国会记录：1999年6月7日（众议院）
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{}时间2030国家安全SPEAKER临时（威斯康星州的格林先生）。在议长的1999年1月6日宣布的政策，从宾夕法尼亚州绅士（韦尔登先生）是公认的60分钟作为多数党领袖的指派。宾夕法尼亚韦尔登先生。议长先生，我今晚上升谈谈我们的同事约我认为是要面对这个国家，肯定在这13年，我曾在本机构服务的荣誉最严重的问题之一。金博宝正规网址我来到我们的同事面前，议长先生，作为共和党的成员，但谁的人认为，国家安全问题超越党派政治。金博宝正规网址我感到非常自豪的是，议长先生，这两个时间我跑了我的家乡的市长我既是共和党和民主党双方的提名。其实我今天所享有显著支持民主党在宾夕法尼亚州我家小区回。在大会上，议长先生，我已经与国家安全问题的另一面的成员采取的工作感到非常自豪，我一直是第一个承认，许多斗争，我们在本机构已经赢得了对白宫的参与金博宝正规网址国家安全是只赢了，因为我们对民主党侧坚强领导的支持，以及共和党方面。我今天，议长先生给那些评论，因为我想专注于与周围考克斯委员会的辩论发生的事情，我是一个成员，已经提出向美国人民了解一个问题是需要得到的信息 to be thoroughly investigated. Mr. Speaker, it is my contention that when the administration got a preliminary view of the Cox Committee report in early January, in fact we gave it to the administration sometime around January 2nd or 3rd, they got a chance to see a document that nine of us, Democrats and Republicans, had worked on together for 7 months in a very nonpartisan way. We did not care where problems had occurred, in which administrations they were in. If we saw evidence of our security being harmed or potentially harmed, we laid the facts basically where they were. We did not attempt to spin them or distort them or attempt to have them be other than what they in fact were. We did that because we wanted to have the integrity of our report kept intact once it was completed. No member of the Cox Committee released any information to the media. We swore to ourselves that we would not in fact jeopardize our findings. We gave it to the White House the first week of January and we asked for a very quick response to assist us in making that report available in a declassified version so the American people and our colleagues could read it and talk about it. As we all know, that took 5 months. But what gave me the first indication that this report was going to be spun politically was about a month later, in February. In fact it was February the 1st. Sandy Berger, the National Security Adviser to the White House, issued a statement that I have a copy of to selective members of the Washington media, responding to the 38 recommendations that we made in our Cox Committee report that were still classified. Without asking any member of the Cox Commission, Sandy Berger released the White House's spin in response to those recommendations. Two days after he released that spin, I had the occasion of asking the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, in a closed National Security Committee hearing in front of 40 Members from both parties if he agreed as the head of the CIA with our findings that our security had been harmed. Now, Mr. Speaker, this was 2 days after Sandy Berger released public information about our still classified report. George Tenet said, ``Congressman, we at the CIA haven't finished reading the document yet.'' Which meant, Mr. Speaker, that the White House, before the CIA had even completed reading our report, was spinning it publicly to try to deflect attention away from the White House and any responsibility of this administration. That is not what the nine members of the Cox Committee did and that is not the approach we used. We did not spin anything. Yet that was my first inclination that this White House was not going to deal in an honorable way with the findings and the conclusions that we drew from our extensive research into the results of the transfer of technology both legally and illegally to China. Mr. Speaker, that spin continues today. Since the report was released some 2 weeks ago, the administration has sent Bill Richardson, a friend of mine whom I served with in this body, out a road show traveling around the country convincing the American people that the only issue in the Cox report is Chinese espionage, the stealing of our W-88 nuclear warhead design, the stealing of our nuclear design technology. And the reason why the White House has wanted to spin the Cox Commission report in this way is because they can point to this stuff to having occurred before the Clinton administration took office. So what Richardson has been saying publicly, on national TV shows, on the talk shows on Sunday mornings is, ``Look, when this administration in 1995 found out that China had stolen some of our designs, prior to us coming into office, we took aggressive steps to stop it. These problems didn't happen under the Clinton administration. They happened under previous administrations.'' I am here tonight, Mr. Speaker, to challenge that notion and to offer to debate Secretary Richardson anytime anyplace in a public format on the issues that I am about to unveil. First of all, Mr. Speaker, even though the Cox Committee report did not just focus on the nuclear laboratories and their security, let us talk about the labs for a few moments, because if you listen to Secretary Bill Richardson traveling around the country, he would have us believe that the only problems with the labs were problems that started under previous administrations which he has now cleaned up. That is hogwash, Mr. Speaker. Let us look at the facts. Mr. Speaker, it was in 1993 and 1994 when Hazel O'Leary was appointed to be the Secretary of Energy by President Bill Clinton that she decided that the color-coded ID system used in our Department of Energy labs which said based upon the color of the chain and the ID that you wore around your neck, you would only be allowed access to certain parts of our laboratories. It was the way that we kept people out of illegally accessing information that they did not have the proper clearance for. When Hazel O'Leary came into office, this long established practice that had been under previous administrations, Republican and Democrat, was overturned because she thought that color- coding was discriminatory. So what happened, Mr. Speaker, was in 1993 and 1994, the Clinton administration did away with that identification process which made it almost impossible for the lab directors and others to know whether or not a person was in a correct area of a lab gathering information and access to data that they should not have had. Now, Mr. Speaker, if that was a good decision back in 1993 and 1994 which maybe the President would say was the case, why then did