify our analysis. This article will consider each theory as a mutually exclusive ideal type, which has been deliberately exaggerated in order to facilitate effective comparison.⁽⁹⁾

Overall, these three theories present a range of different analyses about the causes and the effects of secrecy. For convenience, the main points of each perspective are presented in outline form (see Table 1). The most significant differences among the theories may be summarized as follows: The Internal Threat approach argues that the general public is the principal target of government secrecy. This approach, if substantiated, would pose serious methodological questions for researchers, since it implies that the scope of secrecy would be broad and that governments have a systematic tendency to classify information that is relevant to researchers. The External Threat and Bureaucratic Politics approaches, in contrast, suggest that the scope of secrecy would be considerably more circumscribed and that much of the secret information is somewhat less relevant to researchers. Now that we have outlined the three perspectives, I turn to the case study of the Congo Crisis, where the theories will be applied.

8.刚果案

The Congo Crisis of 1960--1 is well suited for this analysis of secrecy for two reasons. First, it was one of the major conflicts of the Cold War. In the USA, it received regular attention from two presidents (Eisenhower and Kennedy) and, if one looks at the index from the纽约时报,很显然,刚果收到更多的信息ntion during the period 1960--1 than any other Third World crisis area (including even Vietnam). Second, there is now substantial information pertaining to covert operations during the Congo Crisis by the USA and other countries that has been culled by academic researchers and US Senate investigators (see especially Gibbs, 1991; Kalb, 1982; Mahoney, 1983; US Senate, 1975; and Weissman, 1974. These studies are based, in part, on a large volume of US and UN documents that have been declassified over time. Although many documents pertaining to the Congo remain classified, there does exist a significant quantity of declassified materials. With these new materials it is possible to analyze the type of information that was classified and the type of information that was publicly disseminated. By examining this data, we can evaluate, at least tentatively, the three approaches to government secrecy described above.

危机始于1960年6月刚果（现称Zaire）从比利时获得独立的时候。比利时人几乎没有努力为国家做好自治的准备，而在独立之时，不超过30名刚果大学毕业生。新国家几乎立即被随机暴力和内战所困扰。卡坦加省是铜，钴和其他基本矿物的主要生产国，几天之内从刚果中脱离了，并形成了一个单独的状态。后来，南卡西（South Kasai）的钻石生产地区也脱离了。在此期间，刚果国民军队完全混乱，中央政府被证明无能为力。刚果也是几个外国干预的对象。在刚果危机的混乱期间，美国，苏联，比利时，法国和英国都大量干预。联合国维持和平部队 - 历史上最大的和平部队，在1960 - 4年期间赢得了该国，并在其刚果政治中发挥了重要作用。

一个主要问题在早期的Congo Crisis was the role of Patrice Lumumba, the head of the largest political party and also the country's first prime minister. Western officials were generally quite hostile toward Lumumba, and they regarded him as excessively nationalistic and unreliable in the East--west conflict. Lumumba's decision, in August 1960, to accept Soviet military aid, was especially contentious. Early scholarly accounts of Lumumba were highly negative, presenting him as authoritarian, emotionally unstable, and procommunist (see, for example, Lefever, 1965, pp. 38--42). More recent analyses, however, have been considerably more favorable and have noted that Lumumba was the only democratically elected leader in the history of the Congo, and that many of his actions seem much more reasonable in light of what is now known about the extent and nature of foreign intervention in the crisis (see especially Minter, 1984, pp. 28-35).

无论具体细节，美国官员都会憎恶卢蒙巴，并决心推翻他，这成为刚果危机的前六个月中美国政策的主要目标。消除Lumumba的努力引发了中央情报局历史上最大，最重要的行动之一。多年后的1984年，前中央情报局局长威廉·科尔比（William Colby）评论说：在[自1950年代以来）进行的秘密行动...我想说有些人非常成功，有些是灾难...灾难。但是请考虑我们在刚果的计划（Colby，1984，第36页）。

中央情报局局长艾伦·杜勒斯（Allen Dulles）在1960年8月概述了秘密行动计划，他们强调在刚果议会议员中建立反对卢蒙马总理的反对，目的是对总理进行不信任的投票。据报道，艾森豪威尔总统对这些计划进行了审查，并对在这种情况下采取非常直接行动的必要性表示了极大的感受，他想知道所概述的计划是否足以实现这一目标。⁽¹⁰⁾The president's statement appears to have encouraged the CIA to expand the scope of its operational plans. Dulles then cabled the CIA station in the Congo and authorized actions aimed at replacing Lumumba; also, Dulles vaguely suggested even more aggressive action if it can remain covert (US Senate, 1975, p. 16).