this administration 2 weeks ago move to reinstate the policy that Hazel O'Leary did away with in 1993 and 1994? If it was good back in [[Page H3753]] 1993 and 1994 and if the color-coded ID system was not necessary, why did they all of a sudden 2 weeks ago tell the labs, ``You're now going to put back into place a color-coded ID system'' at a tremendous cost to taxpayers. That was under this administration, Mr. Speaker. Number two, it was this administration and Hazel O'Leary who decided that FBI background checks, which had been the case under previous administrations, before people could gain access to our labs, that FBI background checks had to be done so that we could determine whether or not those people were spies or whether or not they were appropriately entitled to have access to classified information. Again it was Secretary O'Leary, Bill Clinton's appointee, who in 1993 and 1994 put a hold in at least two of our labs on FBI background checks, allowing scores of people to get access to our labs, not just Chinese or Asian nationals but a whole host of people because they were not being required to have FBI background checks. Number three, Mr. Speaker. It was in the 1993-1994 time frame when an employee of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory who had retired was accused of releasing sensitive and classified information in a public setting. The Oakland office of the Department of Energy did an investigation of that employee and they found out, and in fact accused him of violating the requirements of security at our labs. What did they do? They penalized that retiree by removing the access he had to classified information even as a retiree. They took the appropriate steps. What did Hazel O'Leary do, Mr. Speaker? When that removal of that retiree's classified status was undertaken and when he appealed it, all the way up to the Secretary's office, Secretary O'Leary overruled the Oakland office of the Department of Energy and reinstated the employee's classification status. Every employee in every laboratory in America saw the signal being sent by this administration, ``We don't need color-coded IDs, we don't need to have FBI background checks, and when employees give out classified information, we're not going to consider that a major issue.'' One more point, Mr. Speaker. And you do not hear Bill Richardson talking about these facts, but I am offering to debate him here tonight, anytime, anyplace. Mr. Richardson says that when this administration found out, in 1995, that the Chinese had stolen the designs to one of our most sophisticated warheads, the W-88 and the W- 87, that they immediately took action, they began a process of closing in on the security, and he said that began in 1995. Mr. Speaker, I want to call particular attention to my colleagues and to the American people this two-page spread that was in the July 31st, 1995 issue of U.S. News and World Report entitled ``Shockwave'' documenting the annihilation and destruction that would be caused by a nuclear attack or a nuclear bomb going off. In this document, Mr. Speaker, is an illustration of the W-87 warhead. Mr. Speaker, in 1995, this was classified. Mr. Speaker, this administration, in 1995, leaked this document to U.S. News and World Report, giving the entire populace of the world, through U.S. News and World Report, access to the design of the W-87 nuclear warhead, the same year that Bill Richardson is saying they were putting the clamps on the control of our technology. But it does not stop there, Mr. Speaker. Because when this occurred, the Department of Energy began an internal investigation as to who would have leaked this design of this W-87 nuclear warhead, who would have given this information out to a national magazine. Mr. Speaker, I have the name of the person that was conducting that investigation, and I have been told that he was told to stop the investigation because they knew where it was going to lead to, that it was Hazel O'Leary herself who gave U.S. News and World Report the actual diagram of the W-87 nuclear warhead in 1995. Yet Secretary Richardson, on the Sunday morning news shows, is saying, ``We have taken the steps to close these gaps.'' Mr. Speaker, I am today asking for a full investigation as to whether or not the Department of Energy did such an internal investigation and I want to know whether or not the individual who was overseeing this was told by his superiors not to pursue finding out who leaked this information in 1995. And, Mr. Speaker, if this administration was so intent on controlling access to these kinds of secrets, then they would surely be able to give us the answers to the questions I am posing tonight. Who did the investigation, and who did they find out leaked this particular diagram to U.S. News and World Report in 1995? It was not the Reagan administration, Mr. Speaker, and it was not the Bush administration. It was this administration. Mr. Speaker, the comments of Bill Richardson around the country are hollow, they are shallow, and they are nothing more than political rhetoric being spun to deflect attention away from one of the most gravest issues that has confronted this Nation in this century, and, that is, the overall loss of our technology, in many cases where we relaxed standards to allow people to take information or where we lowered the thresholds to give people information. Today we have the Secretary telling us that our labs are secure. I can tell you right now, Mr. Speaker, there are no controls on e-mails that are being sent out of our labs at this very moment. They will tell you they have a software system that looks for keywords, that if an e-mail is sent to Beijing or some other city and a keyword is in that e-mail, it raises a flag and that person then will be investigated. Raising a flag after the e-mail leaves the laboratory does us no good, Mr. Speaker. {time} 2045 So for Richardson to say that secure measures are in place today is wrong, it is factually wrong, it is not correct, and he needs to be honest with the American people. Secondarily, Mr. Speaker, we have just learned that later on this year China will be testing the newest version of their long-range ICBM missile with a range of 13,000 kilometers that can be launched from a submarine that has the potential for a MIRV or a multiple reentry capability. This rocket, this long-range ICBM, the JL-2, is beyond anything they have had in the past, and it is almost a replica of the trident class ICBMs that we have used in this Nation. We did not think China would have this capability until several years down the road. We now have word they will test that missile, that ICBM, this year. Mr. Speaker, this is a very serious issue. The American people need to understand what is happening to their country. They need to understand the blame game cannot stop by firing lower level employees who are only following directions. The blame game cannot stop by saying it was industries' fault. Industry was only abiding by the rules set by this government, and they cannot blame Chinese or Asian Americans, many of whom are some of our finest citizens. It was this government and this administration that failed the American people, and the American people need to see the factual information. With that in mind, Mr. Speaker, the following two charts are now available on my web site nationally: The first chart, Mr. Speaker, for the first time ever gives the complete linkage between those agencies and entities of the Peoples Liberation Army and the Central Military Commission of the PLA which are all indicated by the red boxes, and you cannot read them, our colleagues cannot read them, but you can get this off of our web site, and I have offered to give copies of this chart in a smaller form to every Member of Congress regardless of party. The red boxes indicate Chinese arms of the PLA. The green boxes, Mr. Speaker, which are again too small to read, are the financing entities that were established to finance the acquisition of technologies for the arms of the PLA and the Central Military Commission. They would identify the technology, and the green financing entities would then finance the purchase of that. How would they finance the purchase of it? Through the blue boxes or the front companies. Literally hundreds of front companies were established in this country, in Hong Kong, in Macao, all over the world, whose sole purpose it was, was to acquire western and American technology. [[Page H3754]] Mr. Speaker, in this chart our colleagues and the American people can read for themselves who all of these players are and who all of these characters and all these organizations are, but there is something new here, Mr. Speaker: For the first time that I am aware of each of these boxes are interconnected with solid and dotted lines. The solid lines indicate direct working relationships between financing entities, PLA organizations and Chinese front companies. The dotted lines indicate working relationships. I am asking now to enter in the Record, Mr. Speaker, a document I entitled sources and references: Sources and References (1a) Chan, Christine. ``More J&A Securities Staff Quizzed.'' Hong Kong South China Morning Post, July 16, 1998: p a11. Article in Hong Kong South China Morning Post which cites corporation chairman Zhang Guoqing and corporation president Yang Jun as under investigation in connection with their activities at the People's Liberation Army-backed J&A Securities. (1b) J&A Securities (Hong Kong) Limited. Company Ordinance Increasing Share Capital and Creating Additional Shares. Company Reference No. 433562. June 8, 1995. Various company ordinances increasing capital, creating shares, and providing board information for the J&A corporation signed by Zhang Guoqing on behalf of the corporation. (1c) J&A Securities (Hong Kong) Limited. 1997 Brief: Introduction to J&A Securities Limited. 1997. J&A Securities Limited company brochure for 1997 which lists corporation officer and board members. (1d) J&A Securities (Hong Kong) Limited. Company Ordinances Appoint Directors and Officers and for Other Purposes. Company Reference No. 433562. December 21, 1993 through August 18, 1994. Various company ordinances changing the name, appointing directors and officers, and providing board information for the J&A corporation. (1e) J&A Securities (Hong Kong) Limited. Company ordinances Appoint Directors and Officers and for Other Purposes. Company Reference No. 433562. February 14, 1996 through July 18, 1997. Various company ordinances appointing directors and providing board information. (1f) J&A Securities (Hong Kong) Limited. Mortgage and Charge Details. Company Reference No. 433562. April 1, 1998. Documents that detail loans and other incomes from The China State Bank, The Standard Chartered Bank. Documents also certify relationships with additional companies. (2) Laris, Michael. ``Chinese Executive Defend Loral's Role; Undue Missile Aid by U.S. Firm Denied,'' The Washington Post. June 22, 1998: p a17. Article in The Washington Post that identifies a Hong Kong businessman `Zhang' (Zhang Quoqing) as the source of $300,000 given to Johnny Chung. (3) Rempel, William C.; et. al. ``Testimony Links Top China Official, Funds For Clinton.'' The Los Angeles Times. April 4, 1999: p a1. Article in the Los Angeles Times that details the link between a Chinese intelligence official, Johnny Chung, $300,000 intended for the Clinton campaign. (4) ``General's Daughter In Probe.'' Agence France-Presse Wire. Clips from a French Newswire with citations from the South China Morning Post which cites the link between Liu Chao Ying (Daughter of China's Top General and Aerospace Official), Johnny Chung, and executives from Hong Kong and Chinese companies. (5) Chin, Michelle. ``Lippo Fund to Focus on Chain Stores.'' South China Morning Post. July 13, 1995: p 3. Article that cites the directors of the Lippo Fund and lists the China Aerospace International Holdings corp as partner in the fund. (6) Pusat Data Business Indonesia. Conglomeration Indonesia, 2nd edition. Jakarta, Indonesia. Pusat Data Business Indonesia. 