尽管美国考虑将美军派往刚果，但艾森豪威尔总统拒绝了这一选择，认为这一选择过多。取而代之的是，艾森豪威尔政府试图通过中央情报局招募的代理部队来投射美国权力。中央情报局通过一名年轻且政治上的官员约瑟夫·杜斯·莫博图（Joseph Desire Mobutu）做出了特别的努力，以在刚果国民军中获得影响力。⁽¹¹⁾刚果危机的最新研究普遍认为，中央情报局资金支持蒙博托的活动。玛德琳·卡尔布（Madeleine Kalb，1982，p。96）得出结论，在刚果危机期间，中央情报局和其他西方大使馆提供了使他在商业中的钱，而斯蒂芬·韦斯曼（Stephen Weissman）（1974，p。95）引用了证据证据。蒙博托由中央情报局支付。甚至前中央情报局局长科尔比（1984，p。36）现在都同意，该机构在刚果危机期间帮助约瑟夫·莫博图图。

Amply supplied by the USA (and possibly other Western powers), Mobutu distributed large amounts of money to the officers and men under his command; through this arrangement he was able to establish bonds of loyalty among his soldiers. Mobutu's military unit probably numbered only a few hundred soldiers, but his troops were paid exceptionally well (by Congolese standards), and this unit was virtually the only really functioning element of the Congolese National Army. Also, Mobutu and his men were strategically located in Leopoldville, the capital city, and were thus well placed to influence events. This force was a major conduit of influence for American foreign policy. Another source of US government influence was the UN peace-keeping force. The USA provided a disproportionate share of the funding for the UN force (about 40% of total funding for the duration of the operation) and several of the UN officials in charge of the Congo operation, notably Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold and Special Representative Andrew Cordier, secretly collaborated with US officials (see Gibbs, 1993; and Collins, 1992). The USA thus had formidable capabilities to inject its power into the Congo.

在宪法纠纷期间，第一次推翻卢蒙巴（Lumumba）的（记录在案）的努力是在1960年9月。从技术上讲，刚果总理由总统任命，当时是约瑟夫·卡萨沃布（Joseph Kasavubu）。1960年9月5日，Kasavubu总统宣布他正在解雇卢蒙巴并任命新总理。有大量证据表明，我们和联合国官员都影响了卡萨沃布的行动。英国驻刚果大使后来写道：“一次“一次” Kasavubu派遣Cordier“问应该如何组织政变”（引用Weissman，1974年，第90页，第90页，第84页）。Cordier和Hammarskjold都在国务院协调了他们的活动。在卢蒙巴解雇的那天，科尔迪埃寄了

'urgent recommendation' to the US government via Hammarskjold suggesting that it send an official to [the capital city] Leopoldville -- 'not too high-level, not too junior -- who could observe the local scene, see what the Russians were up to, and make a firsthand report to Washington (Kalb, 1982, pp. 74-75).

Cordier also consulted with the US ambassador to the Congo and the next day, September 6, he arranged for UN troops to close the airport -- to preclude any airlift of loyal troops to the capital by Lumumba.⁽¹²⁾然后，科迪尔（Cordier）命令联合国部队也关闭广播电台，这阻止了卢蒙巴（Lumumba）广播呼吁支持。简而言之，联合国与美国合作鼓励卡萨沃布对卢蒙巴采取行动，然后试图使卢蒙巴堡重返权力。尽管联合国对总统卡萨布布（Kasavubu）的支持在当时公开闻名 - 哈马尔斯克（Hammarskjold）公开捍卫总统的行动，但与美国官员的合作是完全秘密的。