1995. Company and shareholder information from a standard business reference work on nice conglomerates run by individuals with links to the Chinese government. (7) Kelly, Michael. ``TRB: CITIC-VIP.'' The New Republic. January 6, 1999. Article which links numerous high-profile Chinese government operatives who met with Clinton through Johnny Chung. (8) Liu, Melinda. ``The Portrait of a Hustler.'' Newsweek. March 31, 1997: p 36. Article in Newsweek that cites Johnny Chung's connection to the White House and the First Family. (9) Partial citation and timeline of activity at Marswell Investments Limited. Document which describes the directors and officers at various Hong Kong `Front' companies. (10) Translation Section of the U.S. Consulate General in Hong Kong. `` `Princeling' Influence Within PLA Said Growing.'' Hong Kong Guo Jih Pao. December 9, 1996. Serial: HK3012054596. Article translated from Hong Kong newspaper by FBIS which details the link between the PLA and CITIC. (11) The Washington Post Company. ``Campaign Finance Key Player: Wang Jun.'' Www.washingtonpost.com. January 6, 1999. Washington Post website profile on Wang Jun, chairman of an arms trading company and White House coffee attendee. (12) The Washington Post Company. ``Campaign Finance Key Player: Ng Lap Seng.'' Www.washingtonpost.com. January 6, 1999. Washington Post website profile on Ng Lap Seng, chairman of a Chinese financial conglomerate and DNC doner. (13) Summary of documentation on China Aerospace International Holdings Limited (CASIL). An analysis of CASIL background and its involvement with the satellite business and a citing of key figures. (14) Dun & Bradstreet. ``Ever-Victory System Engrg.'' Worldbase. April 25, 1997: p. 48. Business citation that establishes the link between Asia-Pacific Satellite and China Aerospace International Holdings, Ltd. (15) The United States Department of State. ``Sasser Writes Home About the Chinese Army.'' United States Department of State. October 1, 1998. A report from the U.S. Ambassador to China on the PLA and their plans to develop communications networks with private companies. (16) Lim, Wah Dr., et. al., ``Independent Review Committee Report on the LM-38B Launch Failure.'' Palo Alto, California. Space Systems/Loral. May 10, 1996. A report initiated by the Loral Company to evaluate the cause of failure for a Chinese Space Launch Vehicle. (17) Diamond, John. ``U.S. Probes Hughes, Chinese General's Son, in Satellite Export Deal.'' The Associated Press. July 3, 1998. AP wire article. (18) The Washington Post Company. ``Campaign Finance Key Player: Maria Hsia.'' Www.washingtonpost.com January 6, 1999. Washington Post website profile on Maria Hsia, Veteran Democrat fund-raiser indicted on money laundering charges in connection with an event attended by Vice President Gore. (19) Suro, Robert. ``Gore's Ties to Hsia Cast Shadow on 2000 Race.'' The Washington Post. February 23, 1998: p a1. A Washington Post article that details the link between Maria Hsia and Vice President Gore. (20) Reed Business Information Limited. ``The Bank of East Asia Limited.'' The Bankers Almanac. Reed Business Information Limited. 1998. Standard business reference material on the Bank of East Asia including profile and personnel information. (21) Sun, Lena H.; Pomfret, John. ``The Curious Cast of Asian Donors.'' The Washington Post. January 27, 1997: p a1. A Washington Post article on the Clinton connection to Asian Donors. (22) China Charity Federation. ``Founders of China Charity Federation and Permanent Members to the Executive Council.''
一九九九年一月六日。将香港上海汇丰银行与银信控股联系起来的宣传材料。（23）梁晓琪和马建兴``在争夺霸权的斗争中，命运发生了重大逆转，韦小宝陷入了困境。1998年2月20日：第38-42页。香港报纸上关于中共官员和黑社会联系的文章。（24）同前刘美玲。（25）休斯公司``从1996年1月1日开始的中国项目。指定中国境内项目的公司内部文件。（26）格思，杰夫和戈尔登，蒂姆``《纽约时报》称，中国向美国一家银行注资，怀疑慢慢上升。一九九九年五月十二日：a1页。《纽约时报》一篇关于中国银行汇往美国的钱的文章。Speaker先生，这份4页的文件给出了28份具体的非机密文件或26份非机密文件，这些文件在这张图表上进行了研究，提供了所有的联系，因此非机密形式的美国人民可以第一次看到所有这些文件是如何联系在一起的，我鼓励我们的每一位同事和全国各地的每一个人打开这个网站，访问这个网站，然后访问这些非机密文件，我会对我们的同事说，‘如果你找不到，我办公室里有这些文件的主副本。事实上，我有几本母版。我会给你这些文件中你找不到的任何一份的副本。”“议长先生，我可以告诉你，这只是表面上的。在我们的一次众议院听证会上，我们的一位同事问FBI，当他们对这些联系进行调查时，他们所知道的有多少是公开的，包括所有的报告、所有的调查，FBI和CIA所知道的有多少是公开的，答案是：不到1%。因此，尽管如此广泛，正如有文件记载的那样，我们对联邦调查局和中央情报局关于解放军前线组织、前线公司和融资机制之间的联系的公开了解不到1%，议长先生，我们必须问的底线问题是：是什么导致了这种情况？导致这些交易发生的润滑脂是什么？是什么导致这些扩散控制被降低？是什么导致这些访问发生的？这就是我的第二张图表，议长先生，这是时间线。发言人先生，我所知的这张图表第一次详细分析了自1993年以来这个国家发生的事情。现在，我在另一边的同事会说，‘好吧，等一下，库尔特。你选择了1993年。你是在搞党派斗争，因为那是克林顿上台的时候。我选择1993年是因为发生了两件事。议长先生，直到1993年，在民主党和共和党总统的领导下，都有一个程序来控制像美国这样的国家的技术，将其发送到我们认为是三级国家的国家，或者不允许或不应该拥有非常有能力的技术的国家，这些国家可能会回来伤害我们。这个过程被称为COCON。COCON是一个由盟国、美国和日本组成的国际组织，定期举行会议，他们共同决定允许向哪些国家出售什么样的技术以及可以向哪些国家出售。1993年，在没有任何其他国家，法国、英国、日本或其他任何国家的事先批准的情况下，本届政府结束了COCON，结束了COCON，大门打开了。现在，他们达成了一项被称为瓦萨纳协议的协议，每个人都承认这是一个彻底的失败，但科康成功了。1993年，COCON结束，闸门打开。议长先生，那一年发生了另一件事。议长先生，我想把白宫1993年9月15日写给比尔·克林顿（Bill Clinton）硅图形公司首席执行官爱德华·麦克拉肯（Edward McCracken）的一封信记录在案。议长先生，每个美国人都需要读这封信，因为这封信是美国总统1993年9月15日寄来的，他把信寄给了谁？他最大的贡献者之一，也是支持他参选的人之一，爱德华·麦克拉肯，加利福尼亚州山景城硅图形公司首席执行官。白宫，华盛顿，1993年9月15日。亲爱的。Edward McCracken，加利福尼亚州山景城硅图形公司首席执行官。亲爱的Edward：感谢您周三抽出时间来吃午饭。很高兴见到你，也很高兴得到你的见解。我想向你们介绍一个我们午餐时无法讨论的话题的最新情况；出口管制问题。正如你们所知，一段时间以来，美国对我们许多最具竞争力的出口产品实施了严格的出口管制。据估计，不必要的出口管制会使美国公司蒙受损失ReportsReportsies $9 billion a year in lost sales. One reason I ran for President was to tailor export controls to the realities of a post-Cold War world. Let me be clear. We will continue to need strong controls to combat the growing threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and dangerous conventional weapons, as well as to send a strong signal to countries that support international terrorism. But we also need to make long overdue reforms to ensure that we do not unfairly and unnecessarily burden our important commercial interests. In that regard, I wanted you to know that we hope to announce some important reforms by September 30. As you may know, Commerce Secretary Ron Brown has been leading a process within the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee (IPCC) to examine how we might better promote U.S. exports. As part of that process, the National Security Council has led an effort to develop specific export control reforms. I hope to announce those when the TPCC issues its report on September 30. We have not yet finalized all of these reforms, because I want to be sure that they get a full interagency review. But I am optimistic that the steps we take will help liberalize controls on many of our most competitive exports, while protecting our important national security concerns. Let me give you a sense of the reform we are considering: Liberalize Computer and Telecommunications Controls. When this Administration began, the U.S. controlled any computer with a capacity above 12.9 MTOPs. My administration is in the process of raising that level to 67 MTOPs for most free world countries, relieving well over 13 billion of computer exports each year from the need for a license. By September 30, I hope to raise that level further--and also announce important liberalizations for telecommunications exports to most free world destinations. Reduce Processing Time. Delays in processing export control licenses is a burden on business--and a legitimate gripe against the Federal government. I hope to announce significant reductions in the time it takes the government to process export license applications. Expand Distribution Licenses. We hope to expand significantly the availability of distribution licenses for controlled computers so that exporters need not come back repeatedly to the Federal government for a license. Eliminate Unnecessary Unilateral Controls. Controls imposed only by the U.S. (and not by competitor countries) at times can put our exporters at an unfair disadvantage as competitor companies export like products freely. I expect to announce that, by December 31, my administration will identify and eliminate wherever possible unnecessary U.S. unilateral export control policies. I expect that these reforms will help liberalize controls on tens of billions of dollars worth of U.S. exports. It can help unleash our companies to compete successfully in the global market. These reforms fit into a broader framework. Soon we will complete our review of nonproliferation and export control policy, which will set guidelines for further steps we should take. I am also currently engaged in seeking major reforms to COCOM, which should lead to significant liberalization of controls on computers, telecommunications and machine tools, while establishing a more effective structure for addressing the changing national security threats we will face in the years ahead. Let me assure you that I am personally committed to developing a more intelligent export control policy, one that prevents dangerous technologies from falling into the wrong hands without unfairly burdening American commerce. It is important. It is the right thing to do. And many of these changes are long overdue. I look forward to working with you in building a new consensus around an effective exports control policy that meets these objectives. Sincerely, Bill Clinton. But what is the content of the letter, Mr. Speaker? The letter outlines the administration's plans to liberalize, liberalize the availability of technology to nations abroad. So here it is in black and white where the President is telling the CEO of Silicon Graphics this is what we are going to do for you over the next 6 years. Guess what, Mr. Speaker. They did it. What were some of the highlights? Let me read from the letter. Quote: Liberalize computer and telecommunication controls, reduce processing times, expand distribution licenses, eliminate unnecessary unilateral controls, and it goes into detail in describing. Now, Mr. Speaker, I am a free trader, and I believe in allowing our companies to compete. But what you had in 1993 was the wholesale opening of the flood gates. At the same time Hazel O'Leary is saying we do not have to worry about the people who work in our labs, they do not need color-coded IDs, they do not need to have FBI background checks, and when they give out classified information, we are going to ignore that and not worry about it. And, oh, by the way, US News, if you want this chart of the W-87, we will give it to you, and you can run it nationwide. Mr. Speaker, these stories need to be told across America. This time line from 1993 to 1999 shows every decision made by this administration that allowed a new technology to flow, in this case to China. It also shows activities of China in violation of arms control regimes. In fact, Mr. Speaker, I would ask at this time to insert Chronology of Chinese Weapons Related Transfers: [From the Los Angeles Times, May 21, 1998] Indignation Rings Shallow on Nuke Tests (By Curt Weldon) Escalating tensions between India and Pakistan should come as no surprise to the Clinton administration. Since the president took office, there have been dozens of reported transfers of sensitive military technology by Russia and China--in direct violation of numerous international arms control agreements--to a host of nations, including Pakistan and India. Yet the Clinton administration has repeatedly chosen to turn a blind eye to this proliferation of missile, chemical- biological and nuclear technology, consistently refusing to impose sanctions on violators. And in those handful of instances where sanctions were imposed, they usually were either quickly waived by the administration or allowed to expire. Rather than condemn India for current tensions, the blame for the political powder keg that has emerged in Asia should be laid squarely at the feet of President Clinton. It is his administration's inaction and refusal to enforce arms control agreements that have allowed the fuse to grow so short. In November 1992, the United States learned that China had transferred M-11 missiles to Pakistan. The Bush administration imposed sanctions for this violation but Clinton waived them a little more than 14 months later. Clearly, the sanctions did not have the desired effect: Reports during the first half of 1995 indicated that M-11 missiles, [[Page H3756]] additional M-11 missile parts, as well as 5,000 ring magnets for Pakistan nuclear enrichment programs were transferred from China. Despite these clear violations, no sanctions were imposed. And it gets worse. Not to be outdone by its sworn foe, India aggressively pursued similar technologies and obtained them, illicitly, from Russia. From 1991 to 1995, Russian entities transferred cryogenic liquid oxygen-hydrogen rocket engines and technology to India. While sanctions were imposed by President Bush in May 1992, the Clinton administration allowed them