此事件发生后，美国与联合国之间的密切关联在一定程度上恶化。科迪尔被召回为刚果行动的董事，而哈马尔斯克乔尔（Hammarskjold）似乎一直担心联合国在美国的方向上靠得太远，而这样的亲密身份证明是削弱了联合国的信誉。几个月来，美国的政策和联合国的政策在某种程度上有所不同（有关详细信息，请参见Gibbs，1991年，第96---98页）。此外，解雇卢蒙巴的努力没有成功。卢蒙巴（Lumumba）在刚果立法机关面前辩护了他的案子，并获得了压倒性的信任票，而卡萨瓦布（Kasavubu）对总理的驳回被反对。

The CIA, apparently out-maneuvered, remained determined to remove Lumumba. The USA now advocated a military coup d'etat by Colonel Mobutu and his men. On 14 September, Mobutu deposed Lumumba, closed the parliament, and established himself as dictator. He organized a council of Congolese university students to advise him, called the College of Commissioners, and established a rudimentary de facto government. There is clear evidence that the CIA played a role in this coup. Weissman (1974, p. 95) writes:

The main point -- that the CIA was heavily involved in the. . . emergence of Col. Joseph Mobutu and his College of Commissioners -- has been confirmed by a former official of the American Embassy who observed the events in question. Further substantiation was provided by two former government officials who spoke directly to the CIA station Chief in [the Congolese capital] Leopoldville, Lawrence Devlin.

前中央情报局官员维克多·马尔蒂蒂（Victor Marchetti，1988年）也证实该机构参与了蒙博托政变。

Let us pause here and focus on the significance of these events for the topic of this article, i.e. information policy. During these events, the US government released no information pertaining to its intervention in the Congo; at the same time, information was selectively released which suggested that the USA was not intervening at all and was, on the contrary, seeking to protect the Congo from potential intervention by other powers. The basic position was publicly stated by the US representative to the United Nations, James Wadsworth (1960, p. 530): . . .the Security Council should make it unmistakably clear once more that no one -- and I repeat no one -- should be permitted to intervene unilaterally in [the Congo]. The information on US intervention in the Crisis, such as the subversion of the Lumumba government or the support for Colonel Mobutu's coup, was suppressed.

在any case, US officials continued to fear Lumumba, even after the coup removed him from power. Lumumba sought refuge in his residence in the capital, but it was widely believed that he would attempt a comeback. US officials urged Mobutu to arrest Lumumba; however, UN forces, now showing some independence from US foreign policy, guarded Lumumba's house and prevented the arrest. A stalemate reigned for several months, until Lumumba left his home in November and fled north where, en route, he was arrested by Mobutu's troops. Lumumba was then imprisoned at a military installation not far from the capital city.

Lumumba was subsequently removed from prison and, on 17 January, 1961, he was assassinated. A full discussion of the assassination would go beyond the scope of this article, but we will focus on the possible role of the United States. Throughout the events described above, the CIA was considering a variety of plans to kill Lumumba, especially with poisons, and these assassination plots have been exhaustively documented in an investigation by the US Senate (1975, ch. 3). The assassination plots were authorized by top level officials, including the CIA Director, Allen Dulles, the Agency Deputy Director for Operations, Richard Bissell, and the Africa Division Chief, Bronson Tweedy.

The obvious question is: Did the CIA assassinate Lumumba? It should be noted that the Senate investigation only acknowledges that the CIA hadplottedto kill Lumumba, but emphasizes that these plots were all unsuccessful. Crucially, the report concludes: there is no evidence that the United States was in any way involved in Lumumba's death at the hands of his Congolese enemies (US Senate, 1975, p. 256).⁽¹³⁾但是，其他调查得出了不同的结论。理查德·马奥尼（Richard Mahoney，1983，p。71）指出，毫无疑问，中央情报局（不是实际的刺客）是谋杀案背后的动力，而玛德琳·卡尔布（Madeleine Kalb，1982，p。189）毫无疑问地指出美国官员鼓励卢蒙巴的刚果反对者消除他。根据约翰·斯托克韦尔（John Stockwell，1978年，第237页）的说法，前中央情报局在非洲有长期经验，卢蒙巴被与中央情报局有着密切关系的刚果政治家的陪同人员殴打致死。无论中央情报局在最终杀害中的作用如何，所有消息来源都达成了一致的共识，该机构无疑策划了杀死卢蒙巴。