to expire after only two years. And in June 1993, evidence surfaced that additional Russian enterprises were involved in missile technology transfers to India. The administration imposed sanctions in June 1993, and then promptly waived them for a month, never following up on the issue. Meanwhile, Pakistan continued to aggressively pursue technology transfers from China. In August 1996, the capability to manufacture M-11 missile or missile components was transferred from China to Pakistan. No sanctions. In November 1996, a special industrial furnace and high-tech diagnostic equipment were transferred from China to an unprotected Pakistani nuclear facility. No sanctions. Also during 1996, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency issued a report stating that China had provided a ``tremendous variety'' of technology and assistance for Pakistan's ballistic missile program and was the principal supplier of nuclear equipment for Pakistan's program. Again, the Clinton administration refused to impose sanctions. Finally, in recent months we have learned that China may have been responsible for the transfer of technology for Pakistan's Ghauri medium-range ballistic missile. Flight tested on April 6, 1998, the Ghauri missile has been widely blamed as the impetus for India's decision to detonate five nuclear weapons in tests earlier this month. Again, no sanctions were imposed on China. Retracing the history of these instances of proliferation, it is obvious that Pakistan and India have been locked in an arms race since the beginning of the decade. And the race has been given repeated jump-starts by China and Russia, a clear violation of a number of arms control agreements. Yet rather than enforce these arms control agreements, the Clinton administration has repeatedly acquiesced, fearing that the imposition of sanctions could either strain relations with China and Russia or potentially hurt U.S. commercial interests in those countries. Now the Clinton administration has announced a get-tough policy, threatening to impose sanctions on India for testing its nuclear weapons. But what about Russia and China, the two nations that violated international arms agreements? Shouldn't they also be subject to U.S. sanctions for their role in this crisis? Sadly, the Clinton administration is likely to ignore the proliferators and impose sanctions solely on India. In the meantime, China and Russia will continue their proliferation of missile and nuclear technology to other nations, including rogue states such as Iran, Iraq and Syria. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Reported transfer by Administration's Date of transfer or report China Possible violation response ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Nov. 1992........................... M-11 missiles or MTCR; Arms Export sanctions imposed on related equipment to Control Act; Export Aug. 24, 1993, for Pakistan (The Administration Act. transfers of M-11 Administration did not related equipment (not officially confirm missiles); waived on reports that M-11 Nov. 1, 1994 missiles are in Pakistan.). Mid-1994 to mid-1995................ dozens or hundreds of MTCR; Iran-Iraq Arms no sanctions missile guidance Nonproliferation Act; systems and Arms Export Control computerized machine Act; Export tools to Iran. Administration Act. 2nd quarter of 1995................. parts for the M-11 MTCR; Arms Export no sanctions missile to Pakistan. Control Act; Export Administration Act. Dec. 1994 to mid-1995............... 5,000 ring magnets for NPT; Export-Import Bank considered sanctions an unsafeguarded Act; Nuclear under the Export-Import nuclear enrichment Proliferation Bank Act; but announced program in Pakistan. Prevention Act; Arms on May 10, 1996, that Export Control Act. no sanctions would be imposed July 1995........................... more than 30 M-11 MTCR; Arms Export no sanctions missiles stored in Control Act; Export crates at Sargodha Air Administration Act. Force Base in Pakistan. Sept. 1995.......................... calutron NPT; Nuclear no sanctions (electromagnetic Proliferation isotope separation Prevention Act; Export- system) for uranium Import Bank Act; Arms enrichment to Iran. Export Control Act. 1995-1997........................... C-802 anti-ship cruise Iran-Iraq Arms no sanctions missiles and C-801 air- Nonproliferation Act. launched cruise missiles to Iran. Before Feb. 1996.................... dual-use chemical Arms Export Control sanctions imposed on May precursors and Act; Export 21, 1997 equipment to Iran's Administration Act. chemical weapon program. Summer 1996......................... 400 tons of chemicals Iran-Iraq Arms no sanctions to Iran. Nonproliferation Act;\1\ Arms Export Control Act; Export Administration Act. Aug. 1996........................... plant to manufacture M- MTCR; Arms Export no sanctions 11 missiles or missile Control Act; Export components in Pakistan. Administration Act. Aug. 1996........................... gyroscopes, MTCR; Iran-Iraq Arms no sanctions accelerometers, and Nonproliferation Act; test equipment for Arms Export Control missile guidance to Act; Export Iran. Administration Act. Sept. 1996.......................... special industrial NPT; Nuclear no sanctions furnace and high-tech Proliferation diagnostic equipment Prevention Act; Export- to unsafeguarded Import Bank Act; Arms nuclear facilities in Export Control Act. Pakistan. July-Dec. 1996...................... Director of Central MTCR; Arms Export no sanctions Intelligence (DCI) Control Act; Export reported ``tremendous Administration Act. variety'' of technology and assistance for Pakistan's ballistic missile program. July-Dec. 1996...................... DCI reported MTCR; Iran-Iraq Arms no sanctions ``tremendous variety'' Nonproliferation Act; of assistance for Arms Export Control Iran's ballistic Act; Export missile program. Administration Act. July-Dec. 1996...................... DCI reported principal NPT; Nuclear no sanctions supplies of nuclear Proliferation equipment, material, Prevention Act; Export- and technology for Import Bank Act; Arms Pakistan's nuclear Export Administration weapon program. Act. July-Dec. 1996...................... DCI reported key NPT; Iran-Iraq Arms no sanctions supplies of technology Nonproliferation Act; for large nuclear Nuclear Proliferation projects in Iran. Prevention Act; Export- Import Bank Act; Arms Export Administration Act. July-Dec. 1996...................... DCI reported Iran-Iraq Arms no sanctions ``considerable'' Nonproliferation Act; chemical weapon- Arms Export Control related transfers of Act; Export production equipment Administration Act. and technology to Iran. Jan. 1997........................... dual-use biological BWC; Iran-Iraq Arms no sanctions items to Iran. Nonproliferation Act; Arms Export Control Act; Export Administration Act. 1997................................ chemical precursors, Iran-Iraq Arms no sanctions production equipment, Nonproliferation Act; and production Arms Export Control technology for Iran's Act; Export chemical weapon Administration Act. program, including a plant for making glass- lined equipment. Sept. to Dec. 1997.................. China Great Wall MTCR; Iran-Iraq Arms no sanctions Industry Corp. Nonproliferation Act; provided telemetry Arms Export Control equipment used in Act; Export flight-tests to Iran Administration Act. for its development of the Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 medium range ballistic missiles. Nov. 1997/April 1998................ may have transferred MTCR; Arms Export no sanctions technology for Control Act; Export Pakistan's Ghauri Administration Act. medium-range ballistic missile that was flight-tested on April 6, 1998. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Additional provisions on chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons were not enacted until February 10, 1996. ABWC--Biological Weapons Convention; MTCR--Missile Technology Control Regime; NPT--Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Mr. Speaker, this CRS document, which I had prepared a year ago, outlines approximately 17 cases where we caught the Chinese selling technology illegally. This administration knew about it, and it is all documented here. They imposed the required sanctions twice and waived them each time. All of those or most of those transfers are documented here. Something else is on this chart, Mr. Speaker: White House presidential visits. I could only complete it up through 1995, the number of times that key people involved in this massive scheme were able to get into the White House. Now, I can tell my colleagues my constituents cannot ever get in the White House. We cannot even get White House tour tickets which are available for schools because we only allow four a year. These are American schoolchildren. Let me read you, Mr. Speaker. John Huang; he visited the White House four times in March of 1993, four times in April of 1993, two times in May, one time in June, one time in November, all in 1993. Now my constituents cannot do that. Yet this White House opened the floodgates to welcome selected people in who were a part of this network, Mr. Speaker. In fact, Mr. Speaker, I am asking the House Clerks Office tonight to give me the price of what it would take to put this document in the Congressional Record. I am not going to put it in tonight until I get the price. What is this document, Mr. Speaker? These [[Page H3757]] are the FBI wiretap transcripts of conversations between Chung and Robert Lu, the FBI wire tapped transcripts that took place from May 6 of 1998 all the way through August of 98. In these transcripts in the words of these key players in this process, the American people, Mr. Speaker, for themselves can see what was going on and can read with their own eyes about the discussions that were taking place. Before I yield to my good friend, Mr. Speaker, I want to say what the rallying cry of this Member, and I would ask for, if I could, a price for that for the next day so I can decide whether or not to put it in the Congressional Record, but I would tell the American people it is available. It was given to me by Carl Cameron from Fox News. It is running nationwide, and I would encourage every American person, every colleague of mine, to read the transcripts contained in here of conversations as documented by the FBI. Mr. Speaker here is the real story: If this administration has nothing to hide, they can do one very simple thing: release the entire text of the memos sent by Louis Freeh and his subordinate investigator to Janet Reno requesting that a special prosecutor be named to handle this whole situation. If there is no other question we need to ask as Americans, for the next year and a half it is this one question because Louis Freeh, the head of the FBI, and his top investigator recommended Janet Reno, but because of all this data, and they have a lot more than I have shown my colleagues; in fact, I have seen a lot more as a member of the Cox Committee that I cannot put on here because it is classified. But they seen all of this data, the other 99 percent we cannot show, and they made their recommendations, and Janet Reno choose not to follow their recommendations. The American people are owed, owed an explanation as to why Janet Reno choose not to follow the advice of her chief law enforcement agent for this country. Every person in this country needs to send a card to the White House, every Member of Congress needs to ask the question why the White House will not release the FBI internal memos that Louie Freeh and his assistant sent to ask for a fully completed investigation of this network, of this operation, because that will tell us, Mr. Speaker, whether or not there were motives behind the transfer of technology that caused America's security harm, and that question needs to be asked by everyone in this country. Mr. Speaker, my hope is that all of our colleagues in this body and the other body will have literally tens of thousands of letter writing campaigns, post cards to the White House asking, and Janet Reno asking one simple question. This can be very confusing, and I do not expect the American public or even our colleagues to understand every nuance of what is explained here. It is very confusing, but they can ask one question: Why will you not release the Louis Freeh memos to Janet Reno in regard to the investigation of the connections between the PLA and the Central Military Commission, the Chinese front companies, the financing mechanisms including the donations of campaign funds to certain individuals to see whether or not there really was a tie and a connection in each of these cases? {time} 2100 That question needs to be answered more than any other single question that I can think of. Mr. Speaker, I would urge all of our colleagues to make that their rallying cry over the next year and a half. Mr. Speaker, I would like to yield to my good friend and colleague, the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Hayworth). Mr. HAYWORTH. Mr. Speaker, I would be remiss at the outset of my remarks if I did not publicly acknowledge a debt of gratitude to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon), who has been at the forefront of explaining to the American people and many of his colleagues in Congress the necessity, the imperative of a strategic missile defense, who has been among the leaders in understanding a prospective missile defense system, who has gone many times to the former Soviet Union, now the Russian Republic, to establish dialogue with the members of the Duma there, so, in the words of Dwight Eisenhower, once Americans and Russians get together they can understand what is at stake here. But more compellingly tonight, Mr. Speaker, our colleague at the outset of his remarks framed the question most appropriately and eloquently when he said, Mr. Speaker, this is a problem that does not confront us as Republicans or Democrats; this is a security concern for all Americans. Indeed, as the gentleman points out, the inadequate, shallow and incomplete responses of our former colleague from New Mexico, Mr. Richardson, now the Secretary of Energy; as he points out the misguided, to say the least, efforts, if you will, of former Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary; as he points out the curious selective investigations by this Justice Department and Attorney General Reno, as he offers, and, Mr. Speaker, I will move with my staff to make available on my web site as well the China connection that my colleague from Pennsylvania has remarkably put together and the time-line that he also offers. This is something that should concern every American, for what we have seen, Mr. Speaker, is a quantum leap in technological prowess by the Communist Chinese, with our know-how, with our expertise. Indeed, I would just say to my friend from Pennsylvania, whatever price it might cost to include those transcripts of the FBI wiretaps in the Congressional Record, it is a small price to pay on behalf of the American people to understand the width and breadth of this scandal. ``Scandal'' is an overused term, we have seen so many, and yet, again, we have this remarkable, troubling, dangerous development in our national security. I have said before, Mr. Speaker, this is as if we are in an Allan Drury novel come to life. But you cannot close the book on this. This is a problem of incredible magnitude that goes to the security of every family. Mr. Speaker, as the President of the United States stood at the podium just in front of the Speaker's Chair and in a State of the Union message bragged that no American child went to sleep a target of Russian missiles, how sad it is that now the Communist Chinese have the technology and have aimed their missiles at America, to the extent that we had the Chinese defense minister in defending a provocative action against Taiwan say, ``Oh, we believe you,'' meaning the United States, ``value Los Angeles more than you do Taiwan.'' The bellicose nature of the threats and, more than rhetoric, the reality of the technology transfer, is inexcusable, and we, not as Republicans nor as Democrats, but as Americans, need to follow the lead of my colleague from Pennsylvania and get to the bottom of this, because it is an outrage. As my colleague from Pennsylvania pointed out, it does not only concern former Energy Secretary O'Leary; it does not only concern Attorney General Reno; it does not only concern the spin offered by our former colleague, current Energy Secretary Mr. Richardson; it goes all the way to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. U.S. News & World Report put that document in, as shocking as that was. I wonder, Mr. Speaker, how many of the American people have seen the videotapes of the Communist Chinese leaders who contributed to the Clinton-Gore campaign in 1996 in the Oval Office? People who are part of these front groups. Mr. Speaker, we do not have too many ducks on the lakes in Arizona, but if it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, Mr. Speaker, a preponderance of the evidence seems to indicate that it is in fact a duck. What we have here is a serious problem. I would also note the outrageous and curious behavior of our so- called National Security Adviser, Mr. Sandy Berger, a former lobbyist for the Communist Chinese on trade issues. In April of 1996 we know for certain that he was informed of the Chinese penetration of our labs in Los Alamos, and apparently he did nothing. Interestingly enough, Mr. Speaker, April of 1996, that was when Vice President Gore went to Southern California for his campaign fund- raiser, what he [[Page H3758]] first described as a community outreach event at the Buddhist temple in Southern California. The American people have simple questions that need to be answered. Are we safe? Are those who took the oath of office to uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States and thereby provide for the common defense in fact being good stewards and good custodians of that trust? As my colleague from Pennsylvania eloquently and substantively explains tonight, that is a serious question for which there may be troubling answers. Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. I thank my colleague for joining me. I would like to stay here and engage the gentleman, but I am supposed to do a TV shot, so, unfortunately, I have to yield back my time. But I would like to thank the gentleman for coming over and joining me. ____________________