9. Analysis

显然，应抑制与美国干预有关的大量信息；同时，美国政府传播了误导性的信息，表明美国没有干预。现在，让我们考虑这些事实对政府保密的三种理论的重要性。首先，外部威胁方法表明，为了欺骗竞争性外国大国，尤其是苏联，关于美国在刚果中的活动，美国撤销了信息。这样的保密是必要的，没有它，苏联可能破坏了美国的行动。由于似乎与外部威胁方法一致的原因，很容易想到某些可能被扣留的信息。当然，美国无法在刚果中发布其秘密行动的操作细节，而不会危及结果。

However, there emerges a major problem with this approach: Much of the information on US covert action was already known to the Soviet Union, at least in its principal features. The collaboration between the USA and the UN command, for example, was openly discussed in Soviet press coverage (seeizvestia，1960年）。美国对Mobutu的支持似乎也是常识。一篇文章Pravda（1960a）指出：“美国帝国主义者为与卢蒙巴的斗争提供了巨额资金，为莫蒙图及其匪徒提供了巨额资金，而另一篇文章（Pravda, 1960 b)蒙博托为“傀儡上校' and a creation of the NATO powers. These are fairly accurate assessments of the situation, at least insofar as Mobutu was indeed dependent on foreign support. (Other countries were aware of these facts as well: In 1961, a Yugoslav diplomat told his US counterpart, We know you have influence with Mobutu [Kalb, 1982, p. 278].) Even the US efforts to assassinate Lumumba were not altogether secret. At one point,Pravda（在Kalb中引用，1982年，第189页）报道说，美国人和比利时人正在“准备取消” Lumumba。如果苏联媒体知道这些事实，那么当然，在苏联外交政策的大部分官僚机构中，它们就广为人知。美国未能发布与苏联已经知道的事件有关的信息。外部威胁方法可能会解释美国信息政策的一些细节，但总的来说，它严重不足。

The Bureaucratic Politics perspective helps to explain other features of the information process in the Congo case. It is certainly true that much of the secret information must have been classified due to standard operating procedures or for idiosyncratic reasons. The present author can attest that the presidential libraries contain (among other things) significant amounts of information on the Congo Crisis that would be of no interest to anyone. Some of the classified information seems so trivial that it is difficult (for the layperson) to understand why officials bothered to classify it.

但是，在进一步考虑的情况下，官僚政治未能提供有关信息政策的充分说明。首先，由于标准操作程序，随机分类在这种情况下无法说明大部分保密性。相反，似乎已经有一项系统的努力来抑制几乎所有与美国干预刚果内部政治有关的信息 - 直到刚果危机结束后很久才发布这些信息。（实际上，上面讨论的许多信息仅在1975年在秘密行动的特殊听证会上在国会的压力下发布。）几乎没有证据表明，爆发际差异在任何程度上都影响了信息政策。尽管中央情报局确实扣留了国务院的一些信息，但⁽¹⁴⁾这两个机构似乎一般同意刚果的干预。⁽¹⁵⁾State Department officials were usually well informed with regard to CIA activities in the Congo and, according to one account, there was a policy consensus in Washington about the need for the removal of Lumumba (US Senate, 1975, p. 16).⁽¹⁶⁾

刚果案强烈支持了内部威胁方法 - 强调政府向公众隐藏信息的努力。根据这种方法，政府试图掩盖潜在的有争议的活动或可能引起公众反对的活动。在刚果案中，保密成功地掩盖了可能引起争议的政府活动（例如暗杀卢蒙巴的努力）。其他秘密行动，例如卡萨沃布总统的教练，破坏卢蒙巴在军队中的地位的努力，对蒙博托政变的支持都很难在公开场合证明是有道理的。此外，内部威胁方法正确地预测，政府常常掩盖了历史上相关的信息。刚果危机的决定性事件 - 例如蒙博图（Mobutu）驳回了卢蒙巴（Lumumba）或政变 - 受到外国干预的影响，但这种干预措施却被公众知识所禁止。

10. Conclusion

我希望您认识到这样的推论是，这些段落的令人震惊的本质导致了它们的压制。- 西格蒙德·弗洛伊德（Sigmund Freud）（1975年，第146页），《梦想审查制度》

The most significant finding in the Congo case was that government information policy systematically distorted the public record and created the misleading impression that the USA was not, in fact, intervening. Indeed, early scholarly accounts of the Congo Crisis (e.g., Young, 1965; also Lefever, 1965) relied overwhelmingly on public information and, as a result, they missed the significance of US intervention. It is also interesting to note that the Congo case is inconsistent with some basic assumptions about international relations. Hans Morgenthau (1967, p. 226), for example, wrote of political assassination as follows:

According to its official records, the Republic of Venice, from 1415 to 1525, planned or attempted about two hundred assassinations for purposes of its foreign policy... The documents record virtually no offer of assassination to have been rejected by the Venetian government... In the same period, the cardinals brought their own butlers and wine to papal coronation dinners for fear they might otherwise be poisoned; this custom is reported to have been general in Rome, without the host's taking offense at it. . . . Obviously, such methods to attain political ends are no longer practiced today.

Our discussion of the Congo suggests that Morgenthau was mistaken; contemporary international relations does indeed entail assassination plots. Morgenthau (writing in 1967) found no evidence of assassination in the public records and, mistakenly, assumed that it no longer occurred. In short, government secrecy successfully misled many researchers.

尽管不进一步的研究eded on this topic, our (tentative) findings in this case raise significant methodological issues. Much of the literature in international relations is based on public -- and possibly unreliable -- sources of information. Studies on the causes of war (Maoz & Abolali, 1989; and Weede, 1984), for example, focus almost exclusively on publicly available information. Such studies systematically miss the significance of covert war (see critique by Forsythe, 1992), and how such wars can influence theories of war in general. Recent discussions of such diverse issues as the Gulf War, the Bosnia--Hercegovina conflict, and international democratization usually fail to mention that much of the information on these subjects remains unavailable. Classified documents pertaining to these events will probably remain closed to researchers for several decades (if, indeed, they are released at all). Such methodological complications, which are rarely addressed in the literature, require augmented consideration.

我们对刚果案件的发现（如果通过进一步的研究确认）也将对民主理论产生影响。最近的分析通常认为，民主政治制度（具有定期选举和言论自由）确保对政府的公众控制（见Diamond等，1988）。我们的讨论提出了有关此假设的严重问题。在刚果案中，公众无法有效控制外交政策，因为该政策的细节是公众不知道的。政府信息政策可以看作是社会控制的一种手段。这并不是一个完美的文件 - 偶尔会泄露文件 - 但它可以有效地维持官僚权力和以似乎与现有民主政府理论不相容的方式来操纵公众舆论。我们在刚果案中的发现表明，对国际问题的讨论有时是基于政府信息政策人为构建的看法（关于一般政治讨论的构建性质，请参见Edelman，1988；金博宝正规网址 Schneider＆Ingram，1993）。民主理论家可能会考虑信息政策的重要性及其如何影响政府的民主控制，尤其是在外交政策领域。

Before closing, I consider one final point: It may be objected that this discussion is anachronistic and that, after the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal, secrecy was effectively curtailed in the USA. Indeed, there is a widespread view that the Freedom of Information Act and other reforms created a far more open foreign policy in the USA and, as a result, the public scrutinizes policies in great detail. Thus, Robert Keohane (1984, pp. 94--95) writes American officials often lament that the US government leaks information "like a sieve. . . ,"' while Alden and Schurmann (1990, p. 66) claim that US foreign policy is formulated in a floodlit society, where secrecy is impractical.

Such views are mistaken; in fact, US foreign policy became far more secretive during the 1980s, as legislative and administrative actions considerably narrowed the range of information supplied by the federal government.^（17）Document sets declassified by the government during this period were considered unreliable. For example, documents published by the State Department in the seriesForeign Relations of the United States(Frus), generated controversy in the history profession, with Roger Dingman noting unmistakable evidence of dramatic and devastating changes in the editorial policies and processes which govern the publication of documents on American foreign policy (paraphrased inWashington Post, 1990). A diplomatic historian, Bruce R. Kuniholm, reviewed a FRUS volume on US policy toward Iran and commented that certain sections constitute a gross misrepresentation of the historical record, sufficient to deserve the label of fraud (quoted inWashington Post, 1990), while Warren I. Cohen (1990) stated that the Iran volume was a fraud, a gross distortion of American activity there. Criticism in the history profession culminated in a resolution by the Organization of American Historians, which criticized an appalling increase in the amount of incomplete and deleted documentary material (quoted inWashington Post, 1990). Other professional organizations also noted increased restrictiveness. The American Library Association (1988) issued a pamphlet entitledLess Access to Less Information by and about the US Government。Military doctrine increasingly emphasized the need for propaganda and public deception, while specific military actions in Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf entailed exceptionally high levels of secrecy (Sharkey, 1991).

随着冷战的灭亡，在1993年，新任总统管理局就职典礼，人们普遍期望政府信息政策在美国的限制性降低。但是，克林顿政府仅进行了信息政策的适度变化，并且有一切迹象表明政府保密将在冷战结束后很长时间继续（请参阅Secrecy and Government Bulletin1993和1994；和二十世纪基金，1992年，第1页。15）。美国外交政策是在洪水条件下进行的，这是不准确的。

Classification of documents contributes to an atmosphere of deception in politics, and such deception will be present, to some extent, in all political systems. It is also worth noting that US information policy is relatively unrestrictive -- at least when compared with other countries such as the (now former) USSR or even Western European democracies (see for example, Gleditsch & Hogetveit, 1984). Our conclusions here would apply with even greater force to other countries, where secrecy is more widely practiced. Information policy thus has significant implications for the practice and the study of democratic politics. It is a subject that deserves increased attention from researchers.

1。Bennet（1988），Feinberg（1989）和Guida（1989）可以找到有关最近信息政策的一些有用描述。

2。但是，这些标准操作程序可以用不同的方式解释。可能会反对情报机构do由于通常将整个文档类别分类，因此系统地扣留信息。但是，没有系统的倾向拒绝（对任何受众）特别重要的信息。分类信息是重要的还是平凡的，是随机过程的结果。

3。With regard to misrepresentation, see analysis by Sissela Bok (1978). It should be noted that the existence of misrepresentation has been disputed by Arthur S. Hulnick (1992, p. 92) who writes: "The CIA does not lie to the press or to Congress."

4。Of course, classification is not the only way to withhold information. Other methods include destroying information or simply not mentioning sensitive issues in writing. Telecommunications obviously contribute to the latter form of suppressing information. A former CIA officer notes, in his memoirs, that the CIA does not record all of its activities with regard to highly sensitive operations, such as assassination plots (Stockwell 1979, p. 160n).

5。It should be noted that Rosenau (1968) provocatively argues that the term "national interest" is so vague that it is not very useful as a social science concept. However, for purposes of argument this essay will accept the contention of Krasner (1978), who argues that the national interest remains a valid concept.

6。However, Friedrich (1977, p. xiv) acknowledges that, in many cases, secrecy can also be dysfunctional and can exceed legitimate boundaries.

7。另外，可以说，公众甚至不想知道政府的秘密，因为其中许多可能令人不安。我感谢戈登·塔洛克（Gordon Tullock）提出了这种可能性。

8。It is interesting to note that a recent report on covert action by the Twentieth Century Fund (1992, p. 14) acknowledges that the public can be a target of secrecy: "Sometimes, covert action has been hidden only from Americans, not from our adversaries." The report does not elaborate on this observation and implies that such occurrences are unusual. Overall, the report endorses continued covert action, even after the end of the Cold War.

9.马克斯·韦伯（Max Weber，1949）指出，理想类型从定义上讲是单方面和夸张的模型。他认为，这样的夸张是社会科学询问的有效甚至至关重要的组成部分，只要夸大其词得到了研究人员的认可。

10.This was reported by National Security advisor Gordon Gray, who paraphrased the president's views (US Senate, 1975, p. 15).

11。请注意，自1965年他的政变以来，Mobutu（现称为Mobutu Sese Seko）一直担任Zaire的总裁。在撰写本文时，他仍在执政。

12。斯蒂芬·韦斯曼（Stephen Weissman）（1974，p。91）写道：“根据美国大使馆的一名成员，科迪尔（Cordier）在采取这一步骤[关闭机场]之前就咨询了Timberlake大使。”请注意，Gendebien（1967，p。76）提供了有关CIA可能参与此事件的信息。

13。John Ranelagh (1987, p. 344) defends the Senate report conclusions. Though he acknowledges that the CIA undoubtedly plotted an assassination, Ranelagh adds:

Lumumba was not assassinated through the efforts of the CIA or by the CIA's killers... He broke away from UN custody on November 27, determined to lead his supporters against Mobutu and the UN force. He was captured by Mobutu's troops three days later. On January 17, 1961, he was flown to Elisabethville, the capital of the secessionist Katanga province, and he was murdered (probably by Mobutu supporters) there within hours of his arrival.

14.At one point CIA headquarters sent a cable to the field, noting that the Agency was considering sending arms and supplies to anti-Lumumba factions; the cable specifically stated the State Department representatives should not be informed of these plans (US Senate, 1975, p. 18, n.1).

15.中央情报局局长杜勒斯电缆发送到域身份验证orizing action "to replace Lumumba with a pro-Western group" and noted that this policy had been '"seen and approved at competent level," by the State Department' (US Senate, 1975, p. 16). Weissman (1974, p. 89) also presents evidence that the US ambassador was involved in the covert operations.

16。这句话来自中央情报局军官布朗森·特威迪（Bronson Tweedy）。应当指出的是，参议院的调查发现了一些证据表明艾森豪威尔总统下令或至少知道暗杀努力，但是这一证据是矛盾和不确定的（美国参议院，1975年，第3章）。

17。应当指出的是，即使在1970年代的政府开放率上，中央情报局也从未特别出现。玛德琳·卡尔布（Madeleine Kalb）（1982，p。xv）撰写了她关于刚果危机的研究：“中央情报局……高度阻碍地。寻求其他信息的吸引力……产生的无限延误 - 最终所有电缆都被扣留了。发布的少数文件中没有任何信息The New York Times; and there were an astonishing number of completely blank pages." It should be noted that these remarks pertained to research Kalb conducted during the mid 1970s. Similarly Peter Wyden wrote of his experiences researching the Bay of Pigs incident: "The CIA bureaucracy... stonewalled and confirmed suspicion about itself by refusing to admit the time off the clock on the wall." This research was also conducted during the 1970s -- when government openness was at a historic high point (Wyden, 1979, p. 331).
还要注意,中央情报局一直保持unofficial files for especially sensitive operations, that do not officially exist and are thus permanently exempted from disclosure. According to former CIA officer John Stockwell (1978, p. 228n), "Since the Freedom of Information Act, the agency increasingly uses a system of 'soft,' 'unofficial,' or 'convenience' files for sensitive subjects... Such files are not registered in the agency's officials records system and hence can never be disclosed under FOIA [Freedom of Information Act]."

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_____________________________
DAVID N. GIBBS，b。1958年，是亚利桑那大学政治学助理教授，作者The Political Economy of Third World Intervention: Mines, Money, and US Policy in the Congo Crisis(University of Chicago Press, 1991). He is currently working on a revisionist account of UN peace-keeping operations.

*The author thanks the following persons for their comments: Thomas Ferguson, David Wilkins, Michael Sullivan, Diana Rix, Gordon Tullock, Michael Schaller, Thomas Chrisiano, Randolph Siverson, Edward Muller, Allen Whiting, William Dixon, Tim McKeown, Cary Nederman, and Kathleen Schwartzman